The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Plantinga's argument tries to show that naturalism is particularly vulnerable to this specific defeater, whereas Christianity is not.

Unless and until such questions about “cognitive reliability” as I have tried to raise her are answered, I don’t see how Christianity fares any better. It is not enough to claim that some undefined “cognitive ...[text shortened]... m wrong—but I am not convinced yet that P’s argument (as presented here) is a “starter” at all.[/b]

that P holds to some foundationalist version of epistemology.

No, P is not a foundationalist as far as I know. I know that in one of his arguments for properly basic theistic belief, he argues that classical foundationalism is "bankrupt".

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Plantinga's argument tries to show that naturalism is particularly vulnerable to this specific defeater, whereas Christianity is not.

Unless and until such questions about “cognitive reliability” as I have tried to raise her are answered, I don’t see how Christianity fares any better. It is not enough to claim that some undefined “cognitive ...[text shortened]... m wrong—but I am not convinced yet that P’s argument (as presented here) is a “starter” at all.[/b]

Again—for example—is this questioned “cognitive reliability” supposed to be infallibilist?

No, by "reliable cognition", P doesn't mean anything like infallibility. Again, he takes reliable cognition to have to do with the production of mostly true or verisimilitudinous beliefs.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Yes, P basically takes the alternative to naturalism to be supernaturalism. But it's good to remain clear that he is NOT arguing for any kind of supernaturalistic versus naturalistic epistemology. The basic idea of epistemic warrant or proper cognitive function he advances is a naturalistic one. The naturalistic versus supernaturalistic distinction he ...[text shortened]... flourish, but he basically claims that it leads to skepticism or violation of rationality).

Okay: obviously there is a lot more going on here than was simply presented in the thread.

I think that a supernatuarlist (extra-naturalist) metaphysics undermines all epistemology. It is only because specfic groups assume and assert their particular "axiomatic" supernaturalist fundamentals (or standards of coherence or contextualism) that they can assume that what follows is epistemically warranted--to the exclusion of all others.

I am not the philosopher that you are; I likely do not even use the "lingo" correctly. But it seems to me that P's claim here is indemonstrable. And it also seems to me that some people seem to seek the "indefeasibility" of their positions by basing them on indemonstrable claims (e.g., that "faith" is in some way an epistemic category; or that we just don't/can't comprehend all the ways of god--however the supernatural category is introduced and employed).

Supernaturalism as a response to epistemic skepticism is simply "desperate measures".

Originally posted by vistesd
Okay: obviously there is a lot more going on here than was simply presented in the thread.

I think that a supernatuarlist (extra-naturalist) metaphysics undermines allepistemology. It is only because specfic groups assume and assert their particular "axiomatic" supernaturalist fundamentals (or standards of coherence or contextualism) that the pernaturalism as a response to epistemic skepticism is simply "desperate measures".

Okay: obviously there is a lot more going on here than was simply presented in the thread.

Yes, the argument as presented in the opening post leaves a lot out. The argument as presented in full by Plantinga is a great read, and I recommend it. Again, I think it fails, but I sure like the way he writes and presents his ideas.

Originally posted by LemonJello
As you can see from the above post, Plantinga thinks warrant links with concepts of proper cognitive function. Throughout this argument, Plantinga basically takes "reliable" cognitive faculties to be cognitive faculties that produces beliefs that are mostly true or verisimilitudinous. So, basically, a reliable cognitive faculty is one that produces a pr ...[text shortened]... to be mostly true or verisimilitudinous -- rather than trying to give a strict account of it.

Throughout this argument, Plantinga basically takes "reliable" cognitive faculties to be cognitive faculties that produces beliefs that are mostly true or verisimilitudinous. So, basically, a reliable cognitive faculty is one that produces a preponderance of true or versimilitudinous beliefs. His idea of being reliable here seems pretty lax.

Sorry, LJ: I didn’t see all your responses before my last post. Okay: “mostly true or verisimilitudinous”. Do we have any warrant for assuming that our cognitive faculties produce less than that? Does P think that we do? (I suspect not.)

On what basis does P think that our cognitive faculties fail—if he thinks they do—specifically when it comes to (a) conclusions that support naturalism, on the one hand; and (b) conclusions that seem to be all over the map among supernaturalists, on the other?

What role does P think that doubt plays in our cognitive inquiries?

I suspect—on the limited info that I have here—that P has not delved particularly deeply into the cognitive questions themselves. (Again, maybe that just hasn’t been presented here—but I really need to think that P has something interesting and crucially challenging to say here before I run to amazon.com on this!)

