Moral Principles for Catholic Voters

Originally posted by Nemesio
How about either Ivanhoe or you provide a definition of 'person' that stands up to
rationale that isn't based on theological dogma (such as the existence of the soul)?

Ivanhoe never produced (even though he said he would), so I am not holding out
much hope on his end. I predict your posts will take the same sort of meandering
between 'logical' and 'd t...we changed out minds) tends to go, but
who knows, it may yield something.

Nemesio

I predict your posts will take the same sort of meandering
between 'logical' and 'dogmatic' that your discussion about the Church (infallible... no wait...only authoritative...no wait...we changed out minds) tends to go, but who knows, it may yield something.

Thanks. I'm looking forward to a respectful, rational discussion with you too.

How about either Ivanhoe or you provide a definition of 'person' that stands up to rationale that isn't based on theological dogma (such as the existence of the soul)?

Provided you do the same. Okay?

EDIT: I mean I'll present my definition of 'person' and attempt to defend it if you'll do the same. Sounds reasonable?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
[b]Species membership is neither necessary nor sufficient for having rights, Ivanhoe, and you know it.

Only because your definition of 'person' (as a bearer of rights) decrees it.

Your view has everything to do with religion.

This is a common ad hominem attack levelled at pro-lifers so that their arguments needn't be examine s[/b]

Because the test of humanity is how we treat our weakest, most vulnerable members.[/b]

Only because your definition of 'person' (as a bearer of rights) decrees it.

That’s a silly allegation, LH. I can’t count the times I’ve presented the arguments in defense of the claim that rights possession, or moral considerability more generally, is neither necessitated by species membership nor does species membership suffice for it. You may object to the arguments, but to claim that I’m merely being stipulative is either careless, disingenuous or stupid.

Spock has rights, yet Spock isn’t human, hence species membership isn’t necessary for rights possession. Irrevocably brain dead folk being kept alive artificially have no rights, because they fail to have even a minimal mentality; there is nothing significant that distinguishes them from other minimally animate yet insentient objects and entities in our world (they're called vegetables for a reason, you know).

Now, you will grant the necessity objection (I hope!), and will object to the sufficiency objection. Objecting to the sufficiency objection entails that you think a complete lack of mentality is compatible with full rights possession. I think that the only arguments you or Ivanhoe have in defense of this claim are theo-teleological. If this is not the case, then present your arguments.

This is a common ad hominem attack levelled at pro-lifers so that their arguments needn't be examined.

Pointing out enthymemes isn’t ad hominem, and you know it.

Because the test of humanity is how we treat our weakest, most vulnerable members.

That’s question begging. The whole debate is over whether fetuses are members in our normative community, or whether they are members of the human community merely in a descriptive sense. Fetuses are clearly biologically human, but I have argued many times that this doesn’t suffice for rights possession; that this doesn’t suffice for being human in a normative sense (e.g., in the Kantian or Aristotelian sense of ‘human’, or in some other sense implicative of moral considerability).

Originally posted by lucifershammer
[b]Species membership is neither necessary nor sufficient for having rights, Ivanhoe, and you know it.

Only because your definition of 'person' (as a bearer of rights) decrees it.

Your view has everything to do with religion.

This is a common ad hominem attack levelled at pro-lifers so that their arguments needn't be examine s[/b]

Because the test of humanity is how we treat our weakest, most vulnerable members.[/b]

Because the test of humanity is how we treat our weakest, most vulnerable members.

Regardless of whether or not this is true, you and ivanhoe are confused here. The zygote/embryo/fetus in early stages is no more "vulnerable" than a rock. That sort of vulnerability requires the existence of some (conscious) perspective from which harm may befall. There simply is no such perspective associated with the fetus until at least well into gestation. You're simply personalizing the fetus by assigning to it a sort of vulnerability for which it doesn't even possess the capacity.

It's not an ad hominem to simply state that ivanhoe is being dishonest about the extent to which conformity to religious fiat has shaped his view on abortion. That's not why I, for one, reject his view. I reject his view (which just happens, as usual, to align perfectly with the arbitrary mandates of his church) because it is based on a species criterion for personhood that is obviously and demonstrably false. The other aspects of his "argument" (e.g., that the fetus is 'vulnerable' and therefore needs protection) are also false.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I'll present my definition of 'person' and attempt to defend it if you'll do the same.

I am interested to know what your criterion for personhood is. Given that your view is personhood-from-conception, I'll be interested to know just how exactly the zygote at conception -- one single diploid cell -- qualifies as a person.

