Originally posted by daniel58Of course he does from our perspective. But I'm saying we don't know how he chooses to use it. We don't understand that. But it appears if he had chose to look into the future with Adam and Eve and had seen for a fact that they were going to choose from their freewill to go against what God had told them not to touch he would have possibly created another pair that would not have. But then if he had done that then the free will of humans and our future would not really be free will. Right?
No we do know the answer, God knows everything
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Originally posted by galveston75From my perspective there are two questions raised by that way of looking at it. The first is this: if god was all knowing when he (I'll use the male pronoun) created everything, then since god made everything just as he wished whilst being all knowing, he must have known the consequences, including the fall. (The alternative is that he wilfully refused to access his knowledge of how things would play out, which seems reckless.) So the first question is:
Of course he does from our perspective. But I'm saying we don't know how he chooses to use it. We don't understand that. But it appears if he had chose to look into the future with Adam and Eve and had seen for a fact that they were going to choose from their freewill to go against what God had told them not to touch he would have possibly created anothe ...[text shortened]... d done that then the free will of humans and our future would not really be free will. Right?
1) Why didn't god just tweak things a little? Or maybe a lot?
The second question is:
2) How would creating a different pair have compromised free will at all? I can't see how it would. If god could simultaneously see all the possible creatures and all the corresponding outcomes, why not create some with a beneficent nature in his image whose free will avoided the fall, instead of the mendacious feeble weak willed covetous creatures who fell for the apple ploy?
Makes no sense does it?
Originally posted by Lord SharkLet's try a slightly differently worded version of bbarr's argument in the thread cited:
Suppose god knows that tomorrow morning I'll have coffee and toast for breakfast. Does this mean that I lack free will in my choice of breakfast?
A while ago some of us agreed that god's infallible knowledge threatens libertarian free will, after bbarr came up with an argument, here:
Thread 130680 on page 9.
The crux was premise 4:
ave coffee and toast is contingent on my choosing to have coffee and toast?
Any thoughts?
P: God knows that you will A in this world. (or reality or timeline or whatever)
Q: You do not A in this world.
L: Libertarianism is true.
(I don't think this is substantially different from what bbarr intended at the starting point.)
Steps 1-5 proceed as he derived. But what does
5) Therefore, necessarily ~Q
actually say? It says, "It is not possible (I've anticipated the translation in step 8) that you do not A in this world."
Now jump ahead to step 7:
7) Then, possibly Q
meaning, "It is possible that you do not A in this world". But the libertarian can say that this does not follow from L (which entails, rather, "You do not A in some possible world" ).
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Originally posted by lucifershammerYes I think they can.
Let's try a slightly differently worded version of bbarr's argument in the thread cited:
P: God knows that you will A in this world. (or reality or timeline or whatever)
Q: You do not A in this world.
L: Libertarianism is true.
(I don't think this is substantially different from what bbarr intended at the starting point.)
Ste ...[text shortened]... follow from L (which entails, rather, "You do not A in some possible world" ).
Just something to ponder on:
When God created Adam, did he know that Adam would sin?
Here is what God set before Adam and Eve: “Be fruitful and become many and fill the earth and subdue it, and have in subjection the fish of the sea and the flying creatures of the heavens and every living creature that is moving upon the earth.” “And Jehovah God also laid this command upon the man: ‘From every tree of the garden you may eat to satisfaction. But as for the tree of the knowledge of good and bad you must not eat from it, for in the day you eat from it you will positively die.’” (Gen. 1:28; 2:16, 17) Would you encourage your children to undertake a project with a marvelous future, knowing from the start that it was doomed to failure? Would you warn them of harm, while knowing that you had planned everything so that they were sure to come to grief? Is it reasonable, then, to attribute such to God?
Matt. 7:11: “If you, although being wicked [or, “bad as you are,” NE], know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more so will your Father who is in the heavens give good things to those asking him?”