Color me frustrated here, but (as I have attempted to outline across several posts) I would think that an epistemic skepticism (again, of the Sextian variety) is preferable to supernaturalism which can be no more than a pretense at an epistemic solution…

Originally posted by vistesd
Okay: obviously there is a lot more going on here than was simply presented in the thread.

I think that a supernatuarlist (extra-naturalist) metaphysics undermines all epistemology. It is only because specfic groups assume and assert their particular "axiomatic" supernaturalist fundamentals (or standards of coherence or contextualism) that the pernaturalism as a response to epistemic skepticism is simply "desperate measures".

Basically, I agree with you that people often deploy the supernatural in order to try to give warrant to their claims (and claim indefeasibility). However, Plantinga as far as I can tell employs thoroughly naturalistic notions of epistemic warrant. It's just that he thinks it "flourishes best" in the gardens of supernatural metaphysics. What does that mean exactly? Well, I'm not completely sure either. Except that in this case, he thinks (wrongly) that naturalistic epistemology conjoined with naturalistic metaphysics is a train wreck. I guess it wouldn't take much to "flourish" to a greater degree than violations of canons of rationality. 🙂

Originally posted by LemonJello
I think P's argument is not nearly as "stupid" as you make it sound. But, I also think Lord Shark and others have correctly identified where P's argument fails.

I am not sure that I understand all that you have said there. Can you explain it in terms I might be a bit more familiar with?
I suspect that you are referring to arguments made by P which are not included in the first post of this thread.
To help clear up some of my misunderstanding can you explain:
1. What methods we could use to gain knowledge of our cognitive abilities. (Doing a probability calculation based on random mutation and natural selection seems to me to be stupid in the extreme - especially considering that we do not have enough information to make a reliable estimate - I suppose that is the 'inscrutable' bit.)
2. Whether our ability to think rationally is in question or merely our ability to perceive the world.
3. What would happen if a Theists with supposedly better cognitive ability came to the conclusion that naturalism is true.
4. What the argument is really proposing a naturalist should do: eg go mad?

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Okay: obviously there is a lot more going on here than was simply presented in the thread.

Yes, the argument as presented in the opening post leaves a lot out. The argument as presented in full by Plantinga is a great read, and I recommend it. Again, I think it fails, but I sure like the way he writes and presents his ideas.[/b]

Well, I cross-posted with you again…

I appreciate your patience. Am I totally off the mark here with my suspicions about the introduction of a supernatural category to “solve” any epistemic problem? I mean, even if I thought that there were such a supernatural category, I don’t think I could honestly claim that it really solved any epistemic problems (that is, in such a way that an “unbeliever” ought to at least take account of).

Or—to put in ‘round about—the introduction of a supernatural category can “solve” any epistemic problem at all, in just about any way. Thus, supernaturalism undermines all epistemology—of the kind that either the naturalist or the supernaturalist might appeal to.

EDIT: Therefore, the notion of epistemology "flourishing" in spupernaturalist gardens is a total non-sequiter for me! 🙂

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Throughout this argument, Plantinga basically takes "reliable" cognitive faculties to be cognitive faculties that produces beliefs that are mostly true or verisimilitudinous. So, basically, a reliable cognitive faculty is one that produces a preponderance of true or versimilitudinous beliefs. His idea of being reliable here seems pretty lax.

Sorry, ...[text shortened]... s preferable to supernaturalism which can be no more than a pretense at an epistemic solution…[/b]

On what basis does P think that our cognitive faculties fail—if he thinks they do—specifically when it comes to (a) conclusions that support naturalism, on the one hand; and (b) conclusions that seem to be all over the map among supernaturalists, on the other?

I'm not sure if I understand your question. P, as far as I know, thinks our cognitive faculties are characteristically reliable. But, he thinks that the epistemic probability of our having reliable cognitive faculties given the truth of naturalism is low (or inscrutable). Thus, he thinks naturalism carries a defeater for belief, including the belief in naturalism itself. Of course, P thinks naturalism is false.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]On what basis does P think that our cognitive faculties fail—if he thinks they do—specifically when it comes to (a) conclusions that support naturalism, on the one hand; and (b) conclusions that seem to be all over the map among supernaturalists, on the other?

I'm not sure if I understand your question. P, in fact, thinks our cog ...[text shortened]... or belief, including the belief in naturalism itself. Of course, P thinks naturalism is false.[/b]

The problem here—and then I’ll wait till we quit cross-posting 😉—is that P questions that reliability precisely when it concludes to naturalism. You see, I don’t think we can arbitrarily exclude those very (metaphysical) questions from our cognitive reliability generally without some explanation.

