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Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
lol. For you to ask that question I can only surmise that what we have here is a failure to communicate. Right now, I can't think of another way to put it.
You'll get no argument from me on that one.
This doesn't seem to make much sense in light of the rest of my post. Did you read the rest of the post or only up to this line?
I read it all. But we've already agreed that we have a failure to communicate.
But to the naturalist, that P rejects naturalism is irrelevant. Keep in mind that what's required is that the naturalist have compelling evidence to take action. P's argument falls short on any number of levels. Try looking at it from the POV of the naturalist.
I am a naturalist. I just don't think you are getting it. Since I have failed to communicate the salient points I recommend reading LJ's excellent series of posts, with which I'm in total agreement.
This isn't entirely on topic, but you might find this interesting to mull over:
From what I can tell, the vast majority of human beings are not fully rational. Yet they proceed as if they are.
In what way do they proceed as if they are? It isn't apparent to me.
Originally posted by LemonJello[/i]Okay, but doesn’t such an “anything is possible” attitude with regard to the terms of S, such that S is presumably a priori indefeasible to any to any defeater, kick the legs out from under epistemology altogether—for the S-ist as well as the N-ist? And would not such an undermining of epistemology generally undermine the cognitive reliability of the S-ist as well? I still do not see how S can be introduced without undermining all epistemology by turning it into a “game” for which different rules can be declared by just about anybody? And the fact that this or that rule-maker declares that their own rules happen to be the correct ones can’t be taken to cut any epistemic ice.
How would your defeater really constitute an ultimate, or undefeated, defeater (as in a defeater that cannot be defeated)? The proponent of S can say [i]but of course there is wildly varying opinion as it regards the actual content and character of S among proponents of S; and, but of course, there are many who simply reject S. This is actually an insta way of attempting to defeat it", but I am not sure I see how yours would do the same.
Anyway, I’ll concede your point, and try again…
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I’ve been trying to work through (in a sense, as I go) this niggling sense that P’s argument is not only potentially defeasible, but that it is just somehow wrong on the face of it. Let me try the following:
(1) A person P is endowed with cognitive faculties C.
(2) C is reliable [R], (according to some generally accepted understanding of that term).
(3) In applying C, P decides that N.
—This, which was not stated in the OP formulation, is I think critical to my argument here. I doubt that Plantinga would argue that all N-ists simply accepted N on some authority without any cognitive consideration; certainly those N-ists who have argued in favor of N (e.g., N-ist philosophers), demonstrate the application of C to decide/affirm N.
(4) The terms of N undermine (2) [the R premise].
—Or, as it was put in the OP, “gravely calls into question” R. I presume, here, that Plantinga would say that his argument survives under any definition of “undermine”, as it does (I assume) under any definition of “reliable”? (That is, that the argument does not require an explicit contradiction at this premise.)
(5) Therefore the rational choice is for P to reject N.
(6) However, rejection of N undermines (2) as well, in light of (3).
—That is, C was already unreliable in its functioning when it led to the decision N.
(7) Therefore, whether P accepts or rejects N, the reliability of C is undermined.
At this point, I would suggest that Plantinga’s argument leads to an epistemic skepticism in which P can no longer rely on C to even identify where the functioning of C went off the rails—i.e., where P erred in her thinking. However, our generalized understanding of R allows for learning—including learning to think (to apply our C) better.
Suppose I come along and offer P, in her confusion, some alternative to N, called S. P is willing to consider whether or not S provides an escape from her skeptical impasse. But, in order to do so, she needs to now cognitively examine the terms of S! But, in order to trust the now challenged reliability of her cognitive faculties, she must discover—or have pointed out to her—the particular errors of cognition that led to N in the first place; and she must be able to affirm this new knowledge in a way that restores her “faith” in the reliability of her own cognitive faculties. Otherwise, she is left between acknowledging her epistemic skepticism, and accepting (say) some version of S on blind (cognitively unexamined) “faith”.
Originally posted by Lord SharkYou'll get no argument from me on that one.
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]lol. For you to ask that question I can only surmise that what we have here is a failure to communicate. Right now, I can't think of another way to put it.
You'll get no argument from me on that one.
This doesn't seem to make much sense in light of the rest of my post. Did you read the rest of the post f they are.