If God foreordained and foreknew Adam’s sin and all that would result from this, it would mean that by creating Adam, God deliberately set in motion all the wickedness committed in human history. He would be the Source of all the wars, the crime, the immorality, the oppression, the lying, the hypocrisy, the disease. But the Bible clearly says: “You are not a God taking delight in wickedness.” (Ps. 5:4) “Anyone loving violence His soul certainly hates.” (Ps. 11:5) “God . . . cannot lie.” (Titus 1:2) “From oppression and from violence he [the One designated by God as Messianic King] will redeem their soul, and their blood will be precious in his eyes.” (Ps. 72:14) “God is love.” (1 John 4:8) “He is a lover of righteousness and justice.”—Ps. 33:5.
Did God predestinate Jacob and Esau?
Gen. 25:23: “Jehovah proceeded to say to her [Rebekah]: ‘Two nations are in your belly, and two national groups will be separated from your inward parts; and the one national group will be stronger than the other national group, and the older [Esau] will serve the younger [Jacob].’” (Jehovah was able to read the genetic pattern of the unborn twins. He may have considered this when foreseeing the qualities that each of the boys would develop and foretelling the outcome. [Ps. 139:16] But there is no indication here that he fixed their eternal destinies or that he predetermined how each event in their lives would turn out.)
Was Judas Iscariot predestined to betray Jesus?
Ps. 41:9: “The man at peace with me, in whom I trusted, who was eating my bread, has magnified his heel against me.” (Notice that the prophecy does not specify which close associate of Jesus it would be. Jehovah knew that the Devil had used David’s counselor Ahithophel to betray him, and He had that recorded because it demonstrated how the Devil operated and what he would do in the future. It was not God but “the Devil . . . [who] put it into the heart of Judas Iscariot, the son of Simon, to betray him [Jesus].” [John 13:2] Instead of resisting, Judas yielded to that satanic influence.)
John 6:64: “From the beginning Jesus knew . . . who was the one that would betray him.” (Not from the beginning of creation, nor from the time of Judas’ birth, but “from the beginning” of his acting treacherously. Compare Genesis 1:1, Luke 1:2, and 1 John 2:7, 13, in each of which texts “beginning” is used in a relative sense. Take note also of John 12:4-6.)
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Originally posted by galveston75That might be coherent if you give up god's omniscience, or hold that god gave up omniscience. If the former, the problem disappears. The world might be a shambles as a result of god's botched creatures, but hey, he did his best. If the latter, then this leaves unanswered those questions about why god would be so reckless and why he didn't just tweak things with his foreknowledge.
Just something to ponder on:
When God created Adam, did he know that Adam would sin?
Here is what God set before Adam and Eve: “Be fruitful and become many and fill the earth and subdue it, and have in subjection the fish of the sea and the flying creatures of the heavens and every living creature that is moving upon the earth.” “And Jehovah ...[text shortened]... in each of which texts “beginning” is used in a relative sense. Take note also of John 12:4-6.)
Originally posted by lucifershammerNice to see you again LH.
Let's try a slightly differently worded version of bbarr's argument in the thread cited:
P: God knows that you will A in this world. (or reality or timeline or whatever)
Q: You do not A in this world.
L: Libertarianism is true.
(I don't think this is substantially different from what bbarr intended at the starting point.)
Ste follow from L (which entails, rather, "You do not A in some possible world" ).
My reply is under construction. Sorry for all the edits. I will post a response later.
Thanks LJ. I had almost finished typing out a reply but now I'll wait for your post.
That said, the following argument might help clarify things (and I think bbarr's argument hinges on what, exactly, we mean by 'necessity'😉:
Consider
P = "I posted on RHP last night" (which I did, in fact, do).
wp' = a possible world where P did not happen; i.e. P is false.
Therefore:
(N1) Necessarily, ~P in wp'
by definition of wp'
(N2) Necessarily, ~P in our world
if ~P is necessary in wp' then it must be necessary in all possible worlds
But
(N3) P in our world
(or we wouldn't be having this conversation!)
So, what gives?
Originally posted by lucifershammerBut (N1) doesn't follow from the definition of wp', unless you want to legislate all contingent truths out of existence. The problem with my original argument, which is of a piece with the error in your post, is that I inferred from some P that it is necessary that God knows P. All we have to work with is 'Necessarily, if P, then God knows P'. That gets us 'If necessarily P, then necessarily God knows P'. But given P on its own, without the modal operator, we have not satisfied the antecedent of this conditional, so we can't infer the consequent. The libertarian can claim that P is not necessary (and better, since he is committed to denying this), and so the claim 'Necessarily God knows P' (my premise (4)) is unjustified.
