20 Aug '10 20:26>
Suppose god knows that tomorrow morning I'll have coffee and toast for breakfast. Does this mean that I lack free will in my choice of breakfast?
A while ago some of us agreed that god's infallible knowledge threatens libertarian free will, after bbarr came up with an argument, here:
Thread 130680 on page 9.
The crux was premise 4:
4) Necessarily P. (Where P: God knows that you will A.)
This premise allows the conclusion that libertarian free will is false, without committing the modal scope fallacy (MSF).
I've been thinking about 4) and the following counter occurred to me: supposing it is necessary that god knows (infallible, omniscient) but the content, what god knows is contingent?
In other words what if it is necessary that god knows what I will have for breakfast, but the fact that god knows I'll have coffee and toast is contingent on my choosing to have coffee and toast?
Any thoughts?
A while ago some of us agreed that god's infallible knowledge threatens libertarian free will, after bbarr came up with an argument, here:
Thread 130680 on page 9.
The crux was premise 4:
4) Necessarily P. (Where P: God knows that you will A.)
This premise allows the conclusion that libertarian free will is false, without committing the modal scope fallacy (MSF).
I've been thinking about 4) and the following counter occurred to me: supposing it is necessary that god knows (infallible, omniscient) but the content, what god knows is contingent?
In other words what if it is necessary that god knows what I will have for breakfast, but the fact that god knows I'll have coffee and toast is contingent on my choosing to have coffee and toast?
Any thoughts?