The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Ah, you have eyes but cannot see.

No-one is blinder than he who will not see.

In the origin of God thread I showed the self contradictory nature of your position on sin as backed up by Jesus' words in Matt 6:9. You had nothing to say because you knew you had nowhere to go , and then predictably you left the thread , as you usually do when you know you are boxed into a corner.

You CHOOSE not to see and then make up some rationalisation to cover your retreat.

Originally posted by knightmeister
No-one is blinder than he who will not see.

In the origin of God thread I showed the self contradictory nature of your position on sin as backed up by Jesus' words in Matt 6:9. You had nothing to say because you knew you had nowhere to go , and then predictably you left the thread , as you usually do when you know you are boxed into a corner.

You CHOOSE not to see and then make up some rationalisation to cover your retreat.

The ravings of the lunatic stalker continue....more's the pity.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
It's not about individual humans.

I took #2 to be referring to humankind as a whole. Either humans, on the whole, are "reliable cognitive agents" or they aren't.

I also took it as saying that the odds of the process of evolution of producing "reliable cognitive agents" as being extremely low.

As such, the "group" is all possible planets with lif ...[text shortened]... g on whether or not they were produced on this planet.

Hope this is clearer.

Yes thanks for clarifying, I think that makes sense.

I think we agree that Plantinga's argument is implausible but have a slightly different emphasis as to the main problem with it.

You think that there is enough evidence to show that even if the probability of evolution producing reliable cognitive agents is low, we as a species are the lottery winners. I think that's reasonable too.

I think that 2) is flawed from the outset because I don't think the argument supporting it works when our cognition is considered in the context of the diversity of problems we need to solve in order to survive.

Perhaps an argument combining both points is best.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Yes thanks for clarifying, I think that makes sense.

I think we agree that Plantinga's argument is implausible but have a slightly different emphasis as to the main problem with it.

You think that there is enough evidence to show that even if the probability of evolution producing reliable cognitive agents is low, we as a species are the lottery wi ...[text shortened]... s we need to solve in order to survive.

Perhaps an argument combining both points is best.

Perhaps an argument combining both would be best as you said, though the assertion that a probability for a group affects the actual attribute for a given member seems ridiculously flawed. A given member's attribute is what it is, regardless of how few other members of the group share that attribute - in this case being "reliable cognitive agents".

Originally posted by Lord Shark
I think we agree that Plantinga's argument is implausible but have a slightly different emphasis as to the main problem with it.

Nearly every piece of the original post is flawed in some way, sometimes on multiple levels. I was actually shocked that epiphinehas who normally seems quite intelligent would post such an argument in the first place.

Perhaps an argument combining both points is best.
As pointed out by ThinkOfOne, showing a higher probability would serve to show that the person who formulated the argument was in error on that point, but it should in no way affect our judgement of our cognitive ability.
To give an analogy of the original argument:
The probability that humanoid forms would evolve on earth via evolution is extremely low (I think most scientists would agree on this). Do we then conclude that we don't have humanoid forms?

Originally posted by twhitehead
Nearly every piece of the original post is flawed in some way, sometimes on multiple levels. I was actually shocked that epiphinehas who normally seems quite intelligent would post such an argument in the first place.

[b]Perhaps an argument combining both points is best.
As pointed out by ThinkOfOne, showing a higher probability would serve to sho ...[text shortened]... nk most scientists would agree on this). Do we then conclude that we don't have humanoid forms?[/b]

Nearly every piece of the original post is flawed in some way, sometimes on multiple levels. I was actually shocked that epiphinehas who normally seems quite intelligent would post such an argument in the first place.

The EAAN is a solid argument, IMO. I think your misunderstanding of it has caused you to conclude, mistakenly, that it is rather weak. Alvin Plantinga, a respected philosopher, has gone to great lengths crafting the EAAN and many philosophers have taken turns responding to it. Whole books have been devoted to this argument. Plantinga, as far as I am aware, has successfully answered all their charges in one publication or another. The debate is certainly ongoing, but I don't think anyone familiar with the argument in detail thinks it is easily brushed aside.

