The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b]Nearly every piece of the original post is flawed in some way, sometimes on multiple levels. I was actually shocked that epiphinehas who normally seems quite intelligent would post such an argument in the first place.

The EAAN is a solid argument, IMO. I think your misunderstanding of it has caused you to conclude, mistakenly, that it is rathe ...[text shortened]... ironment in itself gives no assurance that we've inherited an accurate cognitive apparatus.[/b]

Having successfully adapted to our environment in itself gives no assurance that we've inherited an accurate cognitive apparatus, however having successfully adapted to our environment in itself gives no assurance that we've inherited not an accurate cognitive apparatus either
😵

Originally posted by epiphinehas
The EAAN is a solid argument, IMO. I think your misunderstanding of it has caused you to conclude, mistakenly, that it is rather weak. Alvin Plantinga, a respected philosopher, has gone to great lengths crafting the EAAN and many philosophers have taken turns responding to it. Whole books have been devoted to this argument. Plantinga, as far as I am ...[text shortened]... ut I don't think anyone familiar with the argument in detail thinks it is easily brushed aside.

I have not read any of Alvin Pantinga's writings (unless your first post was a direct quote). What I did read was your first post and it was a terrible and utterly flawed argument. Every single point you make is flawed. The premises are unproven and probably false, the conclusions do not follow from the premises etc. I really dont care how much support Plantinga has, or how many articles he has written, it remains obvious that your first post is flawed. If it incorrectly portrayed Plantinga's argument then why not give us a more accurate picture? So far I don't think you have successfully defended even one of the criticisms leveled against it.

The argument is stating that there is no way to be sure that we've inherited an accurate cognitive apparatus through the process of random mutation and natural selection, since it is equally probable that false beliefs may have given rise to successful adaptive behavior as true beliefs. Therefore, your analogy, as well as ThinkOfOne's lottery analogy, misses the point, since having successfully adapted to our environment in itself gives no assurance that we've inherited an accurate cognitive apparatus.
I don't think I missed the point at all. I don't have any doubt that I have accurate cognitive apparatus, and in fact am as sure of it as I am sure that I have humanoid form and have not won the lottery. But my knowledge of my cognitive apparatus has nothing to do with evolution or naturalism.
What you seem to have missed in your defense, is that regardless of whether we can know the actual state of something, the probability that it is in a given state is not sufficient to conclude that the actual state matches the highest probability.
Most importantly of all, what alternative does the non-naturalist offer? Why do theists believe that they have more accurate cognitive apparatus? Did they evolve differently?

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne

For the life of me, I'm not sure of your point here. Could you be more direct?
Ok. Why do you keep putting this group/member argument, why is it relevant?

You lost me here too. I read this over several times but can't make sense of it in context of what I wrote. Unless where you say "unreliable" you really meant "reliable".
No I didn't mean that.
You said :'Setting aside the fact that any such “probability” would also be the product of an “[un]reliable cognitive agent”'
But there is no need to set it aside, since it can't work as a criticism of the point that we are likely to be unreliable cognitive agents.

I've been arguing against 2) all along with the focus being on "the probability". He can talk about "probability" all he wants. The only thing that matters is "what is". Like I keep saying, either humankind are "reliable cognitive agents" or they aren't.
But this argument doesn't work because if we are systematically unreliable in the way Plantinga suggests given naturalism, then that's indeed what matters-humankind just aren't reliable cognitive agents. You can protest that you have evidence that we are reliable, but this fails because if you are unreliable then so is your assessment of the evidence. You could protest that we might be reliable anyway, against the odds, like lottery winners. But Plantinga could argue that you can't know that-hence probability does matter, because it is all you've got.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I have not read any of Alvin Pantinga's writings (unless your first post was a direct quote). What I did read was your first post and it was a terrible and utterly flawed argument. Every single point you make is flawed. The premises are unproven and probably false, the conclusions do not follow from the premises etc. I really dont care how much support Pl ...[text shortened]... s believe that they have more accurate cognitive apparatus? Did they evolve differently?