In what way do they proceed as if they are? It isn't apparent to me.[/b]
I read it all. But we've already agreed that we have a failure to communicate.
I'm not sure, but in light of your following comment, it seems you may believe that I was indicating the communication failure is from you to me rather than the other way around. But, like I said, "For you to ask that question...".
I am a naturalist. I just don't think you are getting it. Since I have failed to communicate the salient points I recommend reading LJ's excellent series of posts, with which I'm in total agreement.
Whether or not you are a naturalist is irrelevant.
I finished reading LJ's posts. Based on what he had to say, from a practical standpoint, I can only give P's argument a "So what?". I have to agree with V that it's a "clever" argument rather than something profound. As an academic exercise, perhaps the argument has value, but from a practical, i.e., reality based POV, it says nothing of importance. Academia has long lost its allure for me.
I was looking at this from a practical rather than academic POV, since I assume that that was the intent of the OP. From that POV, it falls apart with the premise that "probability" should override the accumulative experience of the naturalist. And yes, I understand the point about "cognitive reliability", however I find the argument that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low" as grossly insufficient for a naturalist to reasonably believe that "their cognitive apparatus has been called into such grave question." He may reasonably have some doubts about it, but certainly not GRAVE doubts.
Like I keep saying, when all is said and done, either humans are "reliable cognitive agents" or they aren't.
In what way do they proceed as if they are? It isn't apparent to me.
As if they are fully rational, even though on some level they realize they aren't.
Originally posted by LemonJello[/i]
How would your defeater really constitute an ultimate, or undefeated, defeater (as in a defeater that cannot be defeated)? The proponent of S can say [i]but of course there is wildly varying opinion as it regards the actual content and character of S among proponents of S; and, but of course, there are many who simply reject S. This is actually an insta way of attempting to defeat it", but I am not sure I see how yours would do the same.
The proponent of S can say but of course there is wildly varying opinion as it regards the actual content and character of S among proponents of S; and, but of course, there are many who simply reject S. This is actually an instance of disagreement that we should expect. God brought about conditions that conduce to such disagreement because he wants us to relate with him in a genuine way. Imagine if the cognitive reliability that God extended to our general cognitive terrain also extended to belief in him, such that it merely passively garnered the cool assent of our intellect! We would be like robots and that is not real love! Real love requires there to be a volitional aspect to our "believing in" him and relating with him, and that is why he didn't extend our cold cognitive reliability to this particular inquiry: he wanted to make it a matter of faith so that we can have the volitional opportunity to genuinely and passionately love him and relate with him, or reject him! Even if you don't happen to find this response all that satisfactory, doesn't this proponent of S now basically have a defeater for your defeater? I wouldn't put it past S-proponents to come up with any number of conceivable defeaters for your defeater.
I just thought, that the proponent of N can just as well say: “Well, there may be aspects of N that are inscrutable, but that is to be expected. We are not omniscient. If all aspects of N were perfectly scrutable, there would be no need for further scientific inquiry at all, and we would be omniscient with regard to N (or at least close to it). Naturalist investigation proceeds by observation, hypothesis, testing, etc. One expects to discover anomalies along the way that require new information, and even new directions of thought. There may be aspects of the natural cosmos that forever elude us—aspects of its “syntax” that simply are beyond the limits of the “grammar” of our consciousness. The fact that we are not is no reason to introduce a supernatural category of any kind to offer speculative “answers” to the gaps of our knowledge. Whatever inscrutabilities and mysteries there are can be natural ones as well as supernatural ones…”
Or some such response; I’ll not belabor it. It’s just a case of what sauce for the S-ist is also sauce for the N–ist. Or else the N-ist and the S-ist are simply playing two different—and non-congruent—epistemic games.
I have a personal concern with regard to this whole line of discussion—fascinating (and hopefully enlightening) as it is:
A philosopher initialed P presents an argument. I appear to be unable, on my own cognitive recognizance, so to speak, to properly challenge that argument. A philosopher (or two) initialed L both show me my errors, and eventually make what appears to be a proper challenge to P.
