16 Sep '08 09:49>
I've tried to drop this but I'm incensed at some of the comments I've read. I tried to send the main protagonists a message - but it was too long, so I'll print it here:
A post from a well respected red re. Hillsborough PART 1
"Why do so many people think that Liverpool fans were to blame for Hillsborough?
Firstly it is important to remember that the year before the Hillsborough disaster, Liverpool met Nottingham Forest in the same ground, and in the same round of the same competition. In both years Liverpool fans were given the smaller Leppings Lane end of the ground, despite having the larger fan base. In 1988, nobody died and nobody was seriously hurt, although there were reports of overcrowding.
Chief Superintendent Duckenfield was the most senior policeman at Hillsborough on the 15th April 1989, the year of the disaster. He had virtually no experience of policing a big match, and was only drafted in a week or so before the match. This was because the police officer that had policed the game the year before, had been suspended after an initiation prank on a new P.C. ended with the new recruit being too traumatised to work.
When a police force undertake an operation such as policing a football match, a detailed report is made that describes in minute detail what was done; by whom; at what time and how. This is called an operational order, and policing the match in 1989 should not have been too difficult to police for Duckenfield, as he has a complete, successfully carried out operational order from the year before. Crucially though, the Inspector decided to make changes to this operational order, and this, among other things led to the disaster.
His first mistake was that despite his limited experience, he decided that he would go against the wisdom of the officer from the year before and decided that there was no need to have police officers posted at varying distances away from the ground. In 1988, police officers were posted at varying distances to check tickets, give directions, and in the event that too many fans arrived at a certain time, they could stem the flow towards the antiquated turnstiles and relieve the pressure. Without these officers, fans were left to head for the ground unchecked, and after bad motorway traffic, many fans arrived at the Leppings Lane end of the ground between 2pm and 2.30pm, and the turnstiles could not admit people quick enough.
In the absence of the outer placed police officers, fans started to congregate around the turnstiles, but they were not able to admit people quick enough and a dangerous crush started to build outside the ground. After being asked several times over the radio by Murray, the most senior policeman outside the ground, Duckenfield next gave the order to open gate C.
Gate C is an exit gate, and as such is designed to let thousands of people leave the ground quickly, but used in reverse it was lethal. Even at this stage, by following the previous year’s operation order, Duckenfield could have averted the disaster. In 1988, there were police officers posted at the entrance of each of the central pens (3+4) and once these pens were full, people we re-directed to the pens on the wings. In 1989, no direction was given. Fans were left to go down a tunnel that led them to the central pens, and once they were there the weight of fans from behind meant that they couldn’t go back.
From his position in the police control box, Duckenfield could see the disaster unfolding. As a part of the subsequent investigation, people visited the police control box and testified that you could “see the colour of people’s eyes” such was the power of the zoom facility on the CCTV. So if this was the case, it was obviously possible to see people vomiting and turning blue as they were crushed against the perimeter fencing. Duckenfield would later testify that once he realised what he had caused he “froze” This version of events is the real truth of the Hillsborough, and why many officers on duty that day wrote in their report that there was no direction from the control box. Duckenfield had basically realised his mistakes, and presumably feared the consequences for him personally.
His mind no doubt racing, he started to think of a way out for him and so when the referee stopped the game at 3.06pm and went to the police control box for information, instead of admitting his fatal errors and short comings, he lied. He told the referee and anyone else who would listen, that drunken Liverpool fans had turned up late and broken down gate C. A picture of mindless, drunk, ticket less yobs was painted in Duckenfield’s attempt to shift the blame. Later in court, he admitted that he had lied. By then, it was too late and the damage had been done.
A post from a well respected red re. Hillsborough PART 1
"Why do so many people think that Liverpool fans were to blame for Hillsborough?
Firstly it is important to remember that the year before the Hillsborough disaster, Liverpool met Nottingham Forest in the same ground, and in the same round of the same competition. In both years Liverpool fans were given the smaller Leppings Lane end of the ground, despite having the larger fan base. In 1988, nobody died and nobody was seriously hurt, although there were reports of overcrowding.
Chief Superintendent Duckenfield was the most senior policeman at Hillsborough on the 15th April 1989, the year of the disaster. He had virtually no experience of policing a big match, and was only drafted in a week or so before the match. This was because the police officer that had policed the game the year before, had been suspended after an initiation prank on a new P.C. ended with the new recruit being too traumatised to work.
When a police force undertake an operation such as policing a football match, a detailed report is made that describes in minute detail what was done; by whom; at what time and how. This is called an operational order, and policing the match in 1989 should not have been too difficult to police for Duckenfield, as he has a complete, successfully carried out operational order from the year before. Crucially though, the Inspector decided to make changes to this operational order, and this, among other things led to the disaster.
His first mistake was that despite his limited experience, he decided that he would go against the wisdom of the officer from the year before and decided that there was no need to have police officers posted at varying distances away from the ground. In 1988, police officers were posted at varying distances to check tickets, give directions, and in the event that too many fans arrived at a certain time, they could stem the flow towards the antiquated turnstiles and relieve the pressure. Without these officers, fans were left to head for the ground unchecked, and after bad motorway traffic, many fans arrived at the Leppings Lane end of the ground between 2pm and 2.30pm, and the turnstiles could not admit people quick enough.
In the absence of the outer placed police officers, fans started to congregate around the turnstiles, but they were not able to admit people quick enough and a dangerous crush started to build outside the ground. After being asked several times over the radio by Murray, the most senior policeman outside the ground, Duckenfield next gave the order to open gate C.
Gate C is an exit gate, and as such is designed to let thousands of people leave the ground quickly, but used in reverse it was lethal. Even at this stage, by following the previous year’s operation order, Duckenfield could have averted the disaster. In 1988, there were police officers posted at the entrance of each of the central pens (3+4) and once these pens were full, people we re-directed to the pens on the wings. In 1989, no direction was given. Fans were left to go down a tunnel that led them to the central pens, and once they were there the weight of fans from behind meant that they couldn’t go back.
From his position in the police control box, Duckenfield could see the disaster unfolding. As a part of the subsequent investigation, people visited the police control box and testified that you could “see the colour of people’s eyes” such was the power of the zoom facility on the CCTV. So if this was the case, it was obviously possible to see people vomiting and turning blue as they were crushed against the perimeter fencing. Duckenfield would later testify that once he realised what he had caused he “froze” This version of events is the real truth of the Hillsborough, and why many officers on duty that day wrote in their report that there was no direction from the control box. Duckenfield had basically realised his mistakes, and presumably feared the consequences for him personally.
His mind no doubt racing, he started to think of a way out for him and so when the referee stopped the game at 3.06pm and went to the police control box for information, instead of admitting his fatal errors and short comings, he lied. He told the referee and anyone else who would listen, that drunken Liverpool fans had turned up late and broken down gate C. A picture of mindless, drunk, ticket less yobs was painted in Duckenfield’s attempt to shift the blame. Later in court, he admitted that he had lied. By then, it was too late and the damage had been done.