Originally posted by twhitehead

I don't have any doubt that I have accurate cognitive apparatus,
Plantinga's point is that you would think that, even if you were mistaken, and if naturalism were true the probability would be very high that you were mistaken. That's the point I think you have missed.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne

[b]For the life of me, I'm not sure of your point here. Could you be more direct?
Ok. Why do you keep putting this group/member argument, why is it relevant?

You lost me here too. I read this over several times but can't make sense of it in context of what I wrote. Unless where you say "unreliable" you know that-hence probability does matter, because it is all you've got.

[/b]Ok. Why do you keep putting this group/member argument, why is it relevant?

Simply because this is the key flaw in P's argument that topples the house of cards. His argument is based on "probability" not on "what is".

You said :'Setting aside the fact that any such “probability” would also be the product of an “[un]reliable cognitive agent”'
But there is no need to set it aside, since it can't work as a criticism of the point that we are likely to be unreliable cognitive agents.

But this argument doesn't work because if we are systematically unreliable in the way Plantinga suggests given naturalism, then that's indeed what matters-humankind just aren't reliable cognitive agents. You can protest that you have evidence that we are reliable, but this fails because if you are unreliable then so is your assessment of the evidence. You could protest that we might be reliable anyway, against the odds, like lottery winners. But Plantinga could argue that you can't know that-hence probability does matter, because it is all you've got.


What you seem to fail to realize is that the "the point that we are likely to be unreliable cognitive agents" would then itself be the product of an "unreliable cognitive agent". You said "probability does matter, because it is all you've got", but you don't even have that - this "probability" would be as unreliable as anything else. The point is that the linchpin of the argument ( "probability" ) would itself be unreliable rendering all of P's conclusions unreliable. Therefore when all is said and done, under what you surmise would be P's argument ALL beliefs are unreliable, so there is no reason to abandon any given belief because one belief is as good as another. There is no compelling reason to take action which is what the argument is advocating.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Plantinga's point is that you would think that, even if you were mistaken, and if naturalism were true the probability would be very high that you were mistaken. That's the point I think you have missed.

No I have not missed it at all. The argument is stupid. If we are unable to determine whether our cognitive apparatus is faulty, then we are unable to determine it regardless of our beliefs about naturalism. The argument is essentially claiming that because one believes that his cognitive ability is likely to be faulty then it must be faulty, but those (Christians I suppose) who believe that they have accurate cognitive abilities must therefore have them. As I said, it is stupid. There is no other word for it.
The argument as presented can lead to only one conclusion: we all have faulty cognitive apparatus and all know nothing whatsoever so abandon all faith. If you disagree, then answer the question I have posed twice now and got no answer: how does the argument differ when applied to Christianity?

Originally posted by twhitehead
No I have not missed it at all. The argument is stupid. If we are unable to determine whether our cognitive apparatus is faulty, then we are unable to determine it regardless of our beliefs about naturalism. The argument is essentially claiming that because one believes that his cognitive ability is likely to be faulty then it must be faulty, but those (C ...[text shortened]... ve posed twice now and got no answer: how does the argument differ when applied to Christianity?

I think you are failing to understand Plantinga's argument. It should be clear in the argument that P claims a defeater on belief, but equally clear that this putative defeater on belief is contingent on the commitment to only naturalistic explanation for cognition. Christians aren't committed to only naturalistic explanation for cognition, so the putative defeater doesn't pertain to them. Traditional theists in general, prima facie, don't have any issues with such a defeater according to P because, after all, they think we were made in the image of a perfect cognizer and that our cognition was brought about ultimately by some capable supernatural entity whose design intention it was that we be on the whole reliable cognizers.

The argument is essentially claiming that because one believes that his cognitive ability is likely to be faulty then it must be faulty, but those (Christians I suppose) who believe that they have accurate cognitive abilities must therefore have them.

