22 Aug 10
2 edits
Originally posted by Lord SharkIs there a reason for to believe that is true or is this strictly a thought experiment for grins?
Because according to our argument, it is false to say that if A is contingent on our free choice, then God doesn't know everything in the future.
Either God's knowledge of the future is limited or it isn't. If "God must wait for A before knowing you will A", then it is limited.
And what has it to do with "counter[ing] the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice"?
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22 Aug 10
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Originally posted by ThinkOfOneIs there a reason for to believe that is true or is this strictly a thought experiment for grins?
Is there a reason for to believe that is true or is this strictly a thought experiment for grins?
And what has it to do with "counter[ing] the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice"?
Well, what reason is there to suppose that god doesn't know things just because they are contingent?
And what has it to do with "counter[ing] the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice"?
Bbarr gave an argument which attempted to show that since god's foreknowledge is necessary, libertarian free will is incompatible with it. I came up with a possible theist counter, as described.
22 Aug 10
2 edits
Originally posted by ThinkOfOneBut it doesn't follow simply from that A is contingent that G would not know about its content. It seems that move would require further assumption(s) that may carry their own complications. To resolve the tension between G's foreknowledge and human freedom, yes, one could just throw out G's foreknowledge. If a theist wished to do that, he could simply hold that propositions regarding future human actions do not have truth values (for instance). But, as I mentioned, this carries its own complications; moreover, many theists would not be satisfied by this kind of concession.
[b]At every possible world, god knows you will A. But for a while now I have been unable to see how to counter the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice.
I haven't followed along, but if A is contingent on our free choice, then God doesn't know everything in the future. God must wait for A before knowing you will A just like everyone else. Why is it more difficult than this?[/b]
So, here, we are considering an argument that denies this type of concession. We want to see if this theist can have his cake...and eat it too.
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by Lord SharkWell, what reason is there to suppose that god doesn't know things just because they are contingent?
[b]Is there a reason for to believe that is true or is this strictly a thought experiment for grins?
Well, what reason is there to suppose that god doesn't know things just because they are contingent?
And what has it to do with "counter[ing] the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice"?
Bbarr g ...[text shortened]... n free will is incompatible with it. I came up with a possible theist counter, as described.[/b]
I added this edit in my previous post: Either God's knowledge of the future is limited or it isn't. If "God must wait for A before knowing you will A", then it is limited.
If God's knowledge is contingent, then it is limited.
Am I still missing something?
Bbarr gave an argument which attempted to show that since god's foreknowledge is necessary, libertarian free will is incompatible with it. I came up with a possible theist counter, as described.
Okay, so it seems you guys are mired in a theoretical argument that you're kicking around.
22 Aug 10
2 edits
Originally posted by ThinkOfOneIf God's knowledge is contingent, then it is limited.
[b]Well, what reason is there to suppose that god doesn't know things just because they are contingent?
I added this edit in my previous post: Either God's knowledge of the future is limited or it isn't. If "God must wait for A before knowing you will A", then it is limited.
If God's knowledge is contingent, then it is limited.
Am I still mi ay, so it seems you guys are mired in a theoretical argument that you're kicking around.[/b]
In your first post on the previous page, the antecedent in the conditional you started with was "A is contingent on our free choice". How did we get to "God's knowledge is contingent"?
EDIT: By the way, I do agree G's knowledge would be "contingent" in the sense outlined by bbarr's last post. That is, even under the supposition that P, we could still have possibly ~Q. But it doesn't seem yet to me that this is a problem for the theist (a problem in the sense of his having to admit that G's knowledge is "limited" in any non-ersatz way) because if possibly ~P, then possibly ~Q could be true only because of the following trivial point: ~Q where ~P. (P: You will A. And Q: G knows you will A.)
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22 Aug 10
Originally posted by ThinkOfOneIf God's knowledge is contingent, then it is limited.
[b]Well, what reason is there to suppose that god doesn't know things just because they are contingent?
I added this edit in my previous post: Either God's knowledge of the future is limited or it isn't. If "God must wait for A before knowing you will A", then it is limited.
If God's knowledge is contingent, then it is limited.
Am I still mi ...[text shortened]... ay, so it seems you guys are mired in a theoretical argument that you're kicking around.[/b]
We have to be careful here. Suppose god knows all facts, past present and future. Now according to the libertarian, some of these facts will be contingent on our choices, but since god knows them, god's knowledge is not limited by this. God does not have to wait.
Am I still missing something?
Maybe you are missing the notion that god knowing what we will do before we do it doesn't preclude our choice?
Okay, so it seems you guys are mired in a theoretical argument that you're kicking around.
It can get fiddly in parts, yes.
23 Aug 10
Originally posted by Lord SharkCalvin and Aquinas, and anyone else that believes that predestination has anything to do with free will, has completely misunderstood the meaning of predestination.
Well the problem I have with this view is that god presumably chose precisely how to make creation whilst being aware of what choices we would make according to all possible creations. So there are no circumstances in which god would need to change creation so that we would do what He wanted us to do.
Perhaps people think the Calvinists are responsible for the idea of predestination, but you can see it in Aquinas.
Calvinist claim that man's will is corrupt beyond his ability to choose. That must be true in order for election and predestination to be interpreted as they say.
Predestination has to do with it's object, which is what man is destined to be, i.e. conformed to the image of Christ.
Romans 8:29 - For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestine to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren.
The idea or meaning of this verse is that God knew us before creation; those of us that would choose to trust in His Christ; therefore He gave us something to be conformed to. Ergo, predestinated.
A careful reading of the entire passage will make it perfectly clear.
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23 Aug 10
Originally posted by josephwOriginally posted by josephw
Calvin and Aquinas, and anyone else that believes that predestination has anything to do with free will, has completely misunderstood the meaning of predestination.
Calvinist claim that man's will is corrupt beyond his ability to choose. That must be true in order for election and predestination to be interpreted as they say.
Predestination has to do w ...[text shortened]... Ergo, predestinated.
A careful reading of the entire passage will make it perfectly clear.
Calvin and Aquinas, and anyone else that believes that predestination has anything to do with free will, has completely misunderstood the meaning of predestination.
Ironically, Aquinas attempts to show that predestination is no threat to moral responsibility. In my view he was no more convincing than you are.
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26 Aug 10
Originally posted by galveston75I don't think that is the point, but hey, it takes all kinds.
So the point is the Bible says "God's thoughts are higher then our thoughts and his ways higher then our ways." So it makes for good discussion but bottom line is we do not know now and will proabaly never know what he knows past, present or future.....
26 Aug 10
Originally posted by daniel58Okay, but galveston75 is obviously confused about what exactly is the question at issue. Saying that God knows everything does not address the current inquiry. Suppose we grant you that God does know everything. What, then, are the relevant implications, if any, for human free will?
No we do know the answer, God knows everything