Originally posted by wolfgang59
[b]If I believed in a god or gods I may well concede that mere mortals
could never fully understand the minds of such deities, however that
would make me even more curious and I would attempt to know the mind
of my god, discuss it at every opportunity and be involved in every debate.

For the life of me I cannot understand such a pitif ...[text shortened]... s - towards knowledge.
Particularly knowledge of something you
presumably are interested in.[/b]

I never said I could not offer an opinion, I said I didn't know.

I do believe God has more information than I do so my attempting to grasp
what He sees is not going to happen. It would be no different than claiming
to know what the best chess move would be by only seeing the light or only
the dark pieces not the other sides.

I do trust God, and with that His judgments I accept on face value, not so
much with man's.
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
"Do you have any thoughts on why He would do these things, like sanctioning genocide and the like? Answer: no, you do not. In fact, you've already stated that you think such insight will only be divulged to you on judgment day. So, there we go: you simply have no relevant input toward the question in the OP. On that question, you have no insight to add. ...[text shortened]... I'll just drop out, and leave it to you who I assume does
know why God does everything.
Kelly

No one knows why God does anything outside of God, you cannot even
reach inside of my mind and know why I'm doing anything

Sorry, but that is just incredibly absurd. We can justifiably infer the motivations of others...happens regularly. But fine, have it your way. So it will be duly noted that in response to the question in the OP, KellyJay has no useful input.

Since the moral worth of an action is pretty much inextricably tied up with the underlying motivation of the agent (and not just with the act itself), I would think you have no basis for claiming on the moral worth of any actions. After all, according to what you say here, you cannot know the motivations Hitler had for sanctioning genocide, just like you cannot know the motivations God had for sanctioning genocide. I guess you'll have to hold off judgment on the moral worth of Hitler's actions: maybe his reasons will be divulged to you on judgment day too.

I'll also ask you to remember that this should cut both ways too. If you cannot know anything about God's reasons for acting, then you should be silent on the moral worth of His actions, whether good or bad. So I'll remember to ignore you on the basis of inconsistency within your position if ever you claim that some of God's actions are good. Of course, I'll remember to ignore you on the basis of inconsitency if you claim something similar for anyone, regardless of who they are.

Man, your position is a mess. 🙄

Or, else, you'll need to provide some other account of the moral worth of actions...one that makes no appeal or reference whatsoever to the underlying motivations one may have for acting. Might be a tough row to hoe....

Originally posted by LemonJello

No one knows why God does anything outside of God, you cannot even
reach inside of my mind and know why I'm doing anything

Sorry, but that is just incredibly absurd. We can justifiably infer the motivations of others...happens regularly. But fine, have it your way. So it will be duly noted that in response to the question in the OP, ...[text shortened]... atsoever to the underlying motivations one may have for acting. Might be a tough row to hoe....

Just for clarification.

When you say "Since the moral worth of an action is pretty much inextricably tied up
with the underlying motivation of the agent (and not just with the act itself)" I assume
you are talking about KellyJay's apparent position and not yours.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Just for clarification.

When you say "Since the moral worth of an action is pretty much inextricably tied up
with the underlying motivation of the agent (and not just with the act itself)" I assume
you are talking about KellyJay's apparent position and not yours.

No, that would be something like my own view, and I mean "moral worth of an action" here as in regards to whether or not the agent, in carrying out the action, is to that extent deserving of moral praiseworthiness or moral blameworthiness. Note I'm not saying this judgment call resides solely in the underlying motivation of the agent; rather I am saying I don't think this judgment call can reasonably be divorced from consideration of the underlying motivation of the agent.

My point is that, given what KJ has claimed about motivational ignorance, I would think he has no basis for making such judgment calls at all. An upshot would be that he has no basis for claiming that any of God's actions are morally praiseworthy, just like he would have no basis for claiming that any of God's actions are morally blameworthy.

If I am wrong, then there is some account under which those types of judgment calls can be made in the absence of considerations regarding the underlying motivations for the action. That could be the case if, for example, it could be shown that the moral praiseworthiness/blameworthiness of an action could be vetted only through consideration of the act itself completely regardless of consideration of the underlying motivational and intentional states of the agent (say, for example, based solely on the consequences of the act). But I have never seen any such account that I think makes sense.

Originally posted by LemonJello
No, that would be something like my own view, and I mean "moral worth of an action" here as in regards to whether or not the agent, in carrying out the action, is to that extent deserving of moral praiseworthiness or moral blameworthiness. Note I'm not saying this judgment call resides solely in the underlying motivation of the agent; rather I am saying ...[text shortened]... the consequences of the act). But I have never seen any such account that I think makes sense.

Hmmm.

I think I'm going to disagree that you can't judge an action as being morally
good or bad (or indifferent) without knowing the intentions of the entity
carrying out that action.