No. P's argument is essentially as the following. He claims that the epistemic probability that we are reliable cognizers conditioned on only naturalist account for our cognition is low or inscrutable; and that either way, accepting only naturalist account would also thereby provide a defeater for one's beliefs generally and also for one's belief in only naturalistic account in particular. (Note that this putative defeater doesn't pertain to those who are not committed to only naturalist account. For instance, the traditional theist, according to P, has no reason for doubting that a primary purpose of his cognitive apparatus is to provide him with a preponderance of true beliefs.) Further, P claims that this is an undefeated defeater, as in a defeater that cannot be defeated. That is based on the idea that any argument the naturalist could offer for the reliability of his own cognitive systems would in context essentially be circular or question begging (P says it would be like trying to settle if some man is honest or not by referencing the man's own word on the matter). So, P thinks that the devotee to only naturalist account has an undefeated defeater for that very belief, and hence naturalism is self-defeating.

I think P's argument is not nearly as "stupid" as you make it sound. But, I also think Lord Shark and others have correctly identified where P's argument fails.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Ok. Why do you keep putting this group/member argument, why is it relevant?

Simply because this is the key flaw in P's argument that topples the house of cards. His argument is based on "probability" not on "what is".

You said :'Setting aside the fact that any such “probability” would also be the product of an “[un]reliable cognitive ...[text shortened]... lling reason to take action which is what the argument is advocating.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Simply because this is the key flaw in P's argument that topples the house of cards. His argument is based on "probability" not on "what is".
I disagree. There is an interesting sub topic here about probability though. Suppose I shake two dice in a cup with my hand over the top and then I slam the cup down on the table so the cup covers the dice. I then offer you odds to bet on a particular range of scores, and you want to decide whether it is rational to take the bet. Should you dismiss any consideration of probability simply because under the cup, the result is already in?

What you seem to fail to realize is that the "the point that we are likely to be unreliable cognitive agents" would then itself be the product of an "unreliable cognitive agent".
As I said before, I think this criticism fails. The reason is that unreliable cognitive agents are not precluded from correct conclusions. An unreliable agent isn't the same as a uniformly incorrect one. Now look at the premises of your argument. If you grant as a premise that we are unreliable, you have conceded already. If you don't, you can't reject the conclusion that we might after all be unreliable.

As LemonJello pointed out, Plantinga, the proposer of this argument, is not susceptible to the undermining effects of the conclusion because he rejects one premise, that naturalism is true. I also made this point earlier on, but with more colourful language: the get-out-of-jail-free card.

Thanks to LemonJello for putting things more clearly than I could.

Originally posted by twhitehead
No I have not missed it at all. The argument is stupid. If we are unable to determine whether our cognitive apparatus is faulty, then we are unable to determine it regardless of our beliefs about naturalism. The argument is essentially claiming that because one believes that his cognitive ability is likely to be faulty then it must be faulty, but those (C ...[text shortened]... ve posed twice now and got no answer: how does the argument differ when applied to Christianity?

Originally posted by twhitehead
No I have not missed it at all. The argument is stupid.
I think the flaw is in 2), but I also think that you have not engaged with the point that Plantinga's argument tries to show that naturalism is particularly vulnerable to this specific defeater, whereas Christianity is not.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]Simply because this is the key flaw in P's argument that topples the house of cards. His argument is based on "probability" not on "what is".
I disagree. There is an interesting sub topic here about probability though. Suppose I shake two dice in a cup with my hand over the top and then I slam the cup down ail-free card.

Thanks to LemonJello for putting things more clearly than I could.[/b]

I disagree. There is an interesting sub topic here about probability though. Suppose I shake two dice in a cup with my hand over the top and then I slam the cup down on the table so the cup covers the dice. I then offer you odds to bet on a particular range of scores, and you want to decide whether it is rational to take the bet. Should you dismiss any consideration of probability simply because under the cup, the result is already in?

lol. For you to ask that question I can only surmise that what we have here is a failure to communicate. Right now, I can't think of another way to put it.

As I said before, I think this criticism fails. The reason is that unreliable cognitive agents are not precluded from correct conclusions. An unreliable agent isn't the same as a uniformly incorrect one. Now look at the premises of your argument. If you grant as a premise that we are unreliable, you have conceded already. If you don't, you can't reject the conclusion that we might after all be unreliable.

