The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Well, it seems you missed the germane point of the post:
The fact is that an [b]actual lottery winner is not insane regardless of how low the odds.

Similarly actual "cognitive agents" produced through evolution are not "[un]reliable cognitive agents" regardless of how low the odds.

Note the word "actual". Analogies are only meant ...[text shortened]... atever the odds were against it, the Earth is a planet that has.

Hope this helps.[/b]

Sorry, I still don't see the relevance.

Why don't we just assume that you are smarter than I am, and that to continue trying to convince me of your analogy's relevance will be a waste of your time?

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Sorry, I still don't see the relevance.

Why don't we just assume that you are smarter than I am, and that to continue trying to convince me of your analogy's relevance will be a waste of your time?

Try to read it over again.

If there are parts that don't make sense to you, I'll try to explain them if you point them out.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
[b]Plantinga, to be more precise.
We already know :-)
Isn't it possible that a false belief might also generate a similar adaptive behavior as a true belief? How certain are you that our cognitive apparatus isn't the result of many successfully adaptive behaviors based on false beliefs?
The issue is not certainty, it is cumulative probabili ...[text shortened]... . Had you thought about that at all or did you just swallow without asking too many questions?[/b]

The issue is not certainty, it is cumulative probability.

OK, how probable is it that our cognitive apparatus is the result of successfully adaptive behaviors based on more true beliefs than false beliefs?

Plantinga might talk of isolated incidents with tigers, but his account becomes much less plausible when you consider a general cognitive mechanism faced with diverse challenges.

"General cognitive mechanism faced with diverse challenges" doesn't mean much to me. Could you please elucidate this position?

Had you thought about that at all or did you just swallow without asking too many questions?

Why would I present an argument if I wasn't interested in the relevant counter-arguments?

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Try to read it over again.

If there are parts that don't make sense to you, I'll try to explain them if you point them out.

Isn't the point of the Plantinga argument that we have no reason to suppose that there are any reliable cognitive agents given how unlikely that is? The problem with your analogy (and hence your accusation of the lottery fallacy) is that you have no non circular way of establishing that we are the lottery winners.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Try to read it over again.

If there are parts that don't make sense to you, I'll try to explain them if you point them out.

Don't worry, I'm content with what I'm able to wrap my mind around. The relevance of your analogy is way over my head.

Let's drop it, shall we? Thanks.

[

OK, how probable is it that our cognitive apparatus is the result of successfully adaptive behaviors based on more true beliefs than false beliefs?
I'd say very.

"General cognitive mechanism faced with diverse challenges" doesn't mean much to me. Could you please elucidate this position?
We can construct individual sets of false beliefs for, say the tiger scenario, which would produce adaptive behaviour. But what is much less credible, is that we can produce a belief producing mechanism that will produce false beliefs that:

1) Are consistent with each other AND
2) will produce adaptive behaviour across the range of situations we are likely to face.

Why would I present an argument if I wasn't interested in the relevant counter-arguments?
Perhaps you are interested, but couldn't you think of them yourself?
In any case, you present, without citation, arguments from somebody who basically does the arguing-for-god for a living. So perhaps you think that when we amateurs (I speak for myself) fail, off the cuff, to effectively counter said arguments, you get your adherence to Plantinga's view validated? Who knows.

I thought of my objections all by myself. But if you search online you will see that professional philosophers have done a better job than I could :-)

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Isn't the point of the Plantinga argument that we have no reason to suppose that there are any reliable cognitive agents given how unlikely that is? The problem with your analogy (and hence your accusation of the lottery fallacy) is that you have no non circular way of establishing that we are the lottery winners.

Maybe I don't understand your point, but wouldn't Plantinga also therefore not be a "reliable cognitive agent"? If so, why is he presenting arguments with the assumption that he is?

Aside from that, doesn't the depth and breadth of knowledge accumulated by mankind indicate some level of cognition? Or is there some specialized definition of "cognitive agent" that hasn't been presented here.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Don't worry, I'm content with what I'm able to wrap my mind around. The relevance of your analogy is way over my head.

Let's drop it, shall we? Thanks.

You sure are a prideful one.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Maybe I don't understand your point, but wouldn't Plantinga also therefore not be a "reliable cognitive agent"? If so, why is he presenting arguments with the assumption that he is?