That's not to say that I don't think that their are circumstances where
the intention of the entity carrying out the act in question makes a difference.
There are absolutely circumstances where the intention makes a difference.

However, to give an example, I think that the mass slaughter of Jews in the
holocaust was morally bad regardless of the motives of the people carrying
it out. I don't need to know what they were thinking to know that the act
in and of itself was morally wrong.
I might want to know what they were thinking when determining their culpability
for their actions, and for determining quite how immoral they were.
But the I think you can judge the act as being immoral without reference to their
state of mind.


However I am open to arguments otherwise.

But this thread is probably not the place to do it.

If you are interested, then we could set up a new thread to debate the issue.


EDIT: and I am still waiting for Kelly to answer my question...

Originally posted by googlefudge
Hmmm.

I think I'm going to disagree that you can't judge an action as being morally
good or bad (or indifferent) without knowing the intentions of the entity
carrying out that action.

That's not to say that I don't think that their are circumstances where
the intention of the entity carrying out the act in question makes a difference.
There ...[text shortened]... thread to debate the issue.


EDIT: and I am still waiting for Kelly to answer my question...

I don't need to know what they were thinking to know that the act
in and of itself was morally wrong.
I might want to know what they were thinking when determining their culpability
for their actions, and for determining quite how immoral they were.
But the I think you can judge the act as being immoral without reference to their
state of mind.

As I mentioned, my comments before were specifically in regards to a judgment call on whether or not the agent, in carrying out some action, is deserving of moral praiseworthiness or moral blameworthiness. The comments were not in regards to whether or not "the act in and of itself was morally wrong". So, if anything and pending further clarification, I would say we sort of agree since you added that you might want to know their state of mind when it comes to determining the agents' culpability. My claim is that if you want to determine whether or not the agents are deserving of moral praiseworthiness/blameworthiness, this judgment call cannot be divorced from consideration of their motivational/intentional states. Does this help clarify? If you still disagree, then this would be a very worthwhile discussion, perhaps in another thread as you mentioned. (Also I should probably clarify the terminology as I would use it in such a discussion: the 'act' is simply what the agent intentionally does; whereas the 'action' is the combination of the act and the agent's underlying maxim.)

My point here is that if KellyJay insists that he can know nothing about the motivations and intentions of God, then I think he should not get to claim anything about God's moral worthiness as a moral agent: he should not get to claim that God is deserving of moral praise any more than he should get to claim that God is deserving of moral blame.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[quote]I don't need to know what they were thinking to know that the act
in and of itself was morally wrong.
I might want to know what they were thinking when determining their culpability
for their actions, and for determining quite how immoral they were.
But the I think you can judge the act as being immoral without reference to their
state of m ...[text shortened]... rving of moral praise any more than he should get to claim that God is deserving of moral blame.

Ah, then in that case we probably do (at least largely) agree.


I agree that if you take Kelly's position where you can't judge god's actions
as being bad as gods motives and knowledge are beyond your own then
you symmetrically can't claim that they are good either.


Which is kinda where my question about Kelly's position on the Euthyphro Dilemma
fits in as it sidesteps this issue and just asks if god even could be a moral source
or not. If not then it really doesn't matter whether god is moral or not (as a basis
for forming a moral system, it obviously matters otherwise) as morals are not based
on god.
If you do claim that god is the source of morality then you have to admit the
consequences of that as outlined in the post with my question (3rd down page
16 this thread Kelly... Just in case you were looking for it).


EDIT: I say largely agree because I think that there can be cases where an agent can
be deemed morally culpable if you can show that they SHOULD have known better.
In much the same way that you can be deemed responsible and negligent for not
doing due diligence and analysing the possible consequences hard enough.
I think that an agent that has the capability to act morally and determine accurately
right from wrong can be deemed to be immoral if they execute immoral actions even
if they hadn't any 'bad intentions' at the time.

However I am not sure if that point on it's own is worth a thread to debate.

Originally posted by googlefudge
Ah, then in that case we probably do (at least largely) agree.


I agree that if you take Kelly's position where you can't judge god's actions
as being bad as gods motives and knowledge are beyond your own then
you symmetrically can't claim that they are good either.


Which is kinda where my question about Kelly's position on the Euthyphro Dil ...[text shortened]... ns' at the time.

However I am not sure if that point on it's own is worth a thread to debate.