The probability that humanoid forms would evolve on earth via evolution is extremely low (I think most scientists would agree on this). Do we then conclude that we don't have humanoid forms?

The argument is stating that there is no way to be sure that we've inherited an accurate cognitive apparatus through the process of random mutation and natural selection, since it is equally probable that false beliefs may have given rise to successful adaptive behavior as true beliefs. Therefore, your analogy, as well as ThinkOfOne's lottery analogy, misses the point, since having successfully adapted to our environment in itself gives no assurance that we've inherited an accurate cognitive apparatus.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Nearly every piece of the original post is flawed in some way, sometimes on multiple levels. I was actually shocked that epiphinehas who normally seems quite intelligent would post such an argument in the first place.

The EAAN is a solid argument, IMO. I think your misunderstanding of it has caused you to conclude, mistakenly, that it is rathe ...[text shortened]... ironment in itself gives no assurance that we've inherited an accurate cognitive apparatus.[/b]

Almost as though the question of veracity (or, better, truth) is what's really in play.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Perhaps an argument combining both would be best as you said, though the assertion that a probability for a group affects the actual attribute for a given member seems ridiculously flawed. A given member's attribute is what it is, regardless of how few other members of the group share that attribute - in this case being "reliable cognitive agents".

Epiphinas says above that you have missed the point of the Plantinga argument and this reply to me leads me to suspect that this is correct.

Firstly, at no stage did I argue that the a posteriori attributes of an individual are affected by probabilities relating to the group of which they are a member. That would be absurd. However, if we want to top that for absurdity, we could argue that our knowledge that Jones is a cat in no way affects our assessment of the probability that Jones will get a job at CERN. Clearly you wouldn't want to argue that.

Now I think the essence of Plantinga's argument is exactly as epiphinas has captured it: the only non circular justification for our efficacy as cognitive agents is pragmatic. In other words, must be reasoning ok about the world because we don't bump into stuff, our planes don't fall out of the sky, our computers work, and so on. But the validity of this justification is precisely what Plantinga denies. This is what you haven't addressed in my view.

That is why my focus was on the flaw in 2) because this explicitly undermines Plantinga's objection to our justification on pragmatic grounds that we are capable cognitive agents.

That's why i think a combined argument works best.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Nearly every piece of the original post is flawed in some way, sometimes on multiple levels. I was actually shocked that epiphinehas who normally seems quite intelligent would post such an argument in the first place.

[b]Perhaps an argument combining both points is best.
As pointed out by ThinkOfOne, showing a higher probability would serve to sho ...[text shortened]... nk most scientists would agree on this). Do we then conclude that we don't have humanoid forms?[/b]

Originally posted by twhitehead
The probability that humanoid forms would evolve on earth via evolution is extremely low (I think most scientists would agree on this). Do we then conclude that we don't have humanoid forms?
I suspect that you have missed the point of the Plantinga argument in the same way as Thinkofone has.

Plantinga is not arguing that the probability that evolution could produce intelligent creatures like us is low therefore we must be dim. That argument would fall to the criticisms you have both offered.

No, Plantinga is arguing something more like the following. Given a species that is intelligent and given a naturalist account of its origin, the probability that the species (and hence any individual member of it in the cat-at-CERN sense) is cognitively reliable is vanishingly small.

That's why you have to highlight the flaw in 2) in my view.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Epiphinas says above that you have missed the point of the Plantinga argument and this reply to me leads me to suspect that this is correct.

Firstly, at no stage did I argue that the a posteriori attributes of an individual are affected by probabilities relating to the group of which they are a member. That would be absurd. However, if we want to top t ...[text shortened]... at we are capable cognitive agents.

That's why i think a combined argument works best.

That is why my focus was on the flaw in 2) because this explicitly undermines Plantinga's objection to our justification on pragmatic grounds that we are capable cognitive agents.