Aside from that, doesn't the depth and breadth of knowledge accumulated by mankind indicate some level of cognition? Or is there some specialized definition of "cognitive agent" that hasn't been presented here.

You're forgetting that Plantinga has a get-out-of-jail-free card. He can argue that he is a reliable cognitive agent because he is made in god's image. Naturalists on the other hand have to do the spade work of proper argument to show that reliable cognitive mechanisms are the parsimonious solution.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
[b]OK, how probable is it that our cognitive apparatus is the result of successfully adaptive behaviors based on more true beliefs than false beliefs?
I'd say very.

"General cognitive mechanism faced with diverse challenges" doesn't mean much to me. Could you please elucidate this position?
We can construct individual sets of fals ...[text shortened]... nline you will see that professional philosophers have done a better job than I could :-)[/b]

But what is much less credible, is that we can produce a belief producing mechanism that will produce false beliefs that... Are consistent with each other...

It sounds like you have some examples in mind. Could you provide them? I don't care if you made them up yourself or read them somewhere.

So perhaps you think that when we amateurs (I speak for myself) fail, off the cuff, to effectively counter said arguments, you get your adherence to Plantinga's view validated? Who knows.

That's possible, if my need for validation were more important to me than the effectiveness of a given argument. In the end, why should it matter to you? My main motivation, as far as I can tell, is to provide atheists on this forum with food for thought.

I thought of my objections all by myself. But if you search online you will see that professional philosophers have done a better job than I could :-)

And if I had the opportunity of discussing Plantinga's argument with the professional philosophers you've alluded to, I certainly would.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
You're forgetting that Plantinga has a get-out-of-jail-free card. He can argue that he is a reliable cognitive agent because he is made in god's image. Naturalists on the other hand have to do the spade work of proper argument to show that reliable cognitive mechanisms are the parsimonious solution.

This doesn't make much sense.

Even if Plantinga argues "that he is a reliable cognitive agent because he is made in god's image", it doesn't necessarily make him one.

Either humans are "reliable cognitive agents" or they aren't. Either they exhibit cognitive abilities or they don't. This is regardless of their origin.

All the talk about the probability of evolution is neither here nor there.

As they say, "It is what it is".

Originally posted by epiphinehas
It sounds like you have some examples in mind. Could you provide them? I don't care if you made them up yourself or read them somewhere.
Actually I saw it as more of a gestalt than with specific examples, but I subsequently read some which I'll link to below.

That's possible, if my need for validation were more important to me than the effectiveness of a given argument. In the end, why should it matter to you? My main motivation, as far as I can tell, is to provide atheists on this forum with food for thought.
You think posting unreferenced chunks of apologetics is a good methodology for assessing the effectiveness of arguments then? is it like weapons testing? And why exactly shouldn't it matter to me? Anyway, thanks for the burger....

And if I had the opportunity of discussing Plantinga's argument with the professional philosophers you've alluded to, I certainly would.
Here's that link I mentioned above: http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/2009/03/new-draft-plantinga-paper.html

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
This doesn't make much sense.

Even if Plantinga argues "that he is a reliable cognitive agent because he is made in god's image", it doesn't necessarily make him one.

Either humans are "reliable cognitive agents" or they aren't. Either they exhibit cognitive abilities or they don't. This is regardless of their origin.

All the talk about the probability of evolution is neither here nor there.

As they say, "It is what it is".

I think that Plantinga's argument is a kind of recoil argument. He attempts to show that starting with naturalist premises leads us to doubt our cognitive faculties. which in turn leads us to doubt our choice of premises. But since Plantinga can play the god card, no symmetrical argument works against his position. I hope that clarifies.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
This doesn't make much sense.

Even if Plantinga argues "that he is a reliable cognitive agent because he is made in god's image", it doesn't necessarily make him one.

Either humans are "reliable cognitive agents" or they aren't. Either they exhibit cognitive abilities or they don't. This is regardless of their origin.

All the talk about the probability of evolution is neither here nor there.

As they say, "It is what it is".

"This is regardless of their origin."

Wrong. It is entirely dependant on their origin.

Never thought I'd see so much sophistry in action.