Originally posted by bbarrAs Data himself reports, his "desire" to reproduce, do his duty etc. come from his programming to emulate human behaviour. His missing LaForge is explained in terms of it having to do with improved performance of his 'positronic circuits'.
Data's psychological states aren't explained particularly well in TNG. Although it is claimed he requires an emotion chip of the sort that his brother Lore possesses in order to have emotional states, it is unclear whether this chip supplies something like 'passion', or whether it is necessary in order for Data to have any adverse psychological states. Even ...[text shortened]... se issues with somebody familiar with the show. My students now have never seen Star Trek.
Yes, things can go better or worse for Data from his point of view -- but the point of view he expresses is a rational one (not emotional) and any rational being should be capable of such judgments. "Suffering" is nothing more than recognising decreased efficiency and/or damage.
If you accept that Data is a person, then the suffering criterion must be dropped from your definition.
Originally posted by lucifershammerWhat if Data were twins?
As Data himself reports, his "desire" to reproduce, do his duty etc. come from his programming to emulate human behaviour. His missing LaForge is explained in terms of it having to do with improved performance of his 'positronic circuits'.
Yes, things can go better or worse for Data from his point of view -- but the point of view he expresses is a ...[text shortened]... that Data is a person, then the suffering criterion must be dropped from your definition.
Originally posted by LemonJelloIt can't. It would be like saying that you should not be allowed to cut off your finger because it would not be in the best interest of the cells in the finger, as they would die.
No I don't think so, but the question would be how something that doesn't even have the capacity for consciousness could possibly possess an interest.
Originally posted by lucifershammerIt doesn't matter where the desires come from, but what Data's psychological states are like when those desires aren't satisfied. When Data explains the state of missing LaForge by reference to his postitronic circuits not functioning as well, the idea (I thought) was that this is analogous to our being depressed in the absence of our friends and happy around them. I thought that Data was just expressing how some psychological states are multiply realizable (to use a term from philosophy of mind). So, I deny that Data the character doesn't suffer.
As Data himself reports, his "desire" to reproduce, do his duty etc. come from his programming to emulate human behaviour. His missing LaForge is explained in terms of it having to do with improved performance of his 'positronic circuits'.
Yes, things can go better or worse for Data from his point of view -- but the point of view he expresses is a ...[text shortened]... that Data is a person, then the suffering criterion must be dropped from your definition.
But look, this is really immaterial. You could just stipulate that there could be creatures like Data, but that for whom nothing can go better or worse for them from their point of view. I deny that such creatures are persons.
Originally posted by LemonJelloYour senior citizen example fails because such discounts are privileges, not rights. I could operate a theatre with no student or senior discounts and not violate anyone's rights.
Okay. But I just don't see how potentiality criteria are sound.
Nothing else I know of works like that. I cannot go to the movies and say that I am a senior citizen in potency and expect to be entitled to the discount. There's no logical connection between potential qualifications and actual status.
So, possessing an intellect and will "in potency" -- why wouldn't that just make the fetus a potential person?
However, even with privileges, there are routine examples of potential qualifications being considered over actual status. For instance, corporations routinely take students (e.g. in B-schools) on trips, dinners, pay them signing bonuses etc. even though they are only potential employees. Venture capitalists invest in businesses that are potential successes, even though in actuality they are just garage operations.
Potency is not merely a property that a being could have -- it is something the being actually possesses (more precisely, all mutable beings are simultaneously in act and potency -- using the classical metaphysics definitions of those terms).
Originally posted by bbarrSomething like potentiality (unless by 'potentiality' you mean something like Aristotle's dynamis) -- but not exactly the same.
So, a zygote has an intellect and a will? Does 'potency' mean potentiality or something like causal efficacy?
[Operative] Potency is something the being is already becoming by virtue of its nature.
Originally posted by lucifershammerWell, it's not clear what Aristotle's dynamis is supposed to include (e.g., capacities, potentialities, powers to realize potentialities, etc.).
Something like potentiality (unless by 'potentiality' you mean something like Aristotle's dynamis) -- but not exactly the same.
[Operative] Potency is something the being is already becoming by virtue of its nature.
If potency is something a fetus is already becoming (presumably from the instant of conception) then it sounds like potency is a state that the fetus will eventually be in. But if that's right, then the proper description of the fetus prior to potency is that the fetus is potentially potent. I must be misreading you here. Can you elaborate on the nature of potency?
Originally posted by bbarrYikes I feel like a geek, but it's nice to talk about these issues with somebody familiar with the show. My students now have never seen Star Trek.
Data's psychological states aren't explained particularly well in TNG. Although it is claimed he requires an emotion chip of the sort that his brother Lore possesses in order to have emotional states, it is unclear whether this chip supplies something like 'passion', or whether it is necessary in order for Data to have any adverse psychological states. Even ...[text shortened]... se issues with somebody familiar with the show. My students now have never seen Star Trek.
Good God, I’m old!!! You’re talking about “Generations”—not even the original Star Trek!
Okay, I’ll follow along quietly now...
