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21 Aug 10
1 edit
As an analogy, imagine worlds as planets. Now a scientist might claim that if life is found on a planet, there must be proteins on that planet. So he would postulate that necessarily if there is life, there are proteins. Suppose then he finds life, then necessarily there are proteins for this planet. Yet this scientist would be completely mad if he asserted that proteins are necessary for all planets. That would be a senseless interpretation of necessity.
This, I think, is bbar's mistake. The theist will acknowledge that P is necessarily true and by consequence that Q is false -- that is, God knows he will do A and it is necessarily false that he will do not-A -- but that should not mean that not-A is impossible. It's just like in the example above where proteins are necessary but obviously it is possible in other planets there are not proteins.
All this ultimately proves is that, in the world the man will do A, God knows it, and therefore, in all related worlds, the man necessarily does A. For the libertarian, this must seem kind of trivial.
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by bbarrWe live in a universe where almost all of our choices are driven by some type
O.K., but you don't need the libertarian account of free will if all you want is choice without coercion.
of coercion, the only one I think that really matters is God forcing us. We are
driven by ad's on TV and radio, we are driven by forces playing upon the left and
right. The only danger would be if God were to tweak us into making a choice all
bets would be off, we would be robots going to the end that is being forced upon
us and nothing was ever at risk to be anything different than that! If we were
given choice (I believe we were) than on us would be outcome of those choices.
Kelly
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by bbarrRight, but this is the point where I am still confused. Why is this a problem for the theist? As you mentioned to Conrau K, this libertarian theist wants the live metaphysical option that one could do otherwise. Here, wouldn't that mean the possibility that ~P? So, even in the supposition that P, isn't the "possibility that it is not the case that God knows P" actually just reflecting the live metaphysical option you mentioned? As you mentioned, on this reading of infallibility, the theist is committed to the claim that necessarily, if P, then G knows that P. But if there is some live metaphysical option that ~P, then there would be some possibility that ~ G knows that P. I am not convinced that there is a problem here for the theist.
So, if the answer is 'no', then:
~ Necessarily God knows P.
Which yields:
Possibly ~ God knows P.
So here we are left both with the supposition that P and the possibility that it is not the case that God knows P. I don't think the theist would be happy with this.
I think your argument in the other thread is for sure valid. However, this thread has stoked some doubts in me that premise 4) is justified based on a general reading of infallibility.
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by Conrau KAgain, that's not what the libertarian wants. The libertarian wants it to be the case that the actual world could have been otherwise than it in fact is; that one could have done otherwise than one in fact did. We can reformulate the argument accordingly:
[b] The libertarian wants it to be true of the actual world that it was a live metaphysical option that one could have done otherwise than one in fact did.
Exactly. To say that it is a 'metaphysically live option' simply entails that there is a world in which it happens. I don't see why you feel the need to make a distinction between 'real' worlds ...[text shortened]... in w1 that God necessarily knows I will do A does not entail that in w2 that I will do A.[/b]
P: God knows that you will A in W1.
Q: You do not A in W1.
L: Libertarianism is true.
You end up with the same result. Either the possibility that God does not know or that libertarianism is false.
Which theorem that comprises S5 are you rejecting, and how does that yield the result you claim?
But, in any case, let's take a look at your claim. To claim that P is necessary in one world, entails that it is true in all possible worlds (unless you want to reject possible world semantic altogether). But if P is necessary in one world and not necessary in another world, then it follows that P is necessary in one world and it is possible that ~P in some other world (unless you want to give up translation rules for modal operators). But if is possible that ~P in some other world, then there is some possible world where ~P (again, unless you want to give up possible world semantics altogether). So, both P and ~P for some world. So, you have to give up either a core commitment of possible world semantics, or translation rules, or your claim that something can be necessary in one world and not necessary in another. What will it be?
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by Conrau KYour analogy employs nomological, not logical necessity. In any case, you're left with claiming that P can be necessary for some world, but not necessary for some other world. I would love to see an argument for this. And I am glad that you've come to see how your account would be completely unsatisfactory for a libertarian.
As an analogy, imagine worlds as planets. Now a scientist might claim that if life is found on a planet, there must be proteins on that planet. So he would postulate that necessarily if there is life, there are proteins. Suppose then he finds life, then necessarily there are proteins for this planet. Yet this scientist would be completely mad if he a ...[text shortened]... lated worlds, the man necessarily does A. For the libertarian, this must seem kind of trivial.
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by LemonJelloYeah, I don't know. My head hurts again. Let me think more about this and we can pick it up later.
Right, but this is the point where I am still confused. Why is this a problem for the theist? As you mentioned to Conrau K, this libertarian theist wants the live metaphysical option that one could do otherwise. Here, wouldn't that mean the possibility that ~P? So, even in the supposition that P, isn't the "possibility that it is not the case that God ...[text shortened]... some doubts in me that premise 4) is justified based on a general reading of infallibility.
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by LemonJelloP: You A
Right, but this is the point where I am still confused. Why is this a problem for the theist? As you mentioned to Conrau K, this libertarian theist wants the live metaphysical option that one could do otherwise. Here, wouldn't that mean the possibility that ~P? So, even in the supposition that P, isn't the "possibility that it is not the case that God ...[text shortened]... some doubts in me that premise 4) is justified based on a general reading of infallibility.
Q: God knows you A
(1) P
(2) Necessarily (P>Q)
(3) Possibly ~P
The question here is whether 1, 2 and 3 form an inconsistent triad. That much, at least, is clear.
