God's infallible knowledge and free will part II

Originally posted by Lord Shark
To be honest, I keep flipping from one view to the other, like looking at a Necker Cube.

My counter though is that to say it is necessary that God knows you will A might be question begging. Necessarily god knows what you will do, but if under libertarian free will this is your choice, then the content of god's knowledge is contingent on your ch ...[text shortened]... [b]that god knows is necessary but what god knows is contingent.

Does that help?[/b]

Okay, well in light of Conrau K's contributions, it seems that I probably WAS confused when I stated the following:

If it is necessary that God knows what I will do; and (suppose) in fact I will end up doing A; then isn't that the same as its being necessary that God knows I will do A? (Perhaps that is the point at which I am confused.)

I think what you have brought up is an issue with ferreting out what exactly follows from the infallibility condition. In the argument proposed by bbarr (in the other thread you linked), I believe his argument is quite sound under the interpretation of infallbility employed there. (Relatedly, I believe there is no allowance for your counter under a construal where infallibility entails that it is necessary that G knows the truth value of all propositions; that much seems relatively clear to me from transfer of necessity and related arguments.) But, perhaps under the (weaker) construal of infallibility that you and Conrau K have roughly outlined here, I can see why we should doubt that Premise 4) follows from the condition of infallibility. I will have to give it some more thought. Thanks,

Originally posted by galveston75
God is able to foretell the future. He describes himself as “the One telling from the beginning the finale, and from long ago the things that have not been done; the One saying, ‘My own counsel will stand, and everything that is my delight I shall do.’” (Isaiah 46:10) Down through human history, God has had his prophecies recorded to show that he can exe ...[text shortened]... e feelings of gratitude in the “elect,” or “chosen ones.”—Genesis 1:27; Job 1:8; Acts 10:34, 35.

Yes, that god chooses not to know whilst retaining the capacity to know, has intuitive appeal as a way of reconciling the god who could know how it will all play out with the god who has a relationship with us. For me, this doesn't work in the end, but each to their own, eh?

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Yes, that god chooses not to know whilst retaining the capacity to know, has intuitive appeal as a way of reconciling the god who could know how it will all play out with the god who has a relationship with us. For me, this doesn't work in the end, but each to their own, eh?

To each his own....

Originally posted by Conrau K
Yes, I think that is possible if we interpret necessity restrictively and limit the accessibility relation across worlds. So think of a set of worlds:

w1: you eat toast and God foresees this.
w2: you eat egg and God foresees this.

In that case, we say say that P is necessary because for each world, God foresees what you eat. There is no counterexa ...[text shortened]... necessity as something coercive (although this admittedly was a criticism of libertarians too.)

O.K., but then plug this into the argument I gave (to which LordShark linked in the OP). It follows that in W1 it is necessary that you eat toast and in W2 it is necessary that you eat eggs. You could respond, I guess, that W1 is the actual world and W2 is a possible world (or vice versa), but then it would be you begging the question, since the argument purports to show that if God is omniscient, and if you eat toast in the actual world, there are no possible worlds where you eat eggs. Further, and in any case, how does it comfort the libertarian that although he must eat eggs in this world, some transworld self must eat toast?

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K., but then plug this into the argument I gave (to which LordShark linked in the OP). It follows that in W1 it is necessary that you eat toast and in W2 it is necessary that you eat eggs. You could respond, I guess, that W1 is the actual world and W2 is a possible world (or vice versa), but then it would be you begging the question, since the argument pur ...[text shortened]... e libertarian that although he must eat eggs in this world, some transworld self must eat toast?

Yes, well, that is a problem. I really have no definite construal of 'world' here (but then, again, hasn't the whole language of 'worlds' and 'accessibility' always been fraught with metaphysical problems?) I think the point of this is simply that the libertarian can coherently say "I have the free choice between A and not-A but God knows that I choose A". It doesn't really matter whether a real world exists in which he chooses not-A. The point of this modal logic is simply to illustrate that God's necessary foreknowledge does not restrict the range of choices available to him. He can say 'Yes, God necessarily knows I choose A but that knowledge does not coerce me -- imagine a world I choose not-A, God would necessarily foreknow that.' The exercise in modal logic is simply to illustrate that God's knowledge while necessary is contingent and not coercive.

Originally posted by Conrau K
Yes, well, that is a problem. I really have no definite construal of 'world' here (but then, again, hasn't the whole language of 'worlds' and 'accessibility' always been fraught with metaphysical problems?) I think the point of this is simply that the libertarian can coherently say "I have the free choice between A and not-A but God knows that I choose A". ...[text shortened]... to illustrate that God's knowledge while necessary is contingent and not coercive.

Look, I'm with you. I don't much care for possible world talk except as a way of talking. When Lewis purported to show that all possible worlds are actual, I got off board. That's too metaphysically profligate for my tastes. But I think that if your argument leads to the conclusion that God's knowledge is both necessary and contingent, then something has come off the rails. Maybe we could try this some other way. I'm pretty sure the argument I originally gave is valid. So, is there a particular premise (or many!) that you think is (are!) contentious?