I agree that the Euthyphro dilemma is a good weapon against the idea that morality is constitutively sourced from some agent, such as God. I have used it in the past, such as what I posted below in a past discussion on these boards Thread 152268:

"Since you have said that you think God determines the components of morality and that morality origination is solely dependent on God, I presume you would agree with the following premise: If God forbids (commands) act A, then act A is morally wrong (right). Now, there are couple ways in which this could hold. For one, it could be that God forbids act A because act A is wrong; that is, there could be reasons, independent of God, that explain the wrongness of act A and it would be in virtue of those reasons that God issues his judgment thusly on act A. But that is not available to you because then it would be those reasons that ultimately explain the moral status of act A and morality would not be dependent on God; God would be inessential to morality in this case. On the other hand, you could hold that act A is wrong because God forbids act A; that is, you could hold that God's forbidding act A is explanatorily prior to the wrongness of act A. Again, since the former interpretation is not available to you (unless you jettison your claim that morality depends constititutively on God), this will be the interpretation you are stuck with. In this case, morality indeed seems dependent on God. But, now, here comes the real dilemma. Either it is the case that God has reasons in virtue of which He forbids act A; or not. If not, then all you have is a purely arbitrary account of morals. And, if there are no reasons in virtue of which God forbids act A, then He may as well never have issued such a judgment in the first place. On the other hand, if there are reasons in virtue of which God forbids act A, then it will be those reasons that ultimately explain the moral status of act A, which again will contradict your claim that morality is dependent on God. So, neither horn of the dilemma seems to work for you: either you have a purely arbitrary account of morals; or morals do not depend constitutively on God."

I say largely agree because I think that there can be cases where an agent can
be deemed morally culpable if you can show that they SHOULD have known better.
In much the same way that you can be deemed responsible and negligent for not
doing due diligence and analysing the possible consequences hard enough.
I think that an agent that has the capability to act morally and determine accurately
right from wrong can be deemed to be immoral if they execute immoral actions even
if they hadn't any 'bad intentions' at the time.

I don't think such an example would contradict my claim that in the course of such judgment it is necessary to consider the agent's motivational/intentional states. What you are claiming is that in some cases it is sufficient for moral blameworthiness that (1) the agent did not have bad intentions and (2) the agent lacked some further knowledge or situational common sense or some such. Perhaps, but I don't think that would contradict my claim that it is necessary to consider the intentions involved...because it is still fully consistent with the idea that, say, if (1) had not been met that would also have been grounds for moral blameworthiness and on a much more basic, principal level as the further probing in (2). This sort of example is not strong enough to cast much doubt on the claim that scrutiny of the underlying motivations is important or essential. To do that, it should also be combined with examples wherein bad intentions are present and yet moral blameworthiness does not follow in tow. Or we should provide examples wherein it is clear that scrutiny of the agent's underlying motivations/intentions is simply irrelevant.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I agree that the Euthyphro dilemma is a good weapon against the idea that morality is constitutively sourced from some agent, such as God. I have used it in the past, such as what I posted below in a past discussion on these boards Thread 152268:

[i]"Since you have said that you think God determines the components of morality and that mo ...[text shortened]... it is clear that scrutiny of the agent's underlying motivations/intentions is simply irrelevant.

That's a nice elegantly logical description of the Euthyphro Dilemma there.
I tend to deliver it with less logical rigour and more emotional punch,
but it depends on the audience. [or at least I intend emotional punch,
whether I achieve it...]

I'm too tired tonight (long day at work) to properly think through a response to the second bit.

But this thought did strike me...

To do that, it should also be combined with examples wherein bad intentions are present
and yet moral blameworthiness does not follow in tow.

Suppose you had an act which had no bad consequences, and indeed had good consequences.

Which was conceived and executed by an agent with bad intentions who did not foresee or
intend the good consequences of this act, and intended bad consequences that didn't manifest...

THEN.

Is the act; moral, amoral, or immoral?

AND

Is the agent; moral, amoral, or Immoral?


Or is this a question that you can't answer in the abstract, and need a concrete example for?

Originally posted by LemonJello

No one knows why God does anything outside of God, you cannot even
reach inside of my mind and know why I'm doing anything

Sorry, but that is just incredibly absurd. We can justifiably infer the motivations of others...happens regularly. But fine, have it your way. So it will be duly noted that in response to the question in the OP, ...[text shortened]... atsoever to the underlying motivations one may have for acting. Might be a tough row to hoe....

We have insight into one another, but we do not know, that is not
true with God, we are far from knowing anything about Him unless He
reveals it to us.
Kelly

Originally posted by LemonJello
I agree that the Euthyphro dilemma is a good weapon against the idea that morality is constitutively sourced from some agent, such as God. I have used it in the past, such as what I posted below in a past discussion on these boards Thread 152268:

[i]"Since you have said that you think God determines the components of morality and that mo ...[text shortened]... it is clear that scrutiny of the agent's underlying motivations/intentions is simply irrelevant.