Okay, all of that is part of the learning process. But, I am beginning to doubt the reliability of my cognitive faculties (intelligence, skill, educational background) to decide satisfactorily between P and L (and P’s counters to L, and L’s counters to P’s counters, etc.). In fact, I may lack the cognitive ability to decide (ala Sextus Empiricus) if the two sides are equipollent, such that my most reasonable course is to suspend judgment.
So, at some point, I may be faced with deciding “on faith” among “philosopher-priests”, or simply remaining agnostic on many of these questions. Those of you who know me know how intensely I dislike either option! 🙂 [Although L certainly has a better track record with me…]
That is, I reach a point (which seems frighteningly near) at which I do not trust the reliability of my own cognitive faculties to reach a conclusion that is ultimately based on anything more than an “it just seems to me”, without pursuing it any further, and without even being able to defend a claim that I have been able to sort the evidence reliably well to this point. This is perhaps the weakest sort of agnosticism; but it is not much different than my agnosticism about the relative flavors of all kinds of mushrooms—that is, different topics have different subjective diminishing rates of interest as well as diminishing abilities to continue the inquiry (which likely positively correlate). It has taken a long, long time for me to approach the point where further inquiry on such philosophical issues starts to seem both fruitless and frustrating. But I am pretty close…
And I will likely choose agnosticism over recognizing a priesthood…
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LJ: This may be the price of inquiring further and further into the nature of “that moon”!
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Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
I'm not sure, but in light of your following comment, it seems you may believe that I was indicating the communication failure is from you to me rather than the other way around. But, like I said, "For you to ask that question...".
I believe that a communication failure has happened and I'm agnostic on the question as to in which direction it mostly occurred. The reason I asked the dice question is that I was trying to explore reasons why you think your comments on Plantinga's appeal to probability are relevant.
Whether or not you are a naturalist is irrelevant.
Not really since I am also speaking from the point of view of a naturalist. That's what you said I ought to do, I'm letting you know that I'm doing that already.
From that POV, it falls apart with the premise that "probability" should override the accumulative experience of the naturalist.
That is the point you keep making that escapes me still. You say that when all is said and done, either humans are "reliable cognitive agents" or they aren't. But as LJ pointed out, Plantinga doesn't dispute this. He says that we are reliable, and when we apply our cognition reliably we ought to assent to the fact that the likelihood of us being that way due to evolution is low. Now surely you see the point that, even if it is possible that we are the lottery winners, by definition the probability is low that we are. More to the point though is that you would have no way of knowing that we were. The cup would still be covering the dice. That's why probability applies despite the fact that we already either are reliable or not.
I don't think I ever see people proceed as if they are fully rational.
Now, I don't disagree that the OP argument fails and is unconvincing. I just think if you're going to bother criticising it you might as well be accurate.
Originally posted by Lord SharkHmmm, in the context of what I wrote, I'm not sure why you bothered to respond as you did. I really don't care about P's argument as an academic exercise. I don't know, maybe you have yet to have made a distinction between academia and the real world. A lot of people seem to get trapped in academia and never find their way out. From what I can tell, you are approaching this from the POV of an academic "philosopher" rather than that of a naturalist. From a practical standpoint, P's argument is meaningless for some of the reasons that I've already pointed out.
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]I'm not sure, but in light of your following comment, it seems you may believe that I was indicating the communication failure is from you to me rather than the other way around. But, like I said, "For you to ask that question...".
I believe that a communication failure has happened and I'm agnostic on the q ...[text shortened]... think if you're going to bother criticising it you might as well be accurate.[/b]
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Originally posted by ThinkOfOneOk, you don't care about P's argument as an academic exercise and you have described, from what you say is a practical standpoint, why you think the argument is meaningless.
Hmmm, in the context of what I wrote, I'm not sure why you bothered to respond as you did. I really don't care about P's argument as an academic exercise. I don't know, maybe you have yet to have made a distinction between academia and the real world. A lot of people seem to get trapped in academia and never find their way out. From what I can tell, you a ...[text shortened]... oint, P's argument is meaningless for some of the reasons that I've already pointed out.
I think P's is an academic philosophical argument. If academic exercises are not for you, that's fair enough. You can criticise it from outside that standpoint as being silly or meaningless or whatever.
