Originally posted by lucifershammerOkay, but I’ll hold to my statements anyway, whether they contradict what Conrau was saying or not..
Actually, it does.
1. Whatever our "perspective" on Jesus, he is either the Son of God or he is not. This is a matter of objective, absolute truth. Whether we have a "God's eye view" or not does not matter - the two contradictory statements cannot be simultaneously true.
2. To say that something is ineffable is to say that it can never be adequa ...[text shortened]... e words we use are false, or that contradictory assertions can be made about the ineffable.
Re ineffability: part of the reason that contradictory assertions are made about the ineffable may be that all attempts to express the inexpressible are at best partial and incomplete, and: perspectival. I don’t want to violate the rule of the excluded middle, but think of it this way—
I show you two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. The shapes do not fit together, nor do the images on them. If one is the truth, the other is not. The problem however, is that the rest of the jigsaw puzzle is missing. It would be absurd to say they can’t come from the same puzzle.
Now, that metaphor may not apply to propositional logic, with inferences for which you can construct a truth-value table. The point of it is that, when we are talking about the ineffable ground of being (God, Brahman, whatever) there are always going to things that are “off the table.”
Perhaps someone wants to claim perfect and complete knowledge of ultimate theological truth. I am unable to make such a claim, because I do not think that I, or anyone else, has a God’s-eye view on it—nor do I believe that such a God’s-eye view is given in any divine revelation. If we disagree here, then I submit that we disagree at our axiomatic foundations.
Originally posted by vistesdIf I say that God is a person, who has a distinct and independent existence from me and you disagree, then we have an axiomatic disagreement*. Our disagreement here is not one of axioms, however; it is one of logic.
Okay, but I’ll hold to my statements anyway, whether they contradict what Conrau was saying or not..
Re ineffability: part of the reason that contradictory assertions are made about the ineffable may be that all attempts to express the inexpressible are at best partial and incomplete, and: perspectival. I don’t want to violate the rule of the ex ...[text shortened]... e revelation. If we disagree here, then I submit that we disagree at our axiomatic foundations.
The jigsaw puzzle metaphor does not apply to the propositional logic case we are talking about here because, in the case of the propositions, we are talking about A and ~A; not A and B. And I agree with you that when we are talking of God, there are always going to be things that are "off the table" (provided our understanding of that term is the same).
vistesd: "part of the reason that contradictory assertions are made about the ineffable may be that all attempts to express the inexpressible are at best partial and incomplete, and: perspectival"
I agree with the partial and incomplete bit and, to some extent, even the perspectival. However, if a partial fingerprint has a whorl, the whole one will not fail to have it. If an incomplete house has a stairwell, the complete house will not fail to have it. That is my point - the laws of reason and logic do not simply disappear when we're talking of the ineffable.
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* Although, axioms are supposed to be "obviously" true. 🙂
Originally posted by lucifershammerOur disagreement here is not one of axioms, however; it is one of logic.
If I say that God is a person, who has a distinct and independent existence from me and you disagree, then we have an axiomatic disagreement*. Our disagreement here is not one of axioms, however; it is one of logic.
The jigsaw puzzle metaphor does not apply to the propositional logic case we are talking about here because, in the case of the propos ...[text shortened]... ing of the ineffable.
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* Although, axioms are supposed to be "obviously" true. 🙂
What exactly is our logical disagreement? Maybe I’m misunderstanding something—i.e., please point out my contradictory statement (it wouldn’t be the first time I made one).
I admitted that I don’t think the jigsaw puzzle applies to propositional logic. My perspectivism is epistemological, not metaphysical. (By off the table, I was doing word-play with the “truth-value table.” ) If you cannot account for all the variables, you have to admit an “error term” into your thinking.
When you apply propositional logic to theological questions, I think you have to be careful. You have to start with certain assumptions (I really do like that phrase better than axioms), such as the completeness and accuracy of divine revelation. I do not believe there is any such thing. If you’re wrong, the logical system you build on such an assumption may be logically consistent but incomplete, or even totally false.
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It struck me that maybe I’m confusing things by being too complicated. Let’s see if I can narrow it down—
I do not think you can make any theological claim whatsoever with certainty. Neither can I. That is not a theological claim; it is an epistemological claim.
The proposition “God or ~God” is not a theological claim. The proposition “There exists a supernatural entity distinct and separate from the natural cosmos” is.
I do not believe there is any kind of one-way “revelation” (whether scriptural or mystical) that is not “adulterated” by our own perspective, and, indeed, our own “contribution.”
(I am thinking here of my belief that any experience of the ineffable ground of being is subject to immediate “translation” by our mind into terms that it finds effable, at least to itself; just as we do with the light stimuli that are formed into images. This may be a Kantian view? That the most we can know are the effable phenomena that we create out of any experience of the noumenon?)