"Since you have said that you think God determines the components of morality and that morality origination is solely dependent on God, I presume you would agree with the following premise: If God forbids (commands) act A, then act A is morally wrong (right). Now, there are couple ways in which this could hold. For one, it could be that God forbids act A because act A is wrong; that is, there could be reasons, independent of God, that explain the wrongness of act A and it would be in virtue of those reasons that God issues his judgment thusly on act A. But that is not available to you because then it would be those reasons that ultimately explain the moral status of act A and morality would not be dependent on God; God would be inessential to morality in this case. On the other hand, you could hold that act A is wrong because God forbids act A; that is, you could hold that God's forbidding act A is explanatorily prior to the wrongness of act A. Again, since the former interpretation is not available to you (unless you jettison your claim that morality depends constititutively on God), this will be the interpretation you are stuck with. In this case, morality indeed seems dependent on God. But, now, here comes the real dilemma. Either it is the case that God has reasons in virtue of which He forbids act A; or not. If not, then all you have is a purely arbitrary account of morals. And, if there are no reasons in virtue of which God forbids act A, then He may as well never have issued such a judgment in the first place. On the other hand, if there are reasons in virtue of which God forbids act A, then it will be those reasons that ultimately explain the moral status of act A, which again will contradict your claim that morality is dependent on God. So, neither horn of the dilemma seems to work for you: either you have a purely arbitrary account of morals; or morals do not depend constitutively on God."

It could not be a mix?
Kelly

Originally posted by KellyJay
"Since you have said that you think God determines the components of morality and that morality origination is solely dependent on God, I presume you would agree with the following premise: If God forbids (commands) act A, then act A is morally wrong (right). Now, there are couple ways in which this could hold. For one, it could be that God forbids act A be ...[text shortened]... unt of morals; or morals do not depend constitutively on God."

It could not be a mix?
Kelly

No, it can't be a mix.

The two options are exclusive and exhaustive, there are no other options.

Originally posted by googlefudge
That's a nice elegantly logical description of the Euthyphro Dilemma there.
I tend to deliver it with less logical rigour and more emotional punch,
but it depends on the audience. [or at least I intend emotional punch,
whether I achieve it...]

I'm too tired tonight (long day at work) to properly think through a response to the second bit. ...[text shortened]...

Or is this a question that you can't answer in the abstract, and need a concrete example for?

I think it must be the case that an act, in and of itself, absent of all context and motive, can rarely, if ever, be deemed moral or immoral.

Of course, creating scenarios where an outwardly highly immoral act (e.g. genocide) can be seen as moral might take us into territory that is so unrealistic and improbable that it amounts to the same thing.

It might also be argued that, if genocide was the moral thing to do (or at least arguably moral), then it does not amount to genocide (a sort of absence of mens rea). But we are just talking terminology here.

On the other hand, if the agent simply fails to execute his/her plan correctly, giving rise to good consequences rather than bad, then I can't see this affects the classification of that person as immoral.

Just as we can bang someone up for life for attempted murder, even if he missed the person he was aiming his gun at, and instead hit the lion that was about to eat that person.

These kind of questions are very much at the heart of the assisted suicide debate in the UK. We have a situation where the act can be described (legally) as one of the most seriously 'immoral' acts we recognise in law (i.e. murder), but which, where the party is acting from moral motives, simply cannot be prosecuted.

Originally posted by Rank outsider
I think it must be the case that an act, in and of itself, absent of all context and motive, can rarely, if ever, be deemed moral or immoral.

Of course, creating scenarios where an outwardly highly immoral act (e.g. genocide) can be seen as moral might take us into territory that is so unrealistic and improbable that it amounts to the same thing.
...[text shortened]... . murder), but which, where the party is acting from moral motives, simply cannot be prosecuted.

I will come back to this...

But there is a school of moral thought Consequentialism that is based entirely on the
outcomes of an act, and not on the motives or thoughts of the person carrying out the act.

Under such a system, an act can indeed be deemed to be immoral without reference to
the motives of the agent.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consequentialism

I am not sure I completely agree with Consequentialism, however it is a genuine school
of thought that some do hold to.

Originally posted by googlefudge
I will come back to this...

But there is a school of moral thought Consequentialism that is based entirely on the
outcomes of an act, and not on the motives or thoughts of the person carrying out the act.

Under such a system, an act can indeed be deemed to be immoral without reference to
the motives of the agent.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki ...[text shortened]... y agree with Consequentialism, however it is a genuine school
of thought that some do hold to.

Interesting. I look forward to your further thoughts.

I would only note, at this stage, that I said context and motives, not just motives. And the outcomes of an act are all part of that context, separate to the act itself.

Whether I should have included motive, on the other hand, remains to be seen. But I think my initial view is that motives are all part and parcel of the context, which might (but not necessarily) help in assessing whether an act is moral or immoral, rather than being the determining factor.

I think we need an example to work on!