Thanks LJ. I had almost finished typing out a reply but now I'll wait for your post.
That said, the following argument might help clarify things (and I think bbarr's argument hinges on what, exactly, we mean by 'necessity'😉:
Consider
P = "I posted on RHP last night" (which I did, in fact, do).
wp' = a possible world where P did not happen; 3) P in our world
(or we wouldn't be having this conversation!)
So, what gives?
I'm interested in whether the addition of tensed premises like "It is true at t1 that you will A at t2", and "God knows at t1 that you will A at t2" can raise some problems for libertarianism. But I have to keep thinking about it for awhile.
Originally posted by lucifershammerThanks, good example. You are right that there could be confusion over just how, as bbarr mentioned earlier, "necessity cuts across" all possible worlds. The sleight of hand here in your example is that although it is true to say that ~P in a wp' is necessarily (analytically) true, it is false to say that necessarily ~P obtains (in any possible world or across the worlds). That we have ~P in a wp' is an analytic truth; it is necessarily true and this necessity cuts across the worlds as it must: there is no possible world where it is not the case that ~P in a wp'. But that has nothing to do with whether necessarily ~P obtains. So your N1 doesn't follow from your definition. That would be my take on it, anyway.
Thanks LJ. I had almost finished typing out a reply but now I'll wait for your post.
That said, the following argument might help clarify things (and I think bbarr's argument hinges on what, exactly, we mean by 'necessity'😉:
Consider
P = "I posted on RHP last night" (which I did, in fact, do).
wp' = a possible world where P did not happen; 3) P in our world
(or we wouldn't be having this conversation!)
So, what gives?
As you probably gathered from my previous post before my last edit, I do not agree with your previous post. I think Premise 7) does follow from L, and I also think you are breaking in a genuine way the rule that necessity cuts across the worlds.
At any rate, I would be interested in your thoughts on the following argument of mine. My main point here would be that I think the libertarian must attack bbarr's Premise 4); otherwise it seems to me he will have problems. If you do not agree with me, however, please let me know where you think I have gone wrong. Consider the following (and I do not think the argument is affected regardless of whether we include your addition of in this world):
(1) Necessarily, G knows that you will A (in this world).
This is bbarr's Premise 4.
(2) Necessarily, if G knows that you will A (in this world), then you will A (in this world).
Expresses that the consequent follows with necessity from the antecedent.
(3) If necessarily P; and if necessarily (P -> Q); then necessarily Q.
A transfer of necessity principle.
(4) Necessarily, you will A (in this world).
Follows from conjuction of (1), (2), and (3).
(5) So ~L.
A main point of L is that it is a feature (of this world) that there are live options that one do otherwise than one in fact does. So no proponent of L can admit of my (4).
-----
For disclosure, I think the libertarian would be justified in denying bbarr's premise 4 (and here my premise (1)) because (as this thread has helped clarify my thinking on it) I do not think the theist is committed to it on the basis of G's infallibility.
Originally posted by bbarr(Thanks for the clarification re: premise 4.)
But (N1) doesn't follow from the definition of wp', unless you want to legislate all contingent truths out of existence. The problem with my original argument, which is of a piece with the error in your post, is that I inferred from some P that it is necessary that God knows P. All we have to work with is 'Necessarily, if P, then God knows P'. That gets us ...[text shortened]... ome problems for libertarianism. But I have to keep thinking about it for awhile.
But what, then, is the modal status of ~P in wp'? If I say 'necessity', then we end up with the reductio above. But the very definition of wp' as a world where ~P holds implies it is something stronger than just possibility.
Alternatively, one can say that 'modal status of ~P in wp' ' is incoherent. But consider the (probably infinite) set of possible worlds WP' = {possible world w| ~P holds in w}. ~P holds in WP' in much the same way a necessary truth holds in U (the universal set of all possible worlds). Anything said of necessary truths in U holds of ~P in WP'.
