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God's infallible knowledge and free will part II

God's infallible knowledge and free will part II

Spirituality

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Originally posted by bbarr
Also, I want to take a moment to say that I deeply appreciate the conversations I have had with the four of you. Your criticisms and suggestions and arguments are just great. Thanks.
Likewise. It took me a while to get my argument clear in my head. Thanks for your meticulous and patient scrutiny.

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Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]@(p ->Kc(p)) (omniscience condition)

Ok. Now I see what the problem is. Obviously we cannot conclude L Kc(p).
L (p --> Kc(p) ) entails L p --> L Kc(p) but then the assertion of p does not lead to L Kc(p).

This certainly captures my initial feelings. It seemed to me to be a clever conjurer's trick to suddenly conclude p is necessary simply b ...[text shortened]... ejects (4) then there is really no need to get muddled in debates about S5 and so on.[/b]
Ok. Now I see what the problem is. Obviously we cannot conclude L Kc(p).
L (p --> Kc(p) ) entails L p --> L Kc(p) but then the assertion of p does not lead to L Kc(p).

Yes.

I think both our objections are based on a similar intuition and they are not substantially different (both Lucifershammer and Lord Shark) said they were pretty much the same.
I am Spartacus! 🙂

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So it seems now at this point we pretty much all share the same mistrust of Premise 4. It seems to me that an infallibility condition on G's knowledge like necessarily (P -> G knows P) does get the theist everything he needs; but then Premise 4 is not justified on the basis of the infallibility condition.

Definitely a lesson learned here is that it is relatively easy for an objector to get caught in these sorts of trap. A discussion could go like this, for example:

Libertarian Theist (LT): "God's knowledge is infallible, but it does not infringe on our free will."

Fatalist Objector (FO): "Now, hold on. Let's suppose that you will A. Now, you're telling me that it is not possible that God does not know you will A. But if that is the case, then.."

LT: "No, excuse me, that's not what I'm telling you. It is possible that God does not know I will A."

FO: "But if you will A; and if possibly God does not know you will A; then possibly God is mistaken or ignorant. So He cannot be a perfect knower."

LT: "No, that doesn't follow. His knowledge is infallibile, and it is not possible that God is mistaken or ignorant about what I end up doing."

FO: "But, how can that be? We've supposed that you do in fact end up A-ing; and you're telling me that it is possibly the case that God does not know that you end up A-ing. So God cannot be a perfect knower."

LT: "No. That I end up A-ing is just contingently true. There are possible worlds where I do not end up A-ing. That God knows I will A is likewise just contingently true because it is true in those possible worlds where I do end up A-ing, but false in those possible worlds where I do not end up A-ing. So even though we have supposed that I will A, it is possible that God does not know that I will A. But that does not mean it is possible God is mistaken about what I do. It is still necessarily the case that if I end up A-ing, God knows it; just like it is necessarily the case that if I end up not A-ing, God knows it."

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To LH: We probably could say this fatalist objector keeps falling into your "crazy" talk mentality. If you think about it, there's really no difference between the person who gets wrapped up in the talk of the possibility that Lord Shark eats coffee and toast for breakfast in a world where Lord Shark got killed by a bus the night prior; and a person who gets wrapped up in the talk of the possibility that a perfect knower does not know that Lord Shark eats coffee and toast for breakfast in a world where Lord Shark does in fact eat coffee and toast for breakfast. In both cases, the person would need to remind himself that a proposition's being possible just means it is true in at least some possible world.


Originally posted by LemonJello
So it seems now at this point we pretty much all share the same mistrust of Premise 4. It seems to me that an infallibility condition on G's knowledge like necessarily (P -> G knows P) does get the theist everything he needs; but then Premise 4 is not justified on the basis of the infallibility condition.

Definitely a lesson learned here is that it is ...[text shortened]... being possible just means it is true in at least some possible world.
Right. Who says that philosophy never makes any progress?


Originally posted by bbarr
Right. Who says that philosophy never makes any progress?
Aaack!

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Originally posted by bbarr
Right. Who says that philosophy never makes any progress?
:-)

Yes, I have enjoyed conversations like this too. Well worth the wait ;-)

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Great thread, guys.

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