But you said:
"Starting with naturalist premises leads us to doubt our cognitive faculties" only if one doesn't see the folly in assigning attributes to individual members of a group based on probabilities for that group."
Which is
a) a criticism from a theoretical standpoint-one an academic might make
b) wrong
So it seems to me you are trying to have things both ways.
Originally posted by Lord SharkI'm not sure what you mean by "both ways". I suspect that you and I don't draw the line between "academic" and "practical" at the same place. While I don't care about purely academic exercises, I do care about truth, i.e., reality. P's argument says nothing meaningful about naturalism and whether or not the beliefs of naturalists is reasonable. I suspect that it's value is from the POV of forming "proper" arguments and counterarguments. What you quoted is only a part of the picture.
Ok, you don't care about P's argument as an academic exercise and you have described, from what you say is a practical standpoint, why you think the argument is meaningless.
I think P's is an academic philosophical argument. If academic exercises are not for you, that's fair enough. You can criticise it from outside that standpoint as being silly or me ...[text shortened]... demic might make
b) wrong
So it seems to me you are trying to have things both ways.
Perhaps you missed the following when I posted it earlier:
I have to agree with V that it's a "clever" argument rather than something profound. As an academic exercise, perhaps the argument has value, but from a practical, i.e., reality based POV, it says nothing of importance. Academia has long lost its allure for me.
I was looking at this from a practical rather than academic POV, since I assume that that was the intent of the OP. From that POV, it falls apart with the premise that "probability" should override the accumulative experience of the naturalist. And yes, I understand the point about "cognitive reliability", however I find the argument that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low" as grossly insufficient for a naturalist to reasonably believe that "their cognitive apparatus has been called into such grave question." He may reasonably have some doubts about it, but certainly not GRAVE doubts.
Whether or not my position is "properly formed" is irrelevant to me. It does, however, address why I find P's argument meaningless.
It seems you find it "improper" for me to hold such a position.
Originally posted by vistesdBut all we have is our self and our specific cognitive agents, and even these are empty -so we have to keep up moving!
I have a personal concern with regard to this whole line of discussion—fascinating (and hopefully enlightening) as it is:
A philosopher initialed P presents an argument. I appear to be unable, on my own cognitive recognizance, so to speak, to properly challenge that argument. A philosopher (or two) initialed L both show me my errors, and eventually make ...[text shortened]... : This may be the price of inquiring further and further into the nature of “that moon”!
Nagasena would rather say that Plantinga commits an error when he suggests that evolutionary naturalism is self-defeating whilst the traditional theism is not, because neither position has an answer to hyperbolic doubt: the evolutionists are unable to justify the theory by means other than critically assessing the amassed evidence and employing rules of inference that seem sound according with given scientific facts and vidence, and on the other hand the theists believe that their so called superior cognitive agents are superior because they were designed by God.
Plantinga attempts to destabilize the naturalistic theories, but the implementation of Quantum Darwinism and of our modern sciences make naturalism an acceptable procedure; compare this fact with the fact that set Sextus Empiricus out of the game (for example, archaeology is so accurate nowdays that at least some of the once upon a time supposed historical facts are considered today validated historical facts).
Therefore, since Plantinga cannot offer an argument that refutes scepticism for his theistic thesis too, methinks his argument fails😵
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Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
I'm not sure what you mean by "both ways". I suspect that you and I don't draw the line between "academic" and "practical" at the same place.
You want to claim that your concerns are just technical enough to bear on P's argument, but not so technical as to render them an 'academic exercise'. I think the distinction is baloney. If you are making a point about the attribution of probability to members and groups and calling that 'practical', then yes, we draw these lines in different places.
I do care about truth, i.e., reality. P's argument says nothing meaningful about naturalism and whether or not the beliefs of naturalists is reasonable. I suspect that it's value is from the POV of forming "proper" arguments and counterarguments. What you quoted is only a part of the picture.
I disagree. If premise 2) of the presentation of the argument in the OP were true, then a naturalist who was also a rationalist would have a problem. Again you seem to want to introduce a bogus distinction, as if your counters to P's argument are correct but just not "proper". Good sound arguments that aren't wearing the proper tie and jacket perhaps, rather than simply wrong which is how I see things.