I think you are correct, (2) is the proper place to start chipping away at Plantinga's argument. The relevant literature seems to indicate this, as both sides focus most of their attention on it.

I'm curious whether your particular objection has been raised already. I'll get back to you when I find out.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]That is why my focus was on the flaw in 2) because this explicitly undermines Plantinga's objection to our justification on pragmatic grounds that we are capable cognitive agents.

I think you are correct, (2) is the proper place to start chipping away at Plantinga's argument. The relevant literature seems to indicate this, as both sides focus ...[text shortened]... er your particular objection has been raised already. I'll get back to you when I find out.[/b]

Thanks.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Epiphinas says above that you have missed the point of the Plantinga argument and this reply to me leads me to suspect that this is correct.

Firstly, at no stage did I argue that the a posteriori attributes of an individual are affected by probabilities relating to the group of which they are a member. That would be absurd. However, if we want to top t at we are capable cognitive agents.

That's why i think a combined argument works best.

Firstly, at no stage did I argue that the a posteriori attributes of an individual are affected by probabilities relating to the group of which they are a member.

I never meant to imply you did.

However, if we want to top that for absurdity, we could argue that our knowledge that Jones is a cat in no way affects our assessment of the probability that Jones will get a job at CERN. Clearly you wouldn't want to argue that.

Well, if Jones has the requisite qualifications, such as a PhD in physics from an elite university, then I like its chances. If not, not so much. The point being that if you have a specific "member" in hand, it should be assessed on its specific merits rather than whatever probabilities may have been assigned to its “group”.

Now I think the essence of Plantinga's argument is exactly as epiphinas has captured it: the only non circular justification for our efficacy as cognitive agents is pragmatic. In other words, must be reasoning ok about the world because we don't bump into stuff, our planes don't fall out of the sky, our computers work, and so on. But the validity of this justification is precisely what Plantinga denies. This is what you haven't addressed in my view.

That is why my focus was on the flaw in 2) because this explicitly undermines Plantinga's objection to our justification on pragmatic grounds that we are capable cognitive agents.

Seems like any “I believe humans are in fact ‘reliable cognitive agents’ by evidence of x, y and z” argument would run into the argument that humans can not reliably assess if they are “reliable cognitive agents” because of the “probability” assertion. Setting aside the fact that any such “probability” would also be the product of an “[un]reliable cognitive agent”, I have addressed this by asserting that the attributes of a specific "member" in hand should be assessed on its specific merits rather than whatever probabilities may have been assigned to its “group”, i.e., that the “probability” assertion itself is improper.

Let’s try a different tack:
Built into P's argument is the assumption that “naturalism is true” as set in 1).

P concludes his argument by asserting that “to the extent that the naturalist is rational, they will give up their belief in naturalism” in 5).

The net assertion is that in a world where naturalism is true, it would be rational for the naturalist to give up his belief in that which is true, i.e. naturalism.

Something is clearly wrong here.

Another result of there being are no “reliable cognitive agents” would be that no beliefs, not only that of naturalism, could reasonably be held.

From what I've seen, whether humans are the product of evolution, divine creation or otherwise cannot be known definitively. To say that one should give up their beliefs on this matter on the strength of arguments such as the one presented in the OP is folly.

Well, if Jones has the requisite qualifications, such as a PhD in physics from an elite university, then I like its chances. If not, not so much. The point being that if you have a specific "member" in hand, it should be assessed on its specific merits rather than whatever probabilities may have been assigned to its “group”.
Of course. That's what you studiously avoided implying I thought. I wouldn't want you to falter by bringing it up too many times :-)

If Jones has the requisite abilities, I see no reason why she shouldn't be hired even if she is a cat. Well apart from some obvious medico-legal things. On the other hand, if such a cat presented herself we would rightly feel that something was in need of explanation. This is because Jones would be so far beyond the cognitive limits that we had previously regarded as inherent to the species, that we might suspect foul play, maybe an alien in a cat simulacrum, like something out of Men in Black.

