07 Aug 06
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerIs that an axiom in your evaluative system?
Where we differ is that I don't attribute them to supernatural causes - a creator god for example.
Is that an axiom in your evaluative system?
I prefer natural causes and explanations.
Do you end up creating natural-seeming causes and explanations to explain them away?
Not answering for ammanion— That is an axiom for me. To paraphrase Laplace, in a slightly different context, “I have found no need for the hypothesis.” (In my case, it is that I no longer have need of the hypothesis.) At bottom, I assume that whatever “mystical” experiences and unexplained happenings there are, are part of a weird natural world—without assuming the supernatural category.
Do you end up creating natural-seeming causes and explanations to explain them away?
What’s the difference between attempting to find a natural explanation for something, and explaining it away? If there is a reasonable, natural explanation—or at least a reasonable hypothesis—why inject the supernatural category? (See Scott’s post on page 1 and my personal expansion on page 2 of the “Is it God?” thread: http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=48933&page=2 )
And even if not, is it necessary to speculate about supernatural forces? Can that not be in itself an attempt to “explain away” the mystery? And does that not lead to the “God of the gaps” problem—or at least a ghost in the gaps? Is something like Amit Goswami’s hypothesis of a “self-aware universe” more fantastic than a supernatural speculation?
From a religious perspective, is the mystery always to be explained? Does it need to be explained so badly that the supernatural category (e.g., divine supernatural revelation) needs to be admitted?
NOTE: By “natural,” I don’t mean in accord with all the known laws of the universe. Nor does the term entail that scientists will necessarily be able to eventually explain all the mysteries (they, of course, must proceed as if they can)—if they do, then the gaps are closed.
07 Aug 06
2 edits
Originally posted by vistesdLet me see if I can explain my question another way. It involves Occam's Razor.
What’s the difference between attempting to find a natural explanation for something, and explaining it away?
Let's suppose we lived in a world where only one person has ever claimed to have a vision of God. Suppose the shared beliefs of both theists (for simplicity, suppose there were only one kind) and atheists is S. Now, the theists' system of beliefs is S+G (for God) whereas that of the atheists is just S. Now, the theists will use G to explain said vision. What would the atheists do?
Now, the atheists might claim that it just a hallucination (the world already contains people who hallucinate; i.e. hallucinations are part of S). Since the atheists' can apparently explain the phenomenon with just S, Occam's Razor dictates that S (rather than S+H) is the preferred explanation.
But, is the atheist actually using S? If every other instance of hallucinations involved drugs, psychological stress etc. -- but this one didn't (the person claiming the vision does not use drugs, was under no psychological stress etc.); then isn't it the case that the atheist has actually added a new premise to his system, a new entity that, while superficially similar to known entities, is actually quite different under the skin? Isn't the atheists' belief system now really S+RH (religious hallucination) instead of just S? Occam's Razor would not apply in this case (because both systems have the same number of assumptions).
One might argue that S+RH is still preferable to S+G because RH is a naturalistic explanation. But now, if you had a person who had a mystical trance in this world, (for similar reasons as above) it would now be S+RH+RT (religious trance) vs. S+G. Here, Occam's Razor would dictate a preference for S+G -- although S+RH+RT uses only naturalistic explanations.
I could go on with other kinds of religious experience (mass visions, miracles etc.). At what point is the atheist simply creating naturalistic entities just so he doesn't have to accept G? Do you see my point?
07 Aug 06
2 edits
Originally posted by lucifershammerThat's good food for thought. It's good to see you back in the forums.
Let me see if I can explain my question another way. It involves Occam's Razor.
Let's suppose we lived in a world where only one person has ever claimed to have a vision of God. Suppose the shared beliefs of both theists (for simplicity, suppose there were only one kind) and atheists is S. Now, the theists' system of beliefs is S+G (for God) wherea ting naturalistic entities just so he doesn't have to accept G? Do you see my point?
But when it comes to matters of sensus divinitatis, I don't think Occam has much utility. What would be useful, though, is a good debate on internalism versus externalism. In short, is this person's worldview inclusion of '+ G' (based on what he takes to be manifestation of the divine sensorium -- his 'vision'😉 warranted? I would argue for an externalist view (if G exists, then probably; if G doesn't exist, then probably not).
BTW, I don't think it is accurate to make axiomatic the preclusion of supernatural explanation. I see no basis for a priori exclusion of the supernatural. I would argue instead for contingent naturalism. We can make a very strong inductive argument that justifies the extended search for natural explanations.
Besides, apart from explaining a 'vision of G', how exactly does '+ G' help the theist in explaining virtually anything else? How would he go from 'G exists' to 'G is responsible for X', and how would such a leap be warranted? (where X is something other than a direct manifestation of G itself.) For example, just because he holds to S+G, that doesn't mean it is warranted for him to attribute just any old as-yet-unexplained-by-naturalism effects to G, does it?
07 Aug 06
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerOkay, that helps—
Let me see if I can explain my question another way. It involves Occam's Razor.