Originally posted by bbarr
Look, I'm with you. I don't much care for possible world talk except as a way of talking. When Lewis purported to show that all possible worlds are actual, I got off board. That's too metaphysically profligate for my tastes. But I think that if your argument leads to the conclusion that God's knowledge is both necessary and contingent, then somethin ...[text shortened]... valid. So, is there a particular premise (or many!) that you think is (are!) contentious?

I too think modal realism is bonkers.

If there are possible worlds in which I eat eggs benedict then I don't see how my eating coffee and toast can be anything other than contingent. In all possible worlds, god knows what I will eat, and this is the 'necessary' component of god's knowledge, but the fact that god knows what I actually will choose in this world is no more of a threat to libertarian free will than if you knew. At least that's the way the cube has flipped at the moment.

Originally posted by bbarr
Look, I'm with you. I don't much care for possible world talk except as a way of talking. When Lewis purported to show that all possible worlds are actual, I got off board. That's too metaphysically profligate for my tastes. But I think that if your argument leads to the conclusion that God's knowledge is both necessary and contingent, then somethin ...[text shortened]... valid. So, is there a particular premise (or many!) that you think is (are!) contentious?

Sorry, I haven't yet read your arguments on the other thread. Give me some time to work through that!

Originally posted by Lord Shark
I too think modal realism is bonkers.

If there are possible worlds in which I eat eggs benedict then I don't see how my eating coffee and toast can be anything other than contingent. In all possible worlds, god knows what I will eat, and this is the 'necessary' component of god's knowledge, but the fact that god knows what I actually will choose in thi ...[text shortened]... ian free will than if you knew. At least that's the way the cube has flipped at the moment.

My head hurts from the burden tennis.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
I too think modal realism is bonkers.

If there are possible worlds in which I eat eggs benedict then I don't see how my eating coffee and toast can be anything other than contingent. In all possible worlds, god knows what I will eat, and this is the 'necessary' component of god's knowledge, but the fact that god knows what I actually will choose in thi ...[text shortened]... ian free will than if you knew. At least that's the way the cube has flipped at the moment.

Right, but my argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then whatever you do in this world, you do necessarily. In fact, the argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then there are no contingent truths. The theist should hate this result. I like the argument, but I'm willing to be persuaded that it has gone wrong somewhere. But it's valid, so if this conclusion is false, then we have to get rid of one of the premises. Which premise would that be?

Originally posted by bbarr
Right, but my argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then whatever you do in this world, you do necessarily. In fact, the argument purports to show that if God necessarily knows, then there are no contingent truths. The theist should hate this result. I like the argument, but I'm willing to be persuaded that it has gone wrong somewhere. B ...[text shortened]... lusion is false, then we have to get rid of one of the premises. Which premise would that be?

4.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
4.

O.K.

(4) Necessarily, God knows that you will A.

So, the negation of (4) would be:

~ Necessarily, God knows that you will A.

Which is equivalent to:

Possibly, ~ God knows that you will A.

Which, in possible worlds semantics reads:

There is at least one world where God does not know that you will A.

So you think a theist would be happy with this?

Originally posted by bbarr
O.K.

(4) Necessarily, God knows that you will A.

So, the negation of (4) would be:

~ Necessarily, God knows that you will A.

Which is equivalent to:

Possibly, ~ God knows that you will A.

Which, in possible worlds semantics reads:

There is at least one world where God does not know that you will A.

So you think a theist would be happy with this?

God knows everything, there is nothing that He doesn't know, there is nothing that He couldn't know, so with God there is no time, He sees it before you do it, does that mean you have to do it? No it means that He knows you will do it, He doesn't force it upon you

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Suppose god knows that tomorrow morning I'll have coffee and toast for breakfast. Does this mean that I lack free will in my choice of breakfast?

A while ago some of us agreed that god's infallible knowledge threatens libertarian free will, after bbarr came up with an argument, here:
Thread 130680 on page 9.

The crux was premise 4:
...[text shortened]... ave coffee and toast is contingent on my choosing to have coffee and toast?

Any thoughts?

I believe if it can be known God will know it; however, if it is up to you than
whatever you choose will be the answer. I can know an apple tree will produce
apples not sure how many when but I can know that baring something out of
my knowledge coming in and changing things. So there are things that within the
scope of time that can happen God will know it, how I'm not sure, maybe he
can work out all possible out comes, maybe he just sees all time at once. Maybe
there is something about God I simply don't understand which is the likely one
in my opinion. The trick for our free will as I see it isn't God's forknowledge, but
God's ability to make sure it is free and not some designed outcome by God.
Kelly

Originally posted by daniel58
God knows everything, there is nothing that He doesn't know, there is nothing that He couldn't know, so with God there is no time, He sees it before you do it, does that mean you have to do it? No it means that He knows you will do it, He doesn't force it upon you

If you say so, but I have a proof that says otherwise. You can find it by following the link in the original post.