The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Originally posted by Palynka
As to likelihood, there are two issues.

First, it's clear that to claim that evolution says anything about likelihood of survival we would required to take the first interpretation. Because if the mapping is from G' to G, then there is no stochasticity involved anymore and so no possible claim on likelihood. It's simply a question of labelling the mapping. ...[text shortened]... instead. Making the first claim (about likelihood), is then comparing these two populations.[/b]

On likelihood, I think it is important to think about what considerations of probability might legitimately allow us to do, and what they can't.

So first let's distinguish between the countless events of reproduction and death and all the causal factors involved therein over time on the one hand. On the other hand we have our theoretical explanatory framework called the modern evolutionary synthesis.

When we consider probabilities, we are thinking and using the latter to explain some features of the former. In your criticism of my position you have called into question whether an a posteriori appraisal of a situation by extrapolation back in time from G' to G allows us to talk about probability.

I think your objection, that there is no stochasticity involved anymore and so no possible claim on likelihood, is flawed. To see why, let's turn to a national lottery game in order to ask which questions might make sense and which would fall foul of your objection.

Imagine that the game is run by having a set of balls numbered 1 to 49 released into a machine like a transparent rotating sphere. (We assume the balls are the same size and made out of the same material.) A mechanism, when triggered, allows six balls out.

A question that would fall to your objection would be something like this:

i) Oh look, the result this week was 2, 7, 8, 9, 28, 31. What are the chances of that?

The question isn't sensible in that the answer is 1 if we treat the question literally. But the philosophical fun begins if we interpret i) to mean:

ii) What were the chances of that at time t-100?

Now it is not clear that ii) can be ruled out, since if we allow the concept of stochasticity at all, we can see that at time t-100 it still applies.

Now let us suppose that a group of statisticians had no access to the actual draws and didn't know the details of the ball or machines, but they did have all the data for the results of the draws carried out to date. With suitable analysis, and providing the weekly draw had been going for a good few years, they would rationally be able to deduce that the system involved the random selection of six numbers from 49. At that point they would rationally be able to conclude something like:

iii) 'at time t=0, the probability that, for the subsequent ten years the same result would recur for every draw was less than the probability that different sets of numbers would occur.'

They might even indulge in some shorthand by saying

iv)'the machine is more likely to select different numbers each week than the same ones over and over again'.

It is my contention that your objections, and Bosse's are analogous to somebody criticising iv) above by saying that the machine has already done it, so there's no stochasticity so we can't talk of likelihood, and (in Bosse's case) saying that the machine has no mind so it can't select anything.

So I don't think your objection works.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
But that is the choice isn't it? If 2) were true, and we want to be coherent, we would either have to conclude that we weren't reliable, which undermines the process by which we choose and assess premises anyway, or we reject some premises.

No, our rationality is not in question here, only our cognitive abilities. If our rationality is in question then we might as well give up now. I am also not convinced that we hold any other premises than that we are reliable cognitively, thus if we give up that premise in the hope of maintaining our reliable cognitivity, we would end up in another loop.
That is why I fail to see how the argument in general supposedly destroys naturalism but not anything else such as theism as I cant see how any other ism can escape the same argument.

Originally posted by twhitehead
No, our rationality is not in question here, only our cognitive abilities. If our rationality is in question then we might as well give up now. I am also not convinced that we hold any other premises than that we are reliable cognitively, thus if we give up that premise in the hope of maintaining our reliable cognitivity, we would end up in another loop. ...[text shortened]... t not anything else such as theism as I cant see how any other ism can escape the same argument.

I'm not clear what you mean here. Our rationality certainly would be in question if we ignored the conclusion delivered by our cognitive abilities given the premises we hold.

It is also clear why theism is not vulnerable to P's argument, even if it is vulnerable to others. Although I agree we need not give up now, I don't think that your touching faith in your cognitive ability gives you license to hold any premises you choose and avoid the charge of incoherence.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
I'm not clear what you mean here. Our rationality certainly would be in question if we ignored the conclusion delivered by our cognitive abilities given the premises we hold.

You implied that naturalism could lead to the conclusion that we may not be rational, whereas the argument only suggests that it could lead to the conclusion that our cognitive abilities are flawed. That we are rational is an assumption of the argument and cannot be called into question.

It is also clear why theism is not vulnerable to P's argument, even if it is vulnerable to others.
It is not at all clear to me. How does theism not depend on our cognitive abilities? Are you saying that we could arrive at theism even if our cognitive abilities were irrevocably flawed?

Although I agree we need not give up now, I don't think that your touching faith in your cognitive ability gives you license to hold any premises you choose and avoid the charge of incoherence.
I am still not convinced that any premises are being chosen, other than the premise that our cognitive abilities are at least minimally reliable.
If our investigation of the universe leads us to the conclusion that the universe probably does not exist, then so be it. I get the impression that some Buddhists end up there, though I am not too sure what they are saying much of the time.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
On likelihood, I think it is important to think about what considerations of probability might legitimately allow us to do, and what they can't.

So first let's distinguish between the countless events of reproduction and death and all the causal factors involved therein over time on the one hand. On the other hand we have our theoretical explanatory f ...[text shortened]... s no mind so it can't select anything.