This doesn't seem to make much sense in light of the rest of my post. Did you read the rest of the post or only up to this line?

As LemonJello pointed out, Plantinga, the proposer of this argument, is not susceptible to the undermining effects of the conclusion because he rejects one premise, that naturalism is true. I also made this point earlier on, but with more colourful language: the get-out-of-jail-free card.

Thanks to LemonJello for putting things more clearly than I could.

But to the naturalist, that P rejects naturalism is irrelevant. Keep in mind that what's required is that the naturalist have compelling evidence to take action. P's argument falls short on any number of levels. Try looking at it from the POV of the naturalist.

This isn't entirely on topic, but you might find this interesting to mull over:
From what I can tell, the vast majority of human beings are not fully rational. Yet they proceed as if they are.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I think you are failing to understand Plantinga's argument. It should be clear in the argument that P claims a defeater on belief, but equally clear that this putative defeater on belief is contingent on the commitment to only naturalistic explanation for cognition. Christians aren't committed to only naturalistic explanation for cognition, so the putat ...[text shortened]... lso think Lord Shark and others have correctly identified where P's argument fails.

I'm glad that you think it is not nearly so "stupid"--since it strikes me as just the kind of thing that someone named "LJ" would likely knock me down flat on, if I presented it...

BTW, there also seems to be an assumption in the OP presentation that the introduction of the "supernatural category" can/does add a level of "scrutability" that naturalism does not. I think that assumption has been adequately defeated just by arguments among Christians themselves (let alone all theists). Aside from that, however, the introduction of the supernatural category simply undermines any epistemic principles such that "anything goes" [Well, my "anything" goes; I simply claim by fiat (or interpretation by fiat) that yours doesn't...).

NOTE: I have been assuming that the alternative to P's "naturalism" here is "supernaturalism", and not the epistemic move made by W.V.O. Quine...

Originally posted by LemonJello
I think you are failing to understand Plantinga's argument. It should be clear in the argument that P claims a defeater on belief, but equally clear that this putative defeater on belief is contingent on the commitment to only naturalistic explanation for cognition. Christians aren't committed to only naturalistic explanation for cognition, so the putat ...[text shortened]... lso think Lord Shark and others have correctly identified where P's argument fails.

Traditional theists in general, prima facie, don't have any issues with such a defeater according to P because, after all, they think we were made in the image of a perfect cognizer and that our cognition was brought about ultimately by some capable supernatural entity whose design intention it was that we be on the whole reliable cognizers.

Again, what is the standard for “reliable” cognition here? The only reason that specific groups of traditional theists might not have any issues with such a defeator is because they each reject the cognitive claims about the “perfect cognizer” made by other theists! That only a certain group of Christians—let’s take evangelical protestants, broadly, for example—might have a reliable cognition of the divine hardly renders the supernaturalist position more tenable (or even “scrutable”!) that the naturalist alternative.

What the hell does “on the whole reliable cognizers mean”? I certainly would not say that human beings are “on the whole” consistent cognizers about questions such as metaphysical dualism/non-dualism, let alone the nature of the god (or gods!) of dualistic theism.

I read a book by Plantinga once, years ago, from the library—and I’m not sure anymore of the title. Maybe I’m asking questions about things that are more clearly spelled out by P as he actually presents this argument. But, as it stands, it seems to me more clever than deep. (As I say, the kind of thing that you would—and have—dismantled me on quite quickly.)

My questions about “cognitive reliability” stand…

Originally posted by vistesd
I'm glad that you think it is not nearly so "stupid"--since it strikes me as just the kind of thing that someone named "LJ" would likely knock me down flat on, if I presented it...

BTW, there also seems to be an assumption in the OP presentation that the introduction of the "supernatural category" can/does add a level of "scrutability" that naturalism doe here is "supernaturalism", and not the epistemic move made by W.V.O. Quine...