I don't see any way to justify the person-from-conception stance. Simply that the organism is human is not sufficient: that would just be arbitrary speciesism. Potentiality of this organism doesn't seem sufficient, either: there is no sound way to argue from potential qualifications for rights to actual possession of rights.

My view on personhood would be something related to actual possession of certain higher neocortical function. However, I really don't think we need a criterion of personhood to make an educated judgment about abortion. It's enough to note that the fetus in early stages lacks obvious necessary conditions for personhood. For the vast majority of abortions -- performed within 15 weeks of gestation -- the fetus simply cannot be harmed in any way, and the woman holds a very basic claim to self-autonomy. So, what's the problem?

Originally posted by bbarr
[b]Only because your definition of 'person' (as a bearer of rights) decrees it.

That’s a silly allegation, LH. I can’t count the times I’ve presented the arguments in defense of the claim that rights possession, or moral considerability more generally, is neither necessitated by species membership nor does species membership suffice for it. You may o ...[text shortened]... Aristotelian sense of ‘human’, or in some other sense implicative of moral considerability).[/b]

Far be it from me to argue a point with which I am not in agreement, but... the other side of the argument is just as untenable. Who is to define 'mentality' or degrees thereof? Further back, why is 'mentality' the deciding factor?

If pain is the barometer, it has been shown conclusively from reflex motility that (physical) pain can be detected by the fetus. Some shoring up of the argument is in order, in my opinion.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
Far be it from me to argue a point with which I am not in agreement, but... the other side of the argument is just as untenable. Who is to define 'mentality' or degrees thereof? Further back, why is 'mentality' the deciding factor?

If pain is the barometer, it has been shown conclusively from reflex motility that (physical) pain can be detected by the fetus. Some shoring up of the argument is in order, in my opinion.

I wasn't providing a definition of mentality, but I take it to to be a minimal condition of possessing a mind that one either have propositional attitudes or that one have the capacity for consciousness. The early fetus has neither. Mentality matters because there is nothing wrong with kicking a stone down the road but there is something wrong with kicking a dog down the road. Suffering is morally relevant; the frustration of interests is morally relevant, and I'm sure you agree with this.

There is no fetal pain prior to the fetus developing the capacity for conscious states, because pain is a conscious state.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I am interested to know what your criterion for personhood is. Given that your view is personhood-from-conception, I'll be interested to know just how exactly the zygote at conception -- one single diploid cell -- qualifies as a person.

I will if you take up the quid pro quo I offered Nemesio.

EDIT: To prevent charges of forcing you (and bbarr) of repeating yourself, I'll recount your position from memory:

A person is a living organism possessing the capacity for rudimentary rationality and suffering.

Anything you want to add/modify?

Bbarr -- what about you?

My view on personhood would be something related to actual possession of certain higher neocortical function.

Isn't that just letting speciesism through the back door?

However, I really don't think we need a criterion of personhood to make an educated judgment about abortion. It's enough to note that the fetus in early stages lacks obvious necessary conditions for personhood. For the vast majority of abortions -- performed within 15 weeks of gestation -- the fetus simply cannot be harmed in any way

Eh? Being destroyed does not count as "harm"?

Originally posted by bbarr
I wasn't providing a definition of mentality, but I take it to to be a minimal condition of possessing a mind that one either have propositional attitudes or that one have the capacity for consciousness. The early fetus has neither. Mentality matters because there is nothing wrong with kicking a stone down the road but there is something wrong with kicking a ...[text shortened]... to the fetus developing the capacity for conscious states, because pain is a conscious state.

I cannot argue the consciousness aspect of the fetus, as it is very clear that none is available. However, the 'wrongness' of a thing must be justified beyond egocentric measure.

I would suggest that there are aspects to pain, physical and mental. A chicken with its head cut off still runs away.

Originally posted by bbarr
[b]Only because your definition of 'person' (as a bearer of rights) decrees it.

That’s a silly allegation, LH. I can’t count the times I’ve presented the arguments in defense of the claim that rights possession, or moral considerability more generally, is neither necessitated by species membership nor does species membership suffice for it. You may o ...[text shortened]... Aristotelian sense of ‘human’, or in some other sense implicative of moral considerability).[/b]

Spock has rights, yet Spock isn’t human, hence species membership isn’t necessary for rights possession.

Correction: Membership in the human species isn't necessary for rights possession. Spock can just as easily possess rights because he is a member of the Vulcan species.

Irrevocably brain dead folk being kept alive artificially have no rights, because they fail to have even a minimal mentality; there is nothing significant that distinguishes them from other minimally animate yet insentient objects and entities in our world (they're called vegetables for a reason, you know).

