08 Jan 08
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesFour edits for (what amounts to) public self-fulfillment? Your solo orgy is unwarranted and unbecoming. Perhaps a sabbatical is in order.
Compared to me, you understand less about this material than the the tsetse fly understands about nuclear fission.
I am an intellectual giant and you are but an ant roaming aimlessly in my shadow.
My critical thinking skills surpass in grandeur any accomplishment you shall ever achieve in your lifetime.
I am so far to the right of you on t ...[text shortened]... of yore. I don't need a lesson about propositions from you. Your claim is empirically false.
08 Jan 08
The contradiction continues to be obvious, to those with eyes to see. Here is the problem, recast for maximum elucidation:
(1) P and Q are propositions.
(2) "If P then Q" is an argument, according to which P entails Q. Note that the argument needn't be deductive, or even true: the question is whether the argument is believed to be true.
(3) "The magic wand" is a hypothetical empirical agency which causes someone to deny Q. Logically, the magic wand can work in only one of two ways: (a) by causing someone to believe that Q is either false or unproven; (b) by causing someone to claim that they deny Q even though they actually believe Q. It is assumed here that the magic wand operates only in mode (a). To eliminate logical ambiguity it is also assumed that the magic wand has no effect on beliefs about P.
Now postulate a subject -- some sentient being -- who has been affected by the magic wand. This subject verbally affirms both P and the argument claiming that P entails Q. The subject also denies Q.
Question: Is it logically possible for the subject, at the time Q is denied, to fully believe both P and the argument according to which P entails Q?
Answer: Since the magic wand works by causing the subject to believe that Q is either false or unproven, the subject cannot simultaneously believe that Q is proven at the time he denies Q. Therefore he cannot fully believe the argument that P entails Q at the time he denies Q.
Postulating a subject who fully believes P and the argument that P entails Q, at the time he denies Q (as Bbarr has done) is therefore equivalent to asserting that the subject simultaneously holds contradictory beliefs to be true: namely, the belief that Q has been proven and the belief that Q has not been proven.
08 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsPeople do this all the time. People are capable of being illogical and irrational.
Postulating a subject who fully believes P and the argument that P entails Q, at the time he denies Q (as Bbarr has done) is therefore equivalent to asserting that the subject simultaneously holds contradictory beliefs to be true: namely, the belief that Q has been proven and the belief that Q has not been proven.
(emphasis added)
An example typical of this forum: A theist who believes both "God is love" and "God sentences lots of people to eternal torment in hell".
08 Jan 08
Originally posted by SwissGambitI don't think those people exist. They insist that people sentence themselves to Hell generally.
People do this all the time. People are capable of being illogical and irrational.
An example typical of this forum: A theist who believes both "God is love" and "God sentences lots of people to eternal torment in hell".
08 Jan 08
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsWell, something here is obvious: You don't know what you're talking about and have no background in even first-order logic.
The contradiction continues to be obvious, to those with eyes to see. Here is the problem, recast for maximum elucidation:
(1) P and Q are propositions.
(2) "If P then Q" is an argument, according to which P entails Q. Note that the argument needn't be deductive, or even true: the question is whether the argument is believed to be true.
(3) "T ...[text shortened]... true: namely, the belief that Q has been proven and the belief that Q has not been proven.
P and Q are propositions. 'P->Q' is also a proposition, one that claims that the truth of P guarantees the truth of Q. The '->' symbol is a truth-functional connective. While it is true that the conjunction of P and P->Q entails Q, it is not the case that the conjunction of the proposition 'S believes P' with the proposition 'S believes P->Q' entails the proposition 'S believes that Q'. This is what the examples I provided earlier show. You can claim until you're blue in the face that S simply must believe Q if he believes the prior propositions, but what is the sense of the modal term 'must'? It can not be the 'must' of logical necessity, since no logical contradiction of the form (P & ~P) is derivable from the the conjunction of the propositions 'S believes P', 'S believes P->Q', and 'It is not the case that S believes Q'. But, it is not the 'must' of nomological necessity either, since it is perfectly possible, in the actual world, for a brain lesion to prevent a subject from believing in accord with what he takes to be sufficient or decisive reason.
08 Jan 08
Originally posted by AThousandYoungOf course they exist. Most of those who put all the blame on man are ignoring parts of Matthew and Revelations that make it clear that God does the judging. They must shift focus off of God's involvement, because it's an embarrassment to their position. That doesn't mean they don't believe that He is involved. Some of the more honest ones will admit as much.
I don't think those people exist. They insist that people sentence themselves to Hell generally.
08 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsVariation on the “Two-Part Intervention” from GED:
The contradiction continues to be obvious, to those with eyes to see. Here is the problem, recast for maximum elucidation:
(1) P and Q are propositions.
(2) "If P then Q" is an argument, according to which P entails Q. Note that the argument needn't be deductive, or even true: the question is whether the argument is believed to be true.
(3) "T true: namely, the belief that Q has been proven and the belief that Q has not been proven.
“You can’t really believe (Q & ~Q). That’s irrational.”