Originally posted by bbarrBy Data's own account, what you call "Data's suffering" is nothing more than his recognition of a state of decreased efficiency and/or damage. Clearly such a state is "worse" from Data's point of view -- but any rational being can make such a judgment vis-a-vis its own operating parameters. I don't need to be particularly "suffering" (in the normal human use of the term) to realise that my dial-up connection decreases my operating efficiency as compared to a broadband connection.
It doesn't matter where the desires come from, but what Data's psychological states are like when those desires aren't satisfied. When Data explains the state of missing LaForge by reference to his postitronic circuits not functioning as well, the idea (I thought) was that this is analogous to our being depressed in the absence of our friends and happy around ...[text shortened]... better or worse for them from their point of view. I deny that such creatures are persons.
I don't know what you mean by creatures "for whom nothing can go better or worse for them from their point of view" unless you simply mean that the creature has a preference (e.g. follows some algorithm that allows it to choose) for certain states over others.
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Originally posted by bbarrThere is no "prior to potency". All mutable beings are simultaneously both in act and potency. Act is just the static snapshot of what it is right now, potency is what it is becoming. A zygote, for instance, is in act a bundle of cells; in potency, it is an 18-year old human being. When it becomes an 18-year old human being, it is in act an 18-year old human being and in potency an 80-year old etc. All mutable beings simultaneously are something (act) and becoming something (potency). Act and potency are just simultaneous, complementary modes of being.
Well, it's not clear what Aristotle's dynamis is supposed to include (e.g., capacities, potentialities, powers to realize potentialities, etc.).
If potency is something a fetus is already becoming (presumably from the instant of conception) then it sounds like potency is a state that the fetus will eventually be in. But if that's right, then the pr ...[text shortened]... entially potent. I must be misreading you here. Can you elaborate on the nature of potency?
Originally posted by lucifershammerI think the senior citizen example is fine, provided we are talking about potentiality. The point is, given this discount exists and there are certain conditions under which the theater is obligated to honor it, no such obligation exists based merely on potential status. Similarly, regardless of what privileges a company may bestow upon potential employees, the company has no obligation to provide employee rights to merely potential employees.
Your senior citizen example fails because such discounts are privileges, not rights. I could operate a theatre with no student or senior discounts and not violate anyone's rights.
However, even with privileges, there are routine examples of potential qualifications being considered over actual status. For instance, corporations routinely take stude ...[text shortened]... n act and potency -- using the classical metaphysics definitions of those terms).
Regardless, now I think I am a little confused what you mean by "in potency".
By Data's own account, what you call "Data's suffering" is nothing more than his recognition of a state of decreased efficiency and/or damage.
No, this is false. Data's suffering is not merely cognitive, it is affective as well. It is functionally related to Data's motivational states (e.g., the desire to alleviate the condition). Further, Data's suffering is richly cognitive; recognition of decreased performace or damage orients Data (just as it does with us) to features of the environment that contribute to or could alleviate the adverse conditions. Data's suffering is functionally isomorphic to our suffering. When Data is in an adverse psychological state, it moves him in ways that are recognizable to us.
I don't know what you mean by creatures "for whom nothing can go better or worse for them from their point of view" unless you simply mean that the creature has a preference (e.g. follows some algorithm that allows it to choose) for certain states over others.
Creatures for whom nothing can go better or worse from their point of view would not find any psychological state adverse. There would be no psychological state they would prefer not to be in or, minimally, no psychological state would motivate them to change their state.
Originally posted by lucifershammerSo, if a fetus is aborted, then prior to its being aborted it was still, in potency, an adult human. If so, then the following claim is false:
There is no "prior to potency". All mutable beings are simultaneously both in act and potency. Act is just the static snapshot of what it is right now, potency is what it is becoming. A zygote, for instance, is in act a bundle of cells; in potency, it is an 18-year old human being. When it becomes an 18-year old human being, it is in act an 18-year ol ...[text shortened]... [/i] something (potency). Act and potency are just simultaneous, complementary modes of being.
If X is in potency Y, then X will at some point be Y.
But I doubt you want to interpret potency as follows:
If X is in potency Y, then it is logically possible that X will at some point by Y.
This would be too encompassing, as mereological sums of matter would qualify as in potency persons. Similarly, I doubt you want to interpret potency as follows:
If X is in potency Y, then it is nomologically possible that X will at some point be Y.
This would entail that a mereological sum of some particular sperm and some ovum would qualify as in potency a person.
So, can you explain the relationship between X and Y, where X is in potency Y, by completing the following conditional for me?
If X is in potency Y, then....
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Originally posted by LemonJelloTo avoid quibbling, a better (certainly more widely used) example might be that an 11-year-old does not have the right to vote simply by virtue of being a "potential adult".
Okay. But I just don't see how potentiality criteria are sound.
Nothing else I know of works like that. I cannot go to the movies and say that I am a senior citizen in potency and expect to be entitled to the discount. There's no logical connection between potential qualifications and actual status.
So, possessing an intellect and will "in potency" -- why wouldn't that just make the fetus a potential person?