So I don't think your objection works.

Very good posts, LS. 🙂

I'll take a bit of time, because I want to answer them properly.

Originally posted by twhitehead
You implied that naturalism could lead to the conclusion that we may not be rational,
No I didn't. I just pointed out that P's argument makes the case that if you hold that naturalism is true (N) and that we are the product of evolution (E), then the probability that we are reliable cognitive agents is low (or inscrutable). I then made the point that to continue to hold that N&E is true is self-defeating if we also think that premise 2) of the OP is true. Not to recognise this difficulty and to hold N&E and 2) are true would call our rationality into question.

Also I'm not clear what rationality represents for you here, since without reliable cognitive abilities, what does rationality consist in?

It is not at all clear to me.
Theism is not vulnerable to P's argument since the argument depends on holding that N is true. Theists reject N so the argument simply doesn't apply.

How does theism not depend on our cognitive abilities? Are you saying that we could arrive at theism even if our cognitive abilities were irrevocably flawed?
I think what you might be overlooking is that some forms of theism, particularly christian, view the very intelligibility of the universe as an expression of an aspect of god's nature, and that we are made in god's image in respect of that. Thus god underwrites our cognitive abilities. Now this position is vulnerable to all kinds of counter-arguments, it is just that P's is not one of them.

I am still not convinced that any premises are being chosen, other than the premise that our cognitive abilities are at least minimally reliable.
P's argument takes these premises:
(N) naturalism – the view that there are no supernatural beings

(E) evolution - current evolutionary doctrine

If our investigation of the universe leads us to the conclusion that the universe probably does not exist, then so be it.
There is an interesting probablistic argument that concludes that we are more likely than not to be in a simulation (like The Matrix), but I'm unconvinced 🙂

Originally posted by Palynka
Very good posts, LS. 🙂

I'll take a bit of time, because I want to answer them properly.

Thanks. 🙂

You were patient with me, take all the time you want.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Also I'm not clear what rationality represents for you here, since without reliable cognitive abilities, what does rationality consist in?

I cant figure out how to express my concerns clearly. In the first post of this thread it is stated "naturalists are rationally bound" which seems to imply that our rationality is an assumption and is not called into question by the argument. For if our rationality is in question then the easiest is to dismiss the argument as being a result of our imperfect rationality.

As for the rest of your post, I believe I had lost track of the argument and was in error.

I must however point out that the supposed premise:
(N) naturalism – the view that there are no supernatural beings
is flawed as it is not a premise at all but a simple logical necessity. The whole concept of 'supernatural' is self contradictory and can be thrown out on those grounds.
To have fun with the argument in question, if the supernatural exists, then there exists activities in the universe which are not only observable but do not follow any rule pattern and thus our cognitive abilities are inherently flawed - this is not just highly probable but by definition. Therefore we should give up supernaturalism.

Originally posted by twhitehead
I cant figure out how to express my concerns clearly. In the first post of this thread it is stated "naturalists are rationally bound" which seems to imply that our rationality is an assumption and is not called into question by the argument.
That comes back to the choice we talked about earlier. If you accept N, E and 2) then you have essentially two ways to go in order to be coherent:

a) You retain the view that you are rational in the sense of being a reliable cognizer, and throw out either N, E or 2)

b) You keep N, E and 2) but then deduce that your cognition is unreliable. This in turn undermines the faculty you use to choose and assess premises. This is equivalent to sawing off the branch you are sitting on, you cannot hold that you have a rational basis to believe N,E and 2) precisely because you have concluded that you don't have a rational basis for choosing premises like N, E and 2).

For if our rationality is in question then the easiest is to dismiss the argument as being a result of our imperfect rationality.
Somebody raised this objection earlier in the thread, I think it might have been Thinkofone. But it doesn't work because it contains a paradox. It has a similar structure to The Liar Paradox. In short, the only way you can dismiss the argument is to use its conclusion-that you're unreliable. But if you've dismissed it, you can't assume you are unreliable, so you have to accept it. Which means you are unreliable...and so on.

There is a separate argument relating to unreliable faculties sometimes giving correct verdicts, but that would complicate things I think.

On your second point, I agree that the concept of 'the supernatural' is problematic. I don't think I'd go as far as to say it was self-contradictory though. However, there are certainly avenues here to attack the alternatives to N, but I'm not aware that logical necessities are not allowed to be premises, so that in itself doesn't damage P's argument.

To have fun with the argument in question, if the supernatural exists, then there exists activities in the universe which are not only observable but do not follow any rule pattern and thus our cognitive abilities are inherently flawed - this is not just highly probable but by definition. Therefore we should give up supernaturalism.
This doesn't quite work. Supposing there were a god who was responsible for time, space, causality and all the regularities therein. This god would be supernatural, since what we have called the natural world in its entirety and its uniformity would be maintained by this god. In this scenario, god furnishes us, its creatures, with means to track regularities in the world. These cognitive abilities are reliable-they work to deliver true beliefs if used correctly because this god isn't particularly interventionist. Hence N could be false but our faculties reliable.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]Well, this could have gone better. I probably could have been clearer, but the intent of the post was to show that the argument fails even if it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low." As such, the question was asked within this context. Please read thru ...[text shortened]... tive, but as a practical matter, what else is there?
Not my problem really 🙂[/b]

You actually think you have a rational basis for concluding that naturalism and evolution are true, even if they predict that you wouldn't have a rational basis for concluding they were true?