“Nevertheless, I do.”
“But no one can actually be so irrational.”
“Nevertheless.”
“You must be lying.”
“I don’t think I am.”
“Now you’re lying about that.”
“I don’t think I am.”
“Now— Well, if you’re not lying, then you really just don’t believe what you believe.”
“Well, it seems to me that I do.”
“You don’t believe that either!”
“So— You’re saying that I don’t believe that I believe what I believe?”
“Exactly!”
“But, do I believe that I believe that I believe what I believe?”
“Of course not!”
“But do I believe that I . . .”
“Stop it! If you persist in this irrationality, we’ll be here all night!”
“But... I thought you said no one could be that irrational.”
“So, you must be lying.”
“I don’t think I am. . .”
08 Jan 08
Originally posted by vistesd“You can’t really believe (Q & ~Q). That’s irrational.”
[b]Variation on the “Two-Part Intervention” from GED:
“You can’t really believe (Q & ~Q). That’s irrational.”
“Nevertheless, I do.”
“But no one can actually be so irrational.”
“Nevertheless.”
“You must be lying.”
“I don’t think I am.”
“Now you’re lying about that.”
“I don’t think I am.”
“Now— Well, if yo ...[text shortened]... said no one could be that irrational.”
“So, you must be lying.”
“I don’t think I am. . .”[/b]
“Nevertheless, I do.”
"No, you don't. You believe that you believe it, but you're mistaken."
09 Jan 08
3 edits
Originally posted by Mark AdkinsPostulating a subject who fully believes P and the argument that P entails Q, at the time he denies Q (as Bbarr has done) is therefore equivalent to asserting that the subject simultaneously holds contradictory beliefs to be true: namely, the belief that Q has been proven and the belief that Q has not been proven.
The contradiction continues to be obvious, to those with eyes to see. Here is the problem, recast for maximum elucidation:
(1) P and Q are propositions.
(2) "If P then Q" is an argument, according to which P entails Q. Note that the argument needn't be deductive, or even true: the question is whether the argument is believed to be true.
(3) "T true: namely, the belief that Q has been proven and the belief that Q has not been proven.
No. This is false because, as bbarr already pointed out, the conjunction of "S believes P" and "S believes P => Q" does not logically entail "S believes Q". This is the obvious error you keep making.
Again, this statement of yours is clearly false. What comes below is really just an aside.
-----------
Beyond that I'm not convinced this would help you even if it were true. You were supposed to derive a logical contradiction. How is "that the subject simultaneously holds contradictory beliefs to be true" a logical contradiction? Does a logical contradiction follow from the conjunction of "S believes Q" and "S believes not-Q"? I don't see how one does.
09 Jan 08
Originally posted by AThousandYoungNice.
“You can’t really believe (Q & ~Q). That’s irrational.”
“Nevertheless, I do.”
"No, you don't. You believe that you believe it, but you're mistaken."
“But I don’t believe that I’m mistaken . . .”
Enough! I can’t carry on this exercise in absurdity any further—else I might start asking people, not what I should believe (for whatever reasons), but what I actually believe, and must believe.
In my few years on here, I have had many people present arguments for what I should believe (from which I have often profited greatly); I have had, on a few occasions, people tell me what I actually believe (contra to my claimed beliefs, the counter generally cast in terms of ulterior motives, or unconscious aims and desires); there have likely been times when I have argued irrationally (and hopefully have learned from having that pointed out), and certainly there have been times when I have argued badly or clumsily; it is really a rare thing, however, to be told what I must (of logical or nomological necessity) believe—whether I believe that I believe it, or not.
There’s a Zen koan in there somewhere, and I retire to ponder it.
09 Jan 08
Originally posted by vistesdOh no. You're bringing musts into this now?!
Nice.
“But I don’t believe that I’m mistaken . . .”
Enough! I can’t carry on this exercise in absurdity any further—else I might start asking people, not what I should believe (for whatever reasons), but what I actually believe, and must believe.
In my few years on here, I have had many people present arguments for what I should bel ...[text shortened]... that I believe it, or not.
There’s a Zen koan in there somewhere, and I retire to ponder it.
09 Jan 08
1 edit
Originally posted by AThousandYoungLOL!!!
Oh no. You're bringing musts into this now?!
I am not the one who has been arguing for necessary beliefs, so I am not the one who brought it in. Which you very well know—and you’re just trumping me (quite well, too: well played! I concede). 🙂
EDIT:
I can’t take anything seriously anymore today. Too much sheer en-joy-ment (if that is possible). Regards, as always, ATY. Be well.
09 Jan 08
Originally posted by vistesdI'll do my best. There's an awful lot of dangerous and deceptive terminology flying about this area.
LOL!!!
I am not the one who has been arguing for necessary beliefs, so I am not the one who brought it in. Which you very well know—and you’re just trumping me (quite well, too: well played! I concede). 🙂
EDIT:
I can’t take anything seriously anymore today. Too much sheer en-joy-ment (if that is possible). Regards, as always, ATY. Be well.