Would you object to such folk being needlessly cut open, chopped up or otherwise disfigured in such a state? Why or why not?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I will if you take up the quid pro quo I offered Nemesio.

EDIT: To prevent charges of forcing you (and bbarr) of repeating yourself, I'll recount your position from memory:

A person is a living organism possessing the capacity for rudimentary rationality and suffering.

Anything you want to add/modify?

Bbarr -- what about you? ...[text shortened]... us simply cannot be harmed in any way

Eh? Being destroyed does not count as "harm"?[/b]

If 'living' is a biological notion, then that isn't part of my conception of personhood, as there may be persons instantiated non-physical substrates. Also, I add the capacity for rudimentary self-consciousness; minimally the capacity for one's conscious states to be objects of one's propositional attitudes (e.g., that one's suffering be the object of a desire, presumably a desire for that suffering to cease). Note also that I don't take personhood to be criterial for all moral considerability. I think we have at least prima facie obligations to minimize the suffering of non-persons.

Originally posted by bbarr
If 'living' is a biological notion, then that isn't part of my conception of personhood, as there may be persons instantiated non-physical substrates. Also, I add the capacity for rudimentary self-consciousness; minimally the capacity for one's conscious states to be objects of one's propositional attitudes (e.g., that one's suffering be the object of a desir ...[text shortened]... think we have at least prima facie obligations to minimize the suffering of non-persons.

Okay:

A person is a being with the capacity for rudimentary rationality, self-consciousness and suffering.

That work for you?

Note also that I don't take personhood to be criterial for all moral considerability. I think we have at least prima facie obligations to minimize the suffering of non-persons.

Why?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Spock has rights, yet Spock isn’t human, hence species membership isn’t necessary for rights possession.

Correction: Membership in the human species isn't necessary for rights possession. Spock can just as easily possess rights because he is a member of the Vulcan species.

Irrevocably brain dead folk being kept alive artificiall being needlessly cut open, chopped up or otherwise disfigured in such a state? Why or why not?

If we instantiated Spock's mentality in a silicon substrate the resultant entity would be a member of no species at all, yet would have rights. So, species membership isn't necessary for rights possession. Further, if both Vulcan species membership and Human species membership are sufficient for rights possession, the either this is a sui generis property of these two species (and perhaps other species), or there is some reason why membership in either of these two species suffices for rights possession. If the former, then the position is merely stipulative. If the latter, then I suggest that the common factor between these two species (that they do not share with things like plants and tapeworms) is that normal Vulcans and humans have a particular sort of mentality.

I would object to the use of brain-dead folk for needless surgical fun because 1) chances are that the relatives and friends of the vegetable would be harmed by it, and 2) other folk stand to benefit from the use of the vegetable's body (transplant patients, for instance, and medical students).

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Okay:

A person is a being with the capacity for rudimentary rationality, self-consciousness and suffering.

That work for you?

[b]Note also that I don't take personhood to be criterial for all moral considerability. I think we have at least prima facie obligations to minimize the suffering of non-persons.

Why?[/b]

Because suffering hurts. Even if an entity cannot represent to itself the badnes of suffering, when an entity is suffering things are going worse for it from its point of view. We have experience with direct, unconceptualized pain, and are directly acquainted with its badness. Empathy and compassion dictate that we take this into account, even amongst non-persons.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
I cannot argue the consciousness aspect of the fetus, as it is very clear that none is available. However, the 'wrongness' of a thing must be justified beyond egocentric measure.

I would suggest that there are aspects to pain, physical and mental. A chicken with its head cut off still runs away.

I'm sorry, I don't understand your post. Specifically, I don't know what "justified beyond egocentric measure" is supposed to convey, and I don't know what the chicken example is supposed to show.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
I will if you take up the quid pro quo I offered Nemesio.

EDIT: To prevent charges of forcing you (and bbarr) of repeating yourself, I'll recount your position from memory:

A person is a living organism possessing the capacity for rudimentary rationality and suffering.

Anything you want to add/modify?

Bbarr -- what about you? us simply cannot be harmed in any way

Eh? Being destroyed does not count as "harm"?[/b]

I'll take you up on that offer -- this thread will play out over a long time, I hope?

Isn't that just letting speciesism through the back door?

No, not at all. Species membership is irrelevant here, and my view doesn't stipulate otherwise. Speciesism is only let in through the door when we stipulate that species membership in and of itself has bearing on moral considerability.

Eh? Being destroyed does not count as "harm"?

Not if what is "destroyed" does not even have the capacity to be harmed. I can destroy a rock or a plant without causing any "harm". Harm requires a breach of interest or at least some level of physiological pain, whereas the fetus in early stages doesn't even have the capacity for any of that.