EDIT: There is a strong tradition, in which I find myself, that uses “paradoxical” language in the face of ineffability. To my mind, this is no more or less valid than someone saying, “Here is how I understand God,” and then playing an original cello concerto. It is an attempt to express one’s experience non-logically or non-verbally in recognition of the “effability problem.” I actually think such aesthetic attempts capture more than attempts at accurate descriptions or logical propositions.
Originally posted by vistesdCan you imagine what our theological world would be like if musicians and writers were THE theologicans? I just cannot imagine that we would have discussions/debates about the validity of Mozart over Bach.
It struck me that maybe I’m confusing things by being too complicated. Let’s see if I can narrow it down—
I do not think you can make any theological claim whatsoever with certainty. Neither can I. That is not a theological claim; it is an epistemological claim.
The proposition “God or ~God” is not a theological claim. The proposition “There exists ...[text shortened]... aesthetic attempts capture more than attempts at accurate descriptions or logical propositions.
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Originally posted by kirksey957Yes. Here are two posts I put on the Spiritual Quotes thread some time back, both by Sufis—
Can you imagine what our theological world would be like if musicians and writers were THE theologicans? I just cannot imagine that we would have discussions/debates about the validity of Mozart over Bach.
______________________________
A wine bottle fell from a wagon
And broke open in a field.
That night one hundred beetles and all their cousins
Gathered
And did some serious binge drinking.
They even found some seed husks nearby
And began to play them like drums and whirl.
This made God very happy.
Then the “night candle” rose into the sky
And one drunk creature, laying down his instrument,
Said to his friend—for no apparent
Reason,
“What should we do about that moon?”
Seems to Hafiz
Most everyone has laid aside the music
Tackling such profoundly useless
Questions.
--Hafiz (from The Gift: Poems by Hafiz, The Great Sufi Master, Daniel Ladinsky, translator)
________________________________
The true way of progressing through music is to evolve freely, to go forward, not caring what others think, and in this way, together with one’s development in music, to harmonize the life of one’s soul, one’s surroundings and one’s affairs…
If this principle of music were followed, there would be no need for an external religion. Some day music will be the means of expressing universal religion. Time is wanted for this, but there will come a day when music and its philosophy will become the religion of humanity.
—Hazrat Inayat Khan (a Sufi master and musician)
Originally posted by vistesdI think there is a fundamental self-contradiction in terms with your perspectivist epistemology of God. You argue that no person can have a "God's eye" view of reality or God and, hence, no person can provide a completely accurate account of God. However, your position is, in itself, a "God's eye" view of human knowing!
[b]Our disagreement here is not one of axioms, however; it is one of logic.
What exactly is our logical disagreement? Maybe I’m misunderstanding something—i.e., please point out my contradictory statement (it wouldn’t be the first time I made one).
I admitted that I don’t think the jigsaw puzzle applies to propositional logic. My perspectivism is ...[text shortened]... build on such an assumption may be logically consistent but incomplete, or even totally false.[/b]
Or, to put it another way, the only way you can say that no person provides a complete/accurate account of God is if you compare every person's account to what God actually is. But, in your perspectivist view, you would be unable to do so, even hypothetically, because your own view of God would be perspectivist.
Does that make sense to you?
This is the kind of thing I'm referring to when I say that the laws of logic are not suspended because we are talking about an infeffable God, or that our knowledge of God is perspectivist. Based on what you've told me so far, perspectivism seems to boil down to relativism or skepticism.
Originally posted by vistesdYour view is basically Kantian - and I think Kant's view is a self-contradicting one.
It struck me that maybe I’m confusing things by being too complicated. Let’s see if I can narrow it down—
I do not think you can make any theological claim whatsoever with certainty. Neither can I. That is not a theological claim; it is an epistemological claim.
The proposition “God or ~God” is not a theological claim. The proposition “There exists ...[text shortened]... aesthetic attempts capture more than attempts at accurate descriptions or logical propositions.
What you're arguing about God can be easily extended to knowledge of anything - including how other human beings come to know things. And that is where the self-contradiction comes in.
Originally posted by lucifershammerOkay. I think I am mis-stating my claims—or, rather, stating my claims in ways that are self-refuting. But, occasionally we do run into purely linguistic problems. I will try to do better—
I think there is a fundamental self-contradiction in terms with your perspectivist epistemology of God. You argue that no person can have a "God's eye" view of reality or God and, hence, no person can provide a completely accurate account of God. However, your position is, in itself, a "God's eye" view of human knowing!
Or, to put it another way, t ...[text shortened]... at you've told me so far, perspectivism seems to boil down to relativism or skepticism.
(1) I do not have a God’s-eye of the universe; I have only my perspective (which is complex, and includes my perspective on information offered by others from their perspective).
(2) I have no evidence that anyone else is significantly different from me in this respect—i.e., I have no evidence that any human being, or particular group, has a “God’s eye view.”
