Originally posted by bbarrBasically:
What's your argument?
(1) We cannot know anything of the noumenon of any being. (Kant)
(2) The process of human knowing is part of the noumenon of the human being.
(3) (From 1 and 2) We cannot know anything about the process of human knowing.
(4) (1) is a true statement about the process of human knowing.
(5) (From 4) We can know something about the process of human knowing.
(6) (From 3 and 5) Contradiction.
I suppose one can refine the argument, but that's the crux of it.
Originally posted by lucifershammerHowever, it is one thing to say that all people view objective truth from a particular perspective; quite another to say that the perspective misrepresents or distorts the truth.
In this context, I'm using the terms 'relativism' and 'skepticism' to refer to specific positions in metaphysics and epistemology respectively. I'm not necessarily using them as "all-encompassing [labels] for evil".
To your points:
Re: (1) I think few people will argue otherwise. However, it is one thing to say that all people view objective tru ...[text shortened]... e do this every day, every single time we 'know' something.
Yes, but there is the possibility that that perspective misrepresents or distorts the truth (remember the blind men and elephant parable). Unless you want to push it to the point of “every perspective represents the truth for that person, because that is how they see it”—which is exactly what I think you don’t want to do. Neither do I, BTW.)
Even with your Mark example, you might be the one who is color blind.
Once again, that people do not have a "God's eye view" does not mean they cannot know (and communicate) objective truth - even about God.
I want to, as much as possible (I know we both like to argue from analogy) restrict this to “God,” partly because I want to avoid the possibility of a category error, if that’s the correct term—i.e., I might be able to infer the possibility of a forest from the existence of a single tree, but even that inference will only envision a forest of that kind of tree, and no such forest may exist.
**I will claim that no, I do not think you can know objective truth about “God.” Now, I am asking you to counter that by (1) telling what objective truth you know about God, (2) how you know it, and (3) how you know it is the objective truth.**
That people (or groups of people) do not have a "God's eye view" does not automatically justify the assumption that they are wrong.
I do not believe I have ever made that assumption, nor leapt to such a false justification.
I am not bothered by the "I might be wrong" bit - it's the fact that you refuse to admit "I might be correct" that bothers me (even though the two are synonymous). That is the only way one avoids doubt-induced paralysis.
The two are synonymous. What avoids doubt-induced paralysis is to have the courage to act even in the face of doubt and uncertainty.
Originally posted by bbarrWhat I one time would have said is a problem with the synthetic a priori is that there is a given aspect of the cosmos about which I can have no empirical (a posteriori) knowledge; in fact—and I am thinking about time-space dimensionality as an example here—such a synthetic a priori dictates the terms in which I see/experience the world.
What's wrong with the synthetic a priori?
Now, I don’t know if that is a correct understanding—if it is not, I would ask you to correct me, as much as possible in non-technical language.
What has led me to change my mind are two things basically:
(1) You once made a comment about the “architecture of our consciousness.” That phrase struck me, and I realized that such architecture is even what we must use to study consciousness itself.
(2) In confronting the conflicting descriptions and conclusions people have drawn from mystical experiences of the ground of being, it seemed to me there were three possibilities—
(a) The content of my experience was inaccurate/invalid;
(b) The content of their experience was inaccurate/invalid;
(c) Both our experiences were subject, not only to later, but also to immediate “translation” analogous to the translation of light stimuli into mental images.
My continuing study of various expressions of the “perennial philosophy” led to my conclusion that (c) was the most reasonable one.
Originally posted by vistesdYes, but there is the possibility that that perspective misrepresents or distorts the truth (remember the blind men and elephant parable). Unless you want to push it to the point of “every perspective represents the truth for that person, because that is how they see it”—which is exactly what I think you don’t want to do. Neither do I, BTW.)
[b]However, it is one thing to say that all people view objective truth from a particular perspective; quite another to say that the perspective misrepresents or distorts the truth.
Yes, but there is the possibility that that perspective misrepresents or distorts the truth (remember the blind men and elephant parable). Unless you want to pus ...[text shortened]... ed paralysis is to have the courage to act even in the face of doubt and uncertainty.[/b]
But that seems to be the direction your arguments are going in. 🙂
Even with the blind men and the elephant, the mistake they made is not in asserting what they felt (e.g. tail, leg or tusk), but in extrapolating that to the whole elephant. If they'd simply said "I feel a trunk" or "The elephant has a trunk" - they would be correct.
Do you see how this differs from the set of assertions that started this thread - "Jesus is the begotten Son of God" vs. "God does not beget" (Lam Yaled in the common prayer)?
Even with your Mark example, you might be the one who is color blind.
Of course. But, if my judgment about the colour of Mark's eyes takes this into account properly, I would still be correct. 🙂
I might be able to infer the possibility of a forest from the existence of a single tree, but even that inference will only envision a forest of that kind of tree, and no such forest may exist.
The problem here is that the set of assertions above are analogous to "This forest contains this kind of tree" vs. "This forest does not contain this kind of tree". You don't need to know the whole forest to see which one is correct provided you see an instance of this kind of tree.
That's my point all along - that you cannot know all about God does not mean you cannot know anything about God. And, if you know something about God, then the opposite cannot be true.
**I will claim that no, I do not think you can know objective truth about “God.” Now, I am asking you to counter that by (1) telling what objective truth you know about God, (2) how you know it, and (3) how you know it is the objective truth.**
I don't want to get into a listing of my belief system here. But I will say this - if no one can know objective truth about God, then what's the point in looking? Why do you seek?
Besides, I don't need to go through (1), (2) and (3) above. To say that the objective truth about God is unknowable is itself to assert an objective truth about God - a self-refuting argument.
The two are synonymous. What avoids doubt-induced paralysis is to have the courage to act even in the face of doubt and uncertainty.
The courage to