Moral Principles for Catholic Voters

Originally posted by bbarr
If we instantiated Spock's mentality in a silicon substrate the resultant entity would be a member of no species at all, yet would have rights. So, species membership isn't necessary for rights possession. Further, if both Vulcan species membership and Human species membership are sufficient for rights possession, the either this is a sui generis property of ...[text shortened]... e plants and tapeworms) is that normal Vulcans and humans have a particular sort of mentality.

If we instantiated Spock's mentality in a silicon substrate the resultant entity would possess no capacity for suffering and so, by the definition you've provided, would not be a person anyhow and have no rights.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
If we instantiated Spock's mentality in a silicon substrate the resultant entity would possess no capacity for suffering and so, by the definition you've provided, would not be a person anyhow and have no rights.

Huh?

Spock's consciousness is an aspect of Spock's mentality, so if we instantiated Spock's mentality in silicon, then the resultant entity would be conscious as well. Presumably, a silicon Spock could suffer from physical pain, loneliness, despair, etc. Suppose that the silicon substrate is functionally identical to the brain of the actual Spock. Then, stimulation of certain Silicon-Neural pathways will be sufficient for the elicitation of physical pain. But note that physical pain isn't the only sort of suffering.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
A person is a being with the capacity for rudimentary rationality, self-consciousness and suffering.

That's getting there. I would say that actual possession of rudimentary self-consciousness is key for personhood.

But even starting with sentience and consciousness, our view of the fetus should change. Even if the fetus is not yet a person, I think we would still have obligations to minimize pain/suffering.

Originally posted by bbarr
Because suffering hurts. Even if an entity cannot represent to itself the badnes of suffering, when an entity is suffering things are going worse for it from its point of view. We have experience with direct, unconceptualized pain, and are directly acquainted with its badness. Empathy and compassion dictate that we take this into account, even amongst non-persons.

Why should empathy and compassion "dictate" anything? Both are rational choices (or the products of rational choices) that any person can choose not to make.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Why should empathy and compassion "dictate" anything? Both are rational choices (or the products of rational choices) that any person can choose not to make.

Sure, people can choose to believe contradictory propositions too, or hold conflicting values. So what? That doesn't mean that it's reasonable to do so.

Anyway, for those who are empathic and compassionate, the suffering of even non-person entities is seen as reason-giving (it dictates consideration). The empathic and compassionate can no more simply ignore the suffering of others than you could simply choose to believe both P and ~P. If you are asking why people ought to cultivate empathy and understanding, then that is a different question, but my answer will be broadly Aristotelian.

Originally posted by LemonJello
That's getting there. I would say that actual possession of rudimentary self-consciousness is key for personhood.

I doubt you want to say that. Persons can be in comas, or otherwise temporarily damaged in ways that prevent them from being even rudimentarily self-conscious.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Harm requires a breach of interest or at least some level of physiological pain, whereas the fetus in early stages doesn't even have the capacity for any of that.

How does destroying something not breach its interest?

Originally posted by bbarr
Huh?

Spock's consciousness is an aspect of Spock's mentality, so if we instantiated Spock's mentality in silicon, then the resultant entity would be conscious as well. Presumably, a silicon Spock could suffer from physical pain, loneliness, despair, etc. Suppose that the silicon substrate is functionally identical to the brain of the actual Spock. Then ...[text shortened]... elicitation of physical pain. But note that physical pain isn't the only sort of suffering.

What about a being like Data then (who doesn't experience any sort of suffering)? Is Data a person? Does Data have rights?

Originally posted by bbarr
I doubt you want to say that. Persons can be in comas, or otherwise temporarily damaged in ways that prevent them from being even rudimentarily self-conscious.

Well...yes, that's a good point. I think my use of "actual possession" there is too strong.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
How does destroying something not breach its interest?

Interests are not breached where there are no interests to breach. How can something like the zygote possibly have an interest?

Originally posted by LemonJello
I'll take you up on that offer -- this thread will play out over a long time, I hope?

Let's see. 😉

I define personhood thus:

A person is a being that possesses (whether in act or potency) an intellect and a will.

(This is not substantially different from the classical conception articulated by Boethius: "A person is an individual substance of rational nature" )

Originally posted by LemonJello
Interests are not breached where there are no interests to breach. How can something like the zygote possibly have an interest?

Does something have to be conscious of an interest for it to have one?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
What about a being like Data then (who doesn't experience any sort of suffering)? Is Data a person? Does Data have rights?

Data's psychological states aren't explained particularly well in TNG. Although it is claimed he requires an emotion chip of the sort that his brother Lore possesses in order to have emotional states, it is unclear whether this chip supplies something like 'passion', or whether it is necessary in order for Data to have any adverse psychological states. Even sans chip, Data self-reports that he misses his friends, has a desire to reproduce, to do his duty, and so on. The frustration of these desires presumably leads to a sort of suffering; the experiencing of adverse psychological states. Things can go better or worse for Data from his own point of view, even without the emotion chip.

Yikes I feel like a geek, but it's nice to talk about these issues with somebody familiar with the show. My students now have never seen Star Trek.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Let's see. 😉

I define personhood thus:

A person is a being that possesses (whether in act or potency) an intellect and a will.

(This is not substantially different from the classical conception articulated by Boethius: "A person is an individual substance of rational nature" )

Okay. But I just don't see how potentiality criteria are sound.

Nothing else I know of works like that. I cannot go to the movies and say that I am a senior citizen in potency and expect to be entitled to the discount. There's no logical connection between potential qualifications and actual status.

So, possessing an intellect and will "in potency" -- why wouldn't that just make the fetus a potential person?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Let's see. 😉

I define personhood thus:

A person is a being that possesses (whether in act or potency) an intellect and a will.

(This is not substantially different from the classical conception articulated by Boethius: "A person is an individual substance of rational nature" )

So, a zygote has an intellect and a will? Does 'potency' mean potentiality or something like causal efficacy?