Yes, P basically takes the alternative to naturalism to be supernaturalism. But it's good to remain clear that he is NOT arguing for any kind of supernaturalistic versus naturalistic epistemology. The basic idea of epistemic warrant or proper cognitive function he advances is a naturalistic one. The naturalistic versus supernaturalistic distinction he draws in this argument is one regarding metaphysics, not epistemology.

He tries to be explicit about that in his argument:

"Once again, therefore, we see that naturalistic epistemology flourishes best in the garden of supernaturalistic metaphysics. Naturalistic epistemology conjoined with naturalistic metaphysics leads via evolution to skepticism or to violation of canons of rationality; conjoined with theism it does not. The naturalistic epistemologist should therefore prefer theism to metaphysical naturalism....I have argued that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function: a belief has warrant, for a person, if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief....We have seen that this view of warrant is a naturalistic one, but one that requires, for its best flourishing, to be set in the context of supernatural theism..."

However, I think that, regardless of whether or not a naturalistic epistemology can flourish in the setting of supernatural metaphysical commitments, Plantinga fails to actually demonstrate his claim that it cannot flourish when conjoined with naturalistic metaphysics (not just does he claim that it doesn't flourish, but he basically claims that it leads to skepticism or violation of rationality).

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Originally posted by twhitehead
[b]No I have not missed it at all. The argument is stupid.
I think the flaw is in 2), but I also think that you have not engaged with the point that Plantinga's argument tries to show that naturalism is particularly vulnerable to this specific defeater, whereas Christianity is not.[/b]

Plantinga's argument tries to show that naturalism is particularly vulnerable to this specific defeater, whereas Christianity is not.

Unless and until such questions about “cognitive reliability” as I have tried to raise her are answered, I don’t see how Christianity fares any better. It is not enough to claim that some undefined “cognitive unreliability” results from naturalism—one must also show that the counter-position actually can demonstrate a greater degree of cognitive reliability. This is not clear.

What the introduction of the supernatural category does is to render any claim indefeasible by what might be termed “speculative fiat”. For example, “My reading of the holy scriptures (and hence, my cognitive understanding of the divine) is correct—and yours is incorrect—because I am informed by the Holy Spirit.” “No, I am…” No, I am…”

I’m assuming, from the terms of the presentation, that P holds to some foundationalist version of epistemology. Now, if P is going to claim that a naturalist assumption fails to provide any foundation, he also has to show that supernaturalism does (which I think he cannot do)—and also that foundationalism is the best epistemological option (it may be).

I just think you guys are leaping to challenging premise (2) far too quickly. Again—for example—is this questioned “cognitive reliability” supposed to be infallibilist? With regard to pragmatic survival issues? With regard to induction? With regard to (theistic or nontheistic) metaphysics? If not, is the claim that our cognition must be assumed to be less fallible under naturalism. How so? Can the parameters of such fallibilism be demonstrated by comparing supernaturalists to naturalists? Have such parameters been compared?

Maybe, as this whole thing develops, I’ll see that I’m wrong—but I am not convinced yet that P’s argument (as presented here) is a “starter” at all.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Traditional theists in general, prima facie, don't have any issues with such a defeater according to P because, after all, they think we were made in the image of a perfect cognizer and that our cognition was brought about ultimately by some capable supernatural entity whose design intention it was that we be on the whole reliable cognizers.

Again, ...[text shortened]... —and have—dismantled me on quite quickly.)

My questions about “cognitive reliability” stand…[/b]

As you can see from the above post, Plantinga thinks warrant links with concepts of proper cognitive function. Throughout this argument, Plantinga basically takes "reliable" cognitive faculties to be cognitive faculties that produces beliefs that are mostly true or verisimilitudinous. So, basically, a reliable cognitive faculty is one that produces a preponderance of true or versimilitudinous beliefs. His idea of being reliable here seems pretty lax. If you read through his argument, he tries to drive home the notion of reliability more through examples that demonstrate for him what it is like for beliefs to be mostly true or verisimilitudinous -- rather than trying to give a strict account of it.