Moral Principles for Catholic Voters

Originally posted by lucifershammer
If you accept that Data is a person, then no more is necessary.

Indeed, the only thing the whole "capacity for suffering" bit does is appeal to our empathy/compassion. It is clearly not sufficient for personhood; based on the discussion of creatures like Data, it is not necessary either. There may be some other condition you may want to put instead ...[text shortened]... erson have preferences and will choose to act in accordance with them to the extent possible).

Wait, now you're just confused. As I said previously, I deny that Data doesn't suffer, and I maintain that the capacity for suffering is necessary for personhood. But, again, if you want to simply stipulate that Data doesn't suffer (and Data's psychology is left vague in TNG, which is what you should expect from a science fiction show that doesn't employ philosophers of mind), then I'd claim that Data is not a person.

Originally posted by bbarr
Wait, now you're just confused. As I said previously, I deny that Data doesn't suffer, and I maintain that the capacity for suffering is necessary for personhood. But, again, if you want to simply stipulate that Data doesn't suffer (and Data's psychology is left vague in TNG, which is what you should expect from a science fiction show that doesn't employ philosophers of mind), then I'd claim that Data is not a person.

So a perfectly intelligent, conscious, sentient being would fail to be a person simply because it cannot experience physical pain or negative emotions?

Is there a reason behind it or is it just an arbitrary line-in-the-sand definition thingy? Why is this whole "capacity for suffering" bit so critical to your definition of personhood?

EDIT: This is beginning to remind me of the case of R. Andrew Martin in Asimov's The Bicentennial Man.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
What does 'nomological' and 'mereological' mean? Could you define these please?

If X is in potency Y, then X is in the process of becoming Y.

That's the simplest way of putting it. It might be more or less the same as your third formulation. But a simple sum of some particular sperm and some particular ovum would not qualify as in potency anythi ...[text shortened]... course, we can speak of a new substantial being (the older sperm and ovum cease to exist).

"Substantial being"? Talk about an "arbitrary line in the sand thingy"!

Many, if not most of these combinations of sperm and egg are, according to the latest studies, in the "process" of ceasing to exist before they leave the womb (many before they are even implanted in the womb). How "substantial" a "being" is that?

Originally posted by no1marauder
"Substantial being"? Talk about an "arbitrary line in the sand thingy"!

Many, if not most of these combinations of sperm and egg are, according to the latest studies, in the "process" of ceasing to exist before they leave the womb (many before they are even implanted in the womb). How "substantial" a "being" is that?

It's a technical term in philosophy, no1.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
It's a technical term in philosophy, no1.

Perhaps you'd explain it to the unwashed peasants.

Originally posted by no1marauder
Perhaps you'd explain it to the unwashed peasants.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/

Originally posted by lucifershammer
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/

Why don't you give it a go since you used the term?

Originally posted by no1marauder
Why don't you give it a go since you used the term?

something that exists by itself and in which accidents or attributes inhere; that which receives modifications and is not itself a mode; something that is causally active; something that is more than an event.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/substance
(Defn 10a)

Originally posted by lucifershammer
something that exists by itself and in which accidents or attributes inhere; that which receives modifications and is not itself a mode; something that is causally active; something that is more than an event.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/substance
(Defn 10a)

Compare Spinoza's definition:

III. By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and is
conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a
conception can be formed independently of any other conception.

Originally posted by dottewell
To avoid quibbling, a better (certainly more widely used) example might be that an 11-year-old does not have the right to vote simply by virtue of being a "potential adult".

Actually, if the "right" to vote is a true right, I would argue that a 11-year old does indeed possess the right to vote by virtue of being a citizen of that country. However, the 11-year old cannot exercise his/her right at the moment because he/she has not acquired the necessary faculties (e.g. civic maturity) required to exercise it. This is no different from, say, a 6-month old child and the right to free speech.

If the right to vote is a proper right belonging to the person, then the person always has it. If, on the other hand, it is simply a privilege granted by the State or by social contract, then it can be withdrawn at any time.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Actually, if the "right" to vote is a true right, I would argue that a 11-year old does indeed possess the right to vote by virtue of being a citizen of that country. However, the 11-year old cannot exercise his/her right at the moment because he/she has not acquired the necessary faculties (e.g. civic maturity) required to exercise it. This is no dif ...[text shortened]... a privilege granted by the State or by social contract, then it can be withdrawn at any time.

The sense in which a minor cannot vote (i.e. ...is prevented, prohibited from voting) is quite different from the sense in which a 6-month-old child cannot exercise free speech (i.e. ...is physically incapable of coherent free speech).

Isn't the simplest explanation for society preventing a child from putting an "x" in a box on polling day that the child has not yet acquired the right to vote?

This certainly seems more acceptable than saying a zygote has a right to vote, or that voting is merely a "privilege"...

Originally posted by dottewell
The sense in which a minor cannot vote (i.e. ...is prevented, prohibited from voting) is quite different from the sense in which a 6-month-old child cannot exercise free speech (i.e. ...is physically incapable of coherent free speech).

Isn't the simplest explanation for society preventing a child from putting an "x" in a box on polling day that the chil ...[text shortened]... eptable than saying a zygote has a right to vote, or that voting is merely a "privilege"...

If the reason the child "acquires" the right to vote (say, when it reaches 18) is that the State (or a particular society) decrees it, then how is it not merely a privilege?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
If the reason the child "acquires" the right to vote (say, when it reaches 18) is that the State decrees it, then how is it not merely a privilege?

Surely we want to say that the state is recognising the acquisition of the right, rather than decreeing it? Just as the homicide laws are not the reason it is wrong to kill someone else.

Originally posted by dottewell
Surely we want to say that the state is recognising the acquisition of the right, rather than decreeing it?

If the State is 'recognising' the acquisition of the right, then wouldn't non-recognition be a violation of that person's rights?

Surely you're aware that there is a wide variety of voting ages around the world (typically 16-21). Who's right? At what point is this right "acquired"? Is there a good number of human beings out there who have already "acquired" the right but are prevented by the State from exercising it? Is there a good number of human beings out there who have not "acquired" the right but are granted a mere privilege? (Note: These questions remain even if we're talking about a different point of time for each individual who "acquires" the right.)

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Surely you're aware that there is a wide variety of voting ages around the world (typically 16-21). Who's right? At what point is this right "acquired"? Is there a good number of human beings out there who have already "acquired" the right but are prevented by the State from exercising it? Is there a good number of human beings out there who have not alking about a different point of time for each individual who "acquires" the right.)

Indeed, there is a healthy debate about when the right can be said to be acquired; there seems to be general agreement, however, that is it at "adulthood" (though differences on how that is defined). And even if there wasn't, that wouldn't affect the moral point that the right to participate directly in representative democracy (by voting) is acquired with maturity/at adulthood. One doesn't settle a moral argument by looking at what people actually do.

There may well be people out there who can be said to have acquired the right to participate in the representative democracies they live in having reached the requisite level of maturity, yet are denied that right; all that means is that there are some imperfect laws regarding voting age. In fact I'd say it's pretty inevitable that will be the case, since we have to (out of practicality) set a statutory voting age, and people mature at different rates.

Again, it doesn't affect the moral principle - the right to take part in a representative democracy by voting is one that is acquired with maturity/at adulthood.

An analogy. Different countries have different ages at which people can have sex. The question, "Who is right?" is of course legitimate. But I take it you agree that the mere question in no way undermines the moral principle that children/teenagers/young adults should be prevented from having sex until a certain age, whatever that age may be. It's just a difference of opinion over the detail.