Perhaps you missed the following when I posted it earlier:
No I saw that. I agree with you that P's argument isn't profound, but that's because it is wrong, not because it isn't couched in terms you approve of.
however I find the argument that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low" as grossly insufficient for a naturalist to reasonably believe that "their cognitive apparatus has been called into such grave question."
I agree. It is flawed. It seems to me we disagree over precisely where the flaw lies. I gave an indication of why I think 2) is wrong which seems to be at odds with the reason you have given for why the argument fails.
Whether or not my position is "properly formed" is irrelevant to me. It does, however, address why I find P's argument meaningless.
This has nothing to do with properly formed arguments. I was trying to debate with you about why P's argument fails. I don't mind what form your argument comes in as long as it makes sense.
It seems you find it "improper" for me to hold such a position.
No I just think you are wrong about the flaw in P's argument and have tried to explain why I think so.
Originally posted by Lord SharkHmmmm, from your responses I gather that not only don't you understand my objections to P's argument, you don't understand where I'm coming from in general.
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]I'm not sure what you mean by "both ways". I suspect that you and I don't draw the line between "academic" and "practical" at the same place.
You want to claim that your concerns are just technical enough to bear on P's argument, but not so technical as to render them an 'academic exercise'. I think the dist w in P's argument and have tried to explain why I think so.[/b]
So, let's try this another way.
I gather that what you find incorrect about P's argument is that you believe that the probability that random mutation and natural selection can produce reliable cognitive agents is high rather than low. Is this correct? If so, do you believe that the probability is 100% or something less than that? If something less than that, at what percentage would you say that P's argument fails?
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Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Hmmmm, from your responses I gather that not only don't you understand my objections to P's argument, you don't understand where I'm coming from in general.
You might be right. Let's see if we can find out.
I gather that what you find incorrect about P's argument is that you believe that the probability that random mutation and natural selection can produce reliable cognitive agents is high rather than low. Is this correct?
Yes.
If so, do you believe that the probability is 100% or something less than that?
Something less than that.
If something less than that, at what percentage would you say that P's argument fails?
This is not the kind of probability that you can calculate and give a percentage for. P's case is that the probability is very low (or inscrutable).
You could ask whether it would fail if the probability was more like evens or around there. I'd say that the lower the probability the greater the problem the argument poses for rational naturalists who hold that something like evolution by natural selection is true.
Originally posted by Lord Shark[/b]Seems like it could be quite the ordeal. I imagine quite a long string of arguments, counter arguments and so on for determining such things as the reliability factor of evolution producing "cognitive agents", the reliability of the reliability factor, how to deal with the level of inscrutability, the highest reliability factor for which abandonment of the belief in naturalism is reasonable, etc.
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]Hmmmm, from your responses I gather that not only don't you understand my objections to P's argument, you don't understand where I'm coming from in general.
You might be right. Let's see if we can find out.
I gather that what you find incorrect about P's argument is that you believe that the probabilit tional naturalists who hold that something like evolution by natural selection is true.
I think that P's argument is so fundamentally flawed that the above is unnecessary, so before you start all that, how about trying a simple thought experiment?
Let's start with the premise in P's argument that "naturalism is true".
Let's say we also concede that the probability is below the threshold.
Let's imagine a billion planets where naturalism is true and the probability is below the threshold.
We run through P's argument for each planet and a billion times we come up with the answer that it is reasonable to abandon the belief in naturalism.
Naturalism is true and the "reasonable" course of action is to abandon belief in it? Even when it is conceded that the probability is below the threshold? P's argument doesn't arrive at an incorrect answer some of the time - or most of the time - but all of the time.
If anything is "self-defeating" it is P's argument.
Here are a couple places that it goes wrong:
1) Determining cognitive reliability based on the probability of evolution producing reliable cognitive agents rather than looking at actual cognitive ability.
2) Determining the reasonableness of belief in naturalism based on a calculated cognitive reliability rather than looking at the actual validity of naturalism.
Seems to me that things start going awry in #1, so that's where I started.
If you want to argue that if the probability is below the threshold, it is still "reasonable" to doubt the reliability of one's cognitive apparatus to the extent that one abandons the belief in naturalism even though it is the incorrect action, then I have to question your definition of "reason".