Let's suppose we lived in a world where only one person has ever claimed to have a vision of God. Suppose the shared beliefs of both theists (for simplicity, suppose there were only one kind) and atheists is S. Now, the theists' system of beliefs is S+G (for God) wherea ting naturalistic entities just so he doesn't have to accept G? Do you see my point?
But now, if you had a person who had a mystical trance in this world, (for similar reasons as above) it would now be S+RH+RT (religious trance) vs. S+G.
I would say that the “trance” is a fact that could be explained by RH, rather than an additional assumption. (Again, see the thread I cited, just for the fact that I don’t personally think that hallucination is the only possibility.)
Also, I’m not sure that RH is an assumption either , rather a hypothesis that may be stated based on the (set of) naturalistic assumption(s) underlying S.
I would also add that I think by adding the supernatural, you are really admitting a whole other category which likely has more than one assumption at it’s foundation. Basically, in your formulation, the set of assumptions entailed by S+G could not exceed the set of assumptions entailed by S+x without violating Occam’s Razor (assuming the explanatory value of G and x to be at least equal).
Suppose, instead of S+G, I propose S+M (no hidden pun intended!), where “M” stands for mystery—situations (currently) unexplained within my belief system S, and about which I can not form a reasonable hypothesis based on current knowledge. This too may be another category, but it would seem to me much more like a statistical error-term, without requiring any further speculation until and unless there is some evidence that allows the formation of a hypothesis within S. It requires no non-naturalistic additional assumption. It seems that in this case, the two alternative systems could be represented by: (S+M) and (S+M)+G.
At what point is the atheist simply creating naturalistic entities just so he doesn't have to accept G? Do you see my point?
I see the point. Personally, I get rather nostalgic for G. (This might be why my former usage of the phrase “ground of being” was problematic, which you once pointed out—sometimes I think I just substituted GoB for G, without going further)
But, just to expand this a bit, suppose I am a non-supernaturalist Advaita Vedantin—does S+B (where “B” is Brahman, but stands for the whole sarvon khalvidam Brahma system). Now, we both share S, but we each are “adding” different metaphysical accounts to explain S. Are G and B truly equivalent, or are they qualitatively different? Can we assess them in terms of Occam’s Razor?
NOTE: This is only about bringing in G as an explanatory variable for otherwise unexplained events. I am not saying there may not be other valid reasons for assuming G (aesthetics for instance—didn’t Urs von Balthasar have something to say about that?)
EDIT: I always enjoy the stimulation you give me in these discussions—good for me to be challenged, and when necessary corrected. But, aren’t we both now spending more time here than we said we were going to? 😉
BTW, I’m thinking of a new metaphysical term: nonsuperntauralisticexpialadocius! 😛
07 Aug 06
Originally posted by lucifershammerSorry, missed this: for me it is, because I am letting the gaps be gaps in that case. I am not compelled to assume either that (1) science, including cognitive science, will someday fill them, or (2) that, absent that, it is somehow necessary to find a ghost for the job.
The thrust of my previous post was -- is that any less a God/ghost of the gaps?
The problem is, by asserting the ghost, one is implicity assuming that science will never fill that gap--which has had embarrassing consequences in the past.
OR, one is attempting to create a realm in which science and non-supernaturalistic philosophy cannot fill the gaps! I really still think there is a category difference here.
07 Aug 06
Originally posted by LemonJelloBTW, I don't think it is accurate to make axiomatic the preclusion of supernatural explanation. I see no basis for a priori exclusion of the supernatural. I would argue instead for contingent naturalism.
That's good food for thought. It's good to see you back in the forums.
But when it comes to matters of sensus divinitatis, I don't think Occam has much utility. What would be useful, though, is a good debate on internalism versus externalism. In short, is this person's worldview inclusion of '+ G' (based on what he takes to be manifestation o ...[text shortened]... ttribute just any old as-yet-unexplained-by-naturalism effects to G, does it?
And I correct my position accordingly... 🙂
07 Aug 06
Originally posted by vistesdCompletely off-topic, but that reminded me of something Bernard Lonergan (along with von Balthasar and Rahner, one of the Catholic theological and philosophical giants of the 20th cent.) wrote:
Suppose, instead of S+G, I propose S+M (no hidden pun intended!), where “M” stands for mystery
"Rahner emphasises Mystery a lot - I just have a few clear things to say."
I suppose that pretty much encapsulates our position!
07 Aug 06
Originally posted by lucifershammerLonergan! That's the name I was trying to remember. (Am trying to maintain my self-imposed ban on book-buying, but I wanted to look for him at the library because of your previous recommendation).
Completely off-topic, but that reminded me of something Bernard Lonergan (along with von Balthasar and Rahner, one of the Catholic theological and philosophical giants of the 20th cent.) wrote:
"Rahner emphasises Mystery a lot - I just have a few clear things to say."
I suppose that pretty much encapsulates our position!
I think I should probably try for a few clear things to say, and let the mystery be the mystery...