Seems like any “I believe humans are in fact ‘reliable cognitive agents’ by evidence of x, y and z” argument would run into the argument that humans can not reliably assess if they are “reliable cognitive agents” because of the “probability” assertion. Setting aside the fact that any such “probability” would also be the product of an “[un]reliable cognitive agent”, I have addressed this by asserting that the attributes of a specific "member" in hand should be assessed on its specific merits rather than whatever probabilities may have been assigned to its “group”, i.e., that the “probability” assertion itself is improper.
The first point attempts a recoil argument-you seek to show that we couldn't rely on our judgement that we are unreliable cognitive agents if we actually are. But that is open to the counter that if said judgement is false, then we have demonstrated that we are unreliable cognitive agents.

I think the second point is overlooking the fact that, according to Plantinga, if naturalism is true:
a) we would be very unlikely to be reliable cognitive agents
b) as such, even if it appeared to us that we were, it is most likely that we would be mistaken

It is b that undermines your member/group argument, since we would have no way of knowing that we were the reliable ones.

The net assertion is that in a world where naturalism is true, it would be rational for the naturalist to give up his belief in that which is true, i.e. naturalism.
I think what is wrong is 2) in the first argument.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
[b]Well, if Jones has the requisite qualifications, such as a PhD in physics from an elite university, then I like its chances. If not, not so much. The point being that if you have a specific "member" in hand, it should be assessed on its specific merits rather than whatever probabilities may have been assigned to its “group”.
Of course. That's wh ...[text shortened]... which is true, i.e. naturalism.[/b]
I think what is wrong is 2) in the first argument.[/b]

Of course. That's what you studiously avoided implying I thought. I wouldn't want you to falter by bringing it up too many times :-)

For the life of me, I'm not sure of your point here. Could you be more direct?

The first point attempts a recoil argument-you seek to show that we couldn't rely on our judgement that we are unreliable cognitive agents if we actually are. But that is open to the counter that if said judgement is false, then we have demonstrated that we are unreliable cognitive agents.

You lost me here too. I read this over several times but can't make sense of it in context of what I wrote. Unless where you say "unreliable" you really meant "reliable".

I think the second point is overlooking the fact that, according to Plantinga, if naturalism is true:
a) we would be very unlikely to be reliable cognitive agents
b) as such, even if it appeared to us that we were, it is most likely that we would be mistaken

Actually, it knocks out the foundation from under those assertions.

I think what is wrong is 2) in the first argument.

I've been arguing against 2) all along with the focus being on "the probability". He can talk about "probability" all he wants. The only thing that matters is "what is". Like I keep saying, either humankind are "reliable cognitive agents" or they aren't.

I am still concerned with (3) and (4). How rigorous is the suggested level of “cognitive reliability”? Must we, for example, assume that epistemic infallibilism must follow from either (2) or the “god alternative to (2)?

How “scrutable” does a proposed god need to be to achieve a sufficiently improved level of “cognitive reliability”?

The reason I brought in Ortegean doubt was because I thought that the cognitive reliability in question had to do with something deeper than, e.g., “If there is no god, how can I know this is asparagus I’m eating? Or that that train will run me down if I don’t get off the track?” In such everyday matters, I might have a pretty good empirical track record for cognitive reliability regardless of its source—so good, in fact, as to require a pretty good challenge to its reliability in less mundane areas, such as generalized inductive/abductive reasoning from observations (e.g., science).

At the other extreme, the ability to doubt my own (or others&rsquo😉 cognitive reliability in specific cases seems part and parcel of my cognitive faculties generally. Am I to doubt the cognitive reliability of my ability to doubt—and what would that mean? What would it mean for various ventures of human inquiry (including theological) if doubt were banished as part and parcel of our cognitive functioning? Does the naturalist position (even assuming Plantinga’s (2)) require me then to doubt that I can reasonably doubt—what?

Until I have some clearer idea about what kind of “cognitive reliability” is being suggested here, I think the whole thing is a morass of ambiguity.