20 Oct '05 18:00>
Originally posted by David CNo, it does not.
[b]It follows then, from this definition of objective value
No, it does not. Although some (some, not all) might feel that way, I personally do not. I also do not believe that your god exists. It is in my nature as a human to subjectively sympathize with the other humans that are here with me. I might feel differently if I was a lion.
How is thi ...[text shortened]...
It does everything of the sort. What do you think the conclusion of Craig's fallacy is?[/b]
Yes, it does follow from your definition of 'objective value'.
Although some (some, not all) might feel that way, I personally do not.
Now you're talking about your subjective valuation of people. That's why I asked my follow-up question.
You might as well be saying (People really don't have [purple monkey dishwasher]).
No. The definition for 'objective value' that you provided is well-formed and meaningful. Even an evolutionary creationist will accept that it is not a meaningless definition *. Hence, in the context of our conversation, "People really don't have 'objective value'" is not the same as saying what you say above.
Frankly, I think of myself as a partially insane ...
I wouldn't disagree.
... agnostic.
Are you both an atheist and an agnostic, then?
I said:
... just what I think a reasonable atheist evolutionist would say.
to which you responded:
... you have absolutely no clue how I (and I presume others) feel.
implying that you are an atheist evolutionist.
If you are not an atheist, then what was the purpose of that post? Simply to abuse me?
It does everything of the sort. What do you think the conclusion of Craig's fallacy is?
Let's look at Craig's argument (the first part, which deals with value):
(A) If God exists, then our valuation of people ought to come from the fact that they were created by God.
(B) God does not exist.
(C) If God does not exist, then our valuation of people ought to come from Nature.
(D) From (B) and (C), our valuation of people ought to come from Nature.
(E) According to the theory of natural selection, the strongest and fittest individuals in Nature survive and thrive.
(F) From (D) and (E), we ought to value the strongest and fittest individuals who can survive and thrive in Nature.
(G) Men are stronger and fitter than women at surviving and thriving in Nature.
(H) From (F) and (G), we ought to value men over women.
(H'😉 We ought to value men and women equally.
This is the reductio.
Craig's argument is that (A), (C), (E), (G) and (H'😉 are true. Hence (B) must be false, and God exists.
LJ's refutation is that (C) is, in fact, not true for many reasons:
1. Just because something is the case in Nature does not mean it ought to be so in ethics. (The Is-Ought Fallacy)
2. If God does not exist, then we are not constrained to taking our basis of moral valuation from Nature. (I think this is an instance of the Excluded Middle Fallacy)
Further, LJ argues that, even if (C) is true, Craig only makes a case for a belief in the existence of God - not the existence of God Himself (essentially, you need to replace the existence of God in the above argument with belief in the existence of God; i.e. "If we believe that God does not exist" etc.)
Note that LJ's refutation does not actually demonstrate that (B) must be true (i.e. LJ does not actually prove that God does not exist) and hence his refutation does not render the theistic perspective on what constitutes objective value in human beings meaningless.
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* He will not accept it is the definition of 'objective value', though.