It’s like saying, “Well, we’re all generally/mostly cognitively reliable except when (a) some of you conclude to naturalism, and/or when (b) some of you conclude to wrong notions about the supernatural (i.e., god).” ??!!

Originally posted by twhitehead
I am not sure that I understand all that you have said there. Can you explain it in terms I might be a bit more familiar with?
I suspect that you are referring to arguments made by P which are not included in the first post of this thread.
To help clear up some of my misunderstanding can you explain:
1. What methods we could use to gain knowledge of ou turalism is true.
4. What the argument is really proposing a naturalist should do: eg go mad?

1. What methods we could use to gain knowledge of our cognitive abilities.

In the context of P's argument, it wouldn't matter what you tried to do to support the idea that your own cognitive faculties are reliable. He would just take all such arguments as question-begging.

3. What would happen if a Theists with supposedly better cognitive ability came to the conclusion that naturalism is true.

He's not arguing that theists have better cognitive faculties. He's not arguing anything about anyone's cognitive faculties at all, per se. He's arguing something about belief in naturalism: he basically argues that it is irrational. Why does he think belief in naturalism is irrational? Because he thinks the person who believes naturalism thereby also has an undefeated defeater for that very same belief in naturalism.

4. What the argument is really proposing a naturalist should do: eg go mad?

P would say something that he would ideally do if he is to be rational: he would give up his acceptance of naturalism (and P also distinguishes between belief and acceptance, whereby he thinks 'acceptance' has volitional aspects that belief doesn't have; hence, I think P would say it makes sense to talk of willfully giving up acceptances, even if we do not have the same active control over beliefs). He says "Hence the devotee of N&E [here 'N' is metaphysical naturalism and 'E' is the proposition that our cognitive faculties arose through mechanims consistent with evolutionary thought] has a defeater D for N&E -- a defeater, furthermore, that can't be ultimately defeated; for obviously D attaches to any consideration one might bring forward by way of attempting to defeat it. If you accept N&E, you have an ultimately undefeated reason for rejecting N&E: but then the rational thing to do is to reject N&E."

Originally posted by vistesd
The problem here—and then I’ll wait till we quit cross-posting 😉—is that P questions that reliability precisely when it concludes to naturalism. You see, I don’t think we can arbitrarily exclude those very (metaphysical) questions from our cognitive reliability generally without some explanation.

It’s like saying, “Well, we’re all generally/most ...[text shortened]... and/or when (b) some of you conclude to wrong notions about the supernatural (i.e., god).” ??!!

It’s like saying, “Well, we’re all generally/mostly cognitively reliable except when (a) some of you conclude to naturalism, and/or when (b) some of you conclude to wrong notions about the supernatural (i.e., god).” ??!!

I'm sure that Plantinga doesn't take it to be that differences in belief that proceed from theoretical deliberations mean that we fail to be cognitively reliable (or that one side thereby fails in that category but the other doesn't). He's already committed, as far as I am concered, to the idea that the entire mature human race is more or less reliable in their cognition (maybe with some exceptions), since he thinks that his naturalistic epistemology flourishes so well in his gardens of metaphysical supernaturalism. It would be strange for him to argue that the naturalist is any less generally reliable in his cognition than the theist, given that he thinks both of them were ultimately brought about by the same supernatural influences and in the same general likeness of God, the almighty great cognizer. And he doesn't argue anything like that. Again, he is not trying to argue anything about the general status of our cognitive reliability. He's trying to argue that belief in naturalism is self-defeating -- nothing more.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]It’s like saying, “Well, we’re all generally/mostly cognitively reliable except when (a) some of you conclude to naturalism, and/or when (b) some of you conclude to wrong notions about the supernatural (i.e., god).” ??!!

I'm sure that Plantinga doesn't take it to be that differences in belief that proceed from theoretical deliberations m bility. He's trying to argue that belief in naturalism is self-defeating -- nothing more.[/b]

It would be strange for him to argue that the naturalist is any less generally reliable in his cognition than the theist, given that he thinks both of them were ultimately brought about by the same supernatural influences and in the same general likeness of God, the almighty great cognizer. And he doesn't argue anything like that. Again, he is not trying to argue anything about the general status of our cognitive reliability. He's trying to argue that belief in naturalism is self-defeating -- nothing more.

But, he has to at least acknowledge that the apparent cognitive reliability of either/both the naturalist and the supernaturalist becomes less reliable on precisely that point. And if a belief in supernaturalism cannot be shown to be non-self-defeating—while remaining epistemologically valid (and not just any ole “magical thinking” )—then his argument devolves to supporting epistemic skepticism on the question, nothing more.