You really seem to be having difficulty in stepping outside P's argument. That you ask this question indicates that you fail to fully understand the situation. "Low probability" is not the same thing as "no probability", yet you seem to proceed as if it is. And once again, ""Keep in mind that for the argument to succeed, it must provide compelling evidence for the naturalist to abandon naturalism." You seem to fail to realize that there is no practical reason for the naturalist to abandon naturalism for the many reasons I've presented earlier.

This might not be a formal argument as in the root 2 case, but where is the air escaping from?

The root 2 case is airtight. It deals in "what is" rather than "what is likely or unlikely" like P's argument. The individual steps in the argument are direct and concrete rather than the indirect and abstract steps of P's argument.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]You actually think you have a rational basis for concluding that naturalism and evolution are true, even if they predict that you wouldn't have a rational basis for concluding they were true?

You really seem to be having difficulty in stepping outside P's argument. That you ask this question indicates that you fail to fully understand the situa ...[text shortened]... direct and concrete rather than the indirect and abstract steps of P's argument.[/b]

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
You really seem to be having difficulty in stepping outside P's argument.
No, I don't think so. Based on what you have said and our dialogue I think it is most likely that you have a strong (and in my view correct) intuition that P's argument is bobbins. But having that intuition reduces your motivation for dotting the 'i's and crossing the 't's on exactly why P's argument fails. You have characterised this as you not coming at the argument from an 'academic' perspective.

In contrast, I have explained why I think P's argument fails, but because I understand logic and probability to an extent, I also recognise that if it were granted that 2) in the OP is true, some problems would ensue.

"Low probability" is not the same thing as "no probability"
I've explained why I think this objection is irrelevant to the argument, so I can only conclude that your lack of interest in the academic side of the argument precludes you from engaging properly, or perhaps you have a blind spot with probability. Of course it is also possible that you are just correct and I am wrong whilst unaware of it, however so far you have not provided compelling arguments that would lead me to suspect that the probability of that is high.

yet you seem to proceed as if it is.
No, that really is a misunderstanding on your part. All P needs is that it is low.

Keep in mind that for the argument to succeed, it must provide compelling evidence for the naturalist to abandon naturalism." You seem to fail to realize that there is no practical reason for the naturalist to abandon naturalism for the many reasons I've presented earlier.
You seem to fail to realize that the many reasons you presented earlier are all circular if you allow premise 2) in the OP. Of course you can continue to get out of bed in the morning and stuff still works, but I prefer to have a clearer idea of the limits on what I can say about why that is the case.

The root 2 case is airtight. It deals in "what is" rather than "what is likely or unlikely" like P's argument. The individual steps in the argument are direct and concrete rather than the indirect and abstract steps of P's argument.
I think we might have to agree to differ at this point. Thanks for an interesting debate though.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]You really seem to be having difficulty in stepping outside P's argument.
No, I don't think so. Based on what you have said and our dialogue I think it is most likely that you have a strong (and in my view correct) intuition that P's argument is bobbins. But having that intuition reduces your motivation for agree to differ at this point. Thanks for an interesting debate though.[/b]

Okay, that's fine, though I wish I at least got some sense that you had some idea of where I'm coming from.

When you can say things like the following:
"Based on what you have said and our dialogue I think it is most likely that you have a strong (and in my view correct) intuition that P's argument is bobbins. But having that intuition reduces your motivation for dotting the 'i's and crossing the 't's on exactly why P's argument fails. You have characterised this as you not coming at the argument from an 'academic' perspective."

it's evident that you have no idea. Not only about P's argument, but what I mean by "practical" vs. "academic". And your comment about "dotting the 'i's and crossing the 't's" is just so misplaced....

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Okay, that's fine, though I wish I at least got some sense that you had some idea of where I'm coming from.

When you can say things like the following:
"Based on what you have said and our dialogue I think it is most likely that you have a strong (and in my view correct) intuition that P's argument is bobbins. But having that intuition reduces your ...[text shortened]... about "dotting the 'i's and crossing the 't's" is just so misplaced....

Well I've tried my best to get an idea of where you are coming from, and I'm sorry that I failed. If you can think of any way to facilitate my understanding of your view then I will try my best again to engage with that process.

The ball is in your court really.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Well I've tried my best to get an idea of where you are coming from, and I'm sorry that I failed. If you can think of any way to facilitate my understanding of your view then I will try my best again to engage with that process.

The ball is in your court really.

Nah, it's okay. We've tried a few things and fallen short. If it were a more important topic, perhaps I'd give it another go. Good kicking it around with you nonetheless.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Nah, it's okay. We've tried a few things and fallen short. If it were a more important topic, perhaps I'd give it another go. Good kicking it around with you nonetheless.

Likewise, here's hoping it goes better next time 🙂