So, suppose that P. Then it necessarily follows that Q. But is Q itself necessary?. If it is, then my original proof goes through. So, suppose ~ necessarily Q. Then possibly ~Q. So, both P and possibly ~Q. This allows us to say "The world is thus and so, and it is possible that God does not know it is thus and so...". But now here is the suggestion: possibly ~ Q can be true in a couple ways. It could be P and ~Q, which is super worrisome, or it could be ~P and ~Q, which is not worrisome at all. My response has been that we have supposed P, so on the assumption that possibly ~Q, it follows that there is some possible world where both P and ~Q. But, in retrospect, that was too quick. Perhaps possibly ~Q is true, but only because ~Q is true in only in those worlds where ~P. That God doesn't know in those worlds is no big deal, since P is false in those worlds.
Is that what you three have been trying to get dense and stubborn me to see for the past few pages? If so, my only defense is that I'm not a metaphysician!
Now, I'll try to find a response. More later...
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by bbarrRight, I think you've summed it up very clearly. I'll be interested to know your response. I am thinking about possible responses as well.
P: You A
Q: God knows you A
(1) P
(2) Necessarily (P>Q)
(3) Possibly ~P
The question here is whether 1, 2 and 3 form an inconsistent triad. That much, at least, is clear.
So, suppose that P. Then it necessarily follows that Q. But is Q itself necessary?. If it is, then my original proof goes through. So, suppose ~ necessarily Q. Then possibl ...[text shortened]... ense is that I'm not a metaphysician!
Now, I'll try to find a response. More later...
I also agree with you that if it followed that Q itself is necessary, then your original argument goes through with force. But I am relatively confident that from the conjunction of your (1) and (2) it is not valid to conclude that Q is necessary.
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22 Aug 10
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrIs that what you three have been trying to get dense and stubborn me to see for the past few pages?
P: You A
Q: God knows you A
(1) P
(2) Necessarily (P>Q)
(3) Possibly ~P
The question here is whether 1, 2 and 3 form an inconsistent triad. That much, at least, is clear.
So, suppose that P. Then it necessarily follows that Q. But is Q itself necessary?. If it is, then my original proof goes through. So, suppose ~ necessarily Q. Then possibl ense is that I'm not a metaphysician!
Now, I'll try to find a response. More later...
That's exactly what I meant anyway. Sorry I didn't make it clearer.
Perhaps another way to look at it is that the problem arises from the fact that in "God knows that you will A.", the A term is not a rigid designator.
This is what I was trying to get at when I said that the necessity operator doesn't reach into the propositional content. At w A picks out me having coffee and toast, whereas at w', A picks out me having waffles.
So there is no problem with:
4) Necessarily, God knows that you will A.
...so long as A is treated as a variable which can take different values at different possible worlds, but as soon as you assign a value as in:
4) Necessarily, God knows that you will eat waffles.
Then this is simply false (in S5 anyway).
It is not that god is ever wrong. At every possible world, god knows you will A. But for a while now I have been unable to see how to counter the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice.
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by Lord Shark"Any thoughts?"
Suppose god knows that tomorrow morning I'll have coffee and toast for breakfast. Does this mean that I lack free will in my choice of breakfast?
A while ago some of us agreed that god's infallible knowledge threatens libertarian free will, after bbarr came up with an argument, here:
Thread 130680 on page 9.
The crux was premise 4:
...[text shortened]... ave coffee and toast is contingent on my choosing to have coffee and toast?
Any thoughts?
Just one. Is there a conflict between the omniscience of God and man's free will?
I don't see one. Why should God's omniscience have any determination on free will? What effect does God knowing in advance what one will choose and the choice one makes?
God knew what we would do and what choices we would make since before creation. I don't see the connection between omniscience and free will. There isn't one. The only connection there could be is if when God knew what we would do and then did something to change it so that we would do what He wanted us to do. If that was the case then there would be no such thing as free will.
If there was no such thing as free will, then there would be no need for consciousness. We would be void of the knowledge of our own existence like a machine or a rock.
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22 Aug 10
Originally posted by josephwWell the problem I have with this view is that god presumably chose precisely how to make creation whilst being aware of what choices we would make according to all possible creations. So there are no circumstances in which god would need to change creation so that we would do what He wanted us to do.
[b]"Any thoughts?"
Just one. Is there a conflict between the omniscience of God and man's free will?
I don't see one. Why should God's omniscience have any determination on free will? What effect does God knowing in advance what one will choose and the choice one makes?
God knew what we would do and what choices we would make since before creatio ...[text shortened]... ousness. We would be void of the knowledge of our own existence like a machine or a rock.[/b]
Perhaps people think the Calvinists are responsible for the idea of predestination, but you can see it in Aquinas.
22 Aug 10
Originally posted by Lord SharkAt every possible world, god knows you will A. But for a while now I have been unable to see how to counter the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice.
[b]Is that what you three have been trying to get dense and stubborn me to see for the past few pages?
That's exactly what I meant anyway. Sorry I didn't make it clearer.
Perhaps another way to look at it is that the problem arises from the fact that in "God knows that you will A.", the A term is not a rigid designator.
This is what I was tryi ...[text shortened]... the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice.[/b]
I haven't followed along, but if A is contingent on our free choice, then God doesn't know everything in the future. God must wait for A before knowing you will A just like everyone else. Why is it more difficult than this?
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22 Aug 10
Originally posted by ThinkOfOneBecause according to our argument, it is false to say that if A is contingent on our free choice, then God doesn't know everything in the future.
[b]At every possible world, god knows you will A. But for a while now I have been unable to see how to counter the theist argument that the assignment of a value to A is contingent on our free choice.
I haven't followed along, but if A is contingent on our free choice, then God doesn't know everything in the future. God must wait for A before knowing you will A just like everyone else. Why is it more difficult than this?[/b]