09 Jan '08 06:52>
Originally posted by AThousandYoungYes, and I’ve likely added to that. I’m not the logician that Dr. S. or bbarr or LJ are. Nevertheless, I think that Mark’s claims cannot be supported; and that he compounds the problem when he asserts, on the one hand, that people can or cannot* of necessity believe certain things—even if they claim to—and, on the other hand, asserts that a person’s beliefs cannot be empirically determined.
I'll do my best. There's an awful lot of dangerous and deceptive terminology flying about this area.
Hence my perhaps clumsy attempt at a reductio on page 15 (I need the practice, though).
On the other hand, Mark seems to be claiming that such dissonance is either logically or empirically impossible. Then I am either lying or, perhaps, as you put it, simply mistaken in believing that I believe X: but if I don’t believe that I am so mistaken, then I believe that I believe that I believe X... And then it seems to me we are getting into the realm of the absurd (it even starts to sound like something out of Samuel Beckett).
However, if my belief in X entails a contradiction [(Q & ~Q)], then if I am aware of the contradiction, and am thinking rationally, I should reject that belief.
* I see where my use of must or must not could be confusing here.