Nevertheless, let me try the counter-argument—

_____________________________________________________________


The devotee of S [where “S” is supernaturalism] has a defeater D for S—a defeater, furthermore, that can't be ultimately defeated; for obviously D attaches to any consideration one might bring forward by way of attempting to defeat it. If you accept S, you have an ultimately undefeated reason for rejecting S: but then the rational thing to do is to reject S.

The defeater D for S is as follows:

(1) If the fact of our being reliable cognitive agents is the result of being so endowed by a supernatural agent, then—


(2) The probability of our being unaware of that fact (i.e., that our bestowed cognitive reliability fails at precisely that fact) is low or, at best, inscrutable; but it cannot reasonably be thought to be high.

(3) There are many people who reject the supernaturalist hypothesis; and, among those who accept, there is no consensus (or even a majority) as to the character/content of the supernatural and how we are to know (be reliably cognitive) of that character.


(4) There is therefore nothing in the supernaturalist belief that endows greater cognitive reliability even on the question of the existence of the supernatural (and its being the source of reliable cognitive faculties).


(5) Consequently, the supernaturalist cannot reasonably hold to the belief that they are reliable cognitive agents at all (since there is no evident cognitive reliability with regard to the source of said cognitive reliability).


—EDIT: Actually, I think this is better modified to say that the supernaturalist cannot reasonably hold that the supernaturalist hypothesis contributes anything to the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents; and that the following should be amended accordingly.


(6) And since the reliability of their cognitive apparatus has been called into such grave question, supernaturalists are rationally bound to dismiss any belief accepted on the basis of trust in that apparatus.
.

(7) Specifically, to the extent that the supernaturalist is rational, they will give up their belief in supernaturalism—and will at least remain skeptical/agnostic on the supernaturalist/naturalist question.

Originally posted by vistesd
It would be strange for him to argue that the naturalist is any less generally reliable in his cognition than the theist, given that he thinks both of them were ultimately brought about by the same supernatural influences and in the same general likeness of God, the almighty great cognizer. And he doesn't argue anything like that. Again, he is not trying alism—and will at least remain skeptical/agnostic on the supernaturalist/naturalist question.

How would your defeater really constitute an ultimate, or undefeated, defeater (as in a defeater that cannot be defeated)? The proponent of S can say but of course there is wildly varying opinion as it regards the actual content and character of S among proponents of S; and, but of course, there are many who simply reject S. This is actually an instance of disagreement that we should expect. God brought about conditions that conduce to such disagreement because he wants us to relate with him in a genuine way. Imagine if the cognitive reliability that God extended to our general cognitive terrain also extended to belief in him, such that it merely passively garnered the cool assent of our intellect! We would be like robots and that is not real love! Real love requires there to be a volitional aspect to our "believing in" him and relating with him, and that is why he didn't extend our cold cognitive reliability to this particular inquiry: he wanted to make it a matter of faith so that we can have the volitional opportunity to genuinely and passionately love him and relate with him, or reject him! Even if you don't happen to find this response all that satisfactory, doesn't this proponent of S now basically have a defeater for your defeater? I wouldn't put it past S-proponents to come up with any number of conceivable defeaters for your defeater. Yours might be a prima facie defeater (for instance, it does seem strange on the face of it that there would be such disagreement over whether or not God even exists let alone the particulars of his character and content -- particularly supposing that he designed us and it was his design intention for us to love and relate with him), but probably not an undefeated defeater.

In contrast, suppose P is right that the epistemic probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given N&E is low and cannot reasonably be thought to be high (he's not right about that, but let's suppose he is because this is basically in what he takes his defeater to consist). That would seem to be a pretty iron-clad defeater! Like P says, how would the proponent of N&E go about defeating this defeater (in such a way that he isn't just begging the question)? His really does seem to "attach to any consideration one might bring forward by way of attempting to defeat it", but I am not sure I see how yours would do the same.

Originally posted by LemonJello
He says "Hence the devotee of N&E [here 'N' is metaphysical naturalism and 'E' is the proposition that our cognitive faculties arose through mechanims consistent with evolutionary thought] has a defeater D for N&E -- a defeater, furthermore, that can't be ultimately defeated; for obviously D attaches to any consideration one might bring forward by wa ...[text shortened]... feated reason for rejecting N&E: but then the rational thing to do is to reject N&E."

Reminiscent of Montaigne's line of thought in 'An Apology for Raymond Sebond' ... Could Plantinga be labelled as a Pyrrhonist? (Idle question).