(Not sure if any of this is relevant to the main discussion, but my intuition is that one can meaningfully speak of 'necessity' in a way that does not imply 'cuts across all possible worlds'.)
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Originally posted by bbarrI agree with this.
But (N1) doesn't follow from the definition of wp', unless you want to legislate all contingent truths out of existence. The problem with my original argument, which is of a piece with the error in your post, is that I inferred from some P that it is necessary that God knows P. All we have to work with is 'Necessarily, if P, then God knows P'. That gets us ...[text shortened]... ome problems for libertarianism. But I have to keep thinking about it for awhile.
The libertarian can claim that P is not necessary (and better, since he is committed to denying this), and so the claim 'Necessarily God knows P' (my premise (4)) is unjustified.
This is what I take Aquinas to be arguing in the Summa contra Gentiles:
"But it will occur in the way in which God foresaw that it would occur. He, however, foresaw that it would occur contingently. It follows, therefore, infallibly that it will occur contingently and not necessarily". (III (xciv))
My interpretation of this is not that god can fail to foresee that A but that his foreseeing it is contingent on its occurring. It is possible that my interpretation is coloured by reading this passage after starting this thread though.
I'm interested in whether the addition of tensed premises like "It is true at t1 that you will A at t2", and "God knows at t1 that you will A at t2" can raise some problems for libertarianism. But I have to keep thinking about it for awhile.
This might be the old A-theorist versus B-theorist thing I suppose. My intuition is that nothing can be gained by considering temporal logic though. Just as from 'I am eating cornflakes' it follows necessarily that 'I am eating cornflakes', yet nothing about the necessity of my eating cornflakes flows from this, similarly 'whatever will be, will be' is banal.
The above argument and the passage from Aquinas I found today in An Introduction to Western Philosophy by Anthony Flew (p 248) and strengthens my confidence in the argument with which I started this thread, however if you can come up with a counter I'll be quite happy.
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Originally posted by lucifershammerOriginally posted by lucifershammer
(Thanks for the clarification re: premise 4.)
But what, then, is the modal status of ~P in wp'? If I say 'necessity', then we end up with the reductio above. But the very definition of wp' as a world where ~P holds implies it is something stronger than just possibility.
Alternatively, one can say that 'modal status of ~P in wp' ' is incoh ...[text shortened]... ak of 'necessity' in a way that does not imply 'cuts across all possible worlds'.)
But what, then, is the modal status of ~P in wp'?
It's possible. The possibility operator defined in terms of possible worlds just means that there is at least one such world at which the proposition is true. The fact that you are looking at one such world doesn't alter that.
Originally posted by Lord SharkConsider a function M:U^2xP -> O such that
Originally posted by lucifershammer
[b]But what, then, is the modal status of ~P in wp'?
It's possible. The possibility operator defined in terms of possible worlds just means that there is at least one such world at which the proposition is true. The fact that you are looking at one such world doesn't alter that.[/b]
U = set of all possible worlds
P = set of all possible (meaningful) propositions
O = {necessary, possible, impossible} (the modal operators)
and
M(W C U,p E P) = {'necessary' iff Necessarily p in W (i.e. p holds in all worlds of W); 'possible' iff Possibly p in W (at least one world); 'impossible' iff Impossibly p in W}
(Now coming back to my example)
Clearly M(U,~P) = 'possible'. But M(WP',~P) = 'necessary'.
Originally posted by LemonJelloSince the discussion has already yielded viable challenges to premise 4, the omniscience-free will debate does not depend on our side-discussion on libertarian free will. Nevertheless, I am still interested in a discussion on exactly what L entails (my instinct is that your premise (4) can, in fact, be accommodated in a 'mere libertarianism' as Conrau K tried to show a few pages back). Maybe that should move to another thread (even another forum since it's not really Spirituality).
Thanks, good example. You are right that there could be confusion over just how, as bbarr mentioned earlier, "necessity cuts across" all possible worlds. The sleight of hand here in your example is that although it is true to say that ~P in a wp' is necessarily (analytically) true, it is false to say that necessarily ~P obtains (in any possible world or ...[text shortened]... on it) I do not think the theist is committed to it on the basis of G's infallibility.