(3) Therefore, I assert that, to my knowledge, no one has a God’s eye view. However, since I also do not, I might be wrong.
In the end, LH, it seems to me that it is that “I might be wrong” that causes you problems. (It did way back when I said that I have to keep that self-challenge in the back of my mind always: you asked if that included moral issues? I said yes. I know of no other way to keep intellectually honest than to allow for the possibility that I might be wrong, no matter how slim that possibility is. That does not prevent me from acting—it does not paralyze me—because I am willing to live with it as an inescapable existential fact, that I am always faced with uncertainty at some level.)
You see, unless you are claiming a God’s eye view for your perspective, you always have to keep in mind the possibility that you might be wrong (what I mean by an “error term,” borrowing from statistics). Is that epistemological relativism? Do you want to claim certainty for your theology? Do you want to claim a God’s eye view?
NOTE: I think it was you who one time made the distinction between metaphysical relativism and epistemological relativism? I have trouble with that word relativism being bandied about like some all-encompassing label for evil. 😉
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Originally posted by lucifershammerIs saying, "There may be some things we cannot know* beyond the limit of how our body/mind constructs our perception of reality”** self-contradictory? If so, how?
Your view is basically Kantian - and I think Kant's view is a self-contradicting one.
What you're arguing about God can be easily extended to knowledge of anything - including how other human beings come to know things. And that is where the self-contradiction comes in.
* e.g., the “thing-in-itself” or noumenon.
** e.g., phenomena.
NOTE: I am just using the phrase body/mind as a catch-all to avoid mind-body, neurological-consciousness types of questions. We could both go and do a year’s study on the latest brain research and relationship to philosophy of the mind, and then come back, of course.
EDIT: I came to this Kantian viewpoint kicking and screaming, BTW. I didn't like the whole notion of "transcendentals" and synthetic a prioris.
Originally posted by vistesdWhat's wrong with the synthetic a priori?
Is saying, "There may be some things we cannot know* beyond the limit of how our body/mind constructs our perception of reality”** self-contradictory? If so, how?
* e.g., the “thing-in-itself” or noumenon.
** e.g., phenomena.
NOTE: I am just using the phrase body/mind as a catch-all to avoid mind-body, neurological-consciousness types of question ...[text shortened]... g, BTW. I didn't like the whole notion of "transcendentals" and synthetic a prioris.
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Originally posted by vistesdIn this context, I'm using the terms 'relativism' and 'skepticism' to refer to specific positions in metaphysics and epistemology respectively. I'm not necessarily using them as "all-encompassing [labels] for evil".
Okay. I think I am mis-stating my claims—or, rather, stating my claims in ways that are self-refuting. But, occasionally we do run into purely linguistic problems. I will try to do better—
(1) I do not have a God’s-eye of the universe; I have only my perspective (which is complex, and includes my perspective on information offered by others from the ...[text shortened]... ble with that word relativism being bandied about like some all-encompassing label for evil. 😉
To your points:
Re: (1) I think few people will argue otherwise. However, it is one thing to say that all people view objective truth from a particular perspective; quite another to say that the perspective misrepresents or distorts the truth.
Re: (2,3) Once again, that people do not have a "God's eye view" does not mean they cannot know (and communicate) objective truth - even about God.
Here's an example. I would argue that the essence of a person is 'ineffable'. So, if I was talking to a third party about my friend Mark and he said, "Describe Mark", I would be unable to give a complete and exhaustive description of Mark (as I see him) such that, from the description, this third party can replicate my understanding of Mark. It does not mean my description is wrong, however. If I say, "Mark has blue eyes", then this third party is not going to see brown eyes when he meets Mark in person (contact lenses aside). If he does see brown eyes, then one of us is simply mistaken. And you don't need a "Mark's eye view" (unintentional pun) to see (argh!) that.
That people (or groups of people) do not have a "God's eye view" does not automatically justify the assumption that they are wrong. They may be - but you need to correctly judge that based on diligent examination of the evidence and intelligent postulation of hypotheses.
I am not bothered by the "I might be wrong" bit - it's the fact that you refuse to admit "I might be correct" that bothers me (even though the two are synonymous). That is the only way one avoids doubt-induced paralysis.
You see, unless you are claiming a God’s eye view for your perspective, you always have to keep in mind the possibility that you might be wrong (what I mean by an “error term,” borrowing from statistics). Is that epistemological relativism? Do you want to claim certainty for your theology? Do you want to claim a God’s eye view?
This is what my Mark example is for. You see, I don't need a God's eye view to make true assertions about God. Not having a God's eye view simply means I cannot list every true proposition about God - not that I cannot list any.
That I "might" be wrong does not mean I should assume I am. And, if I have applied right judgement to intelligent hypotheses based on a diligent observation of data, then I can be very confident that I am correct. We do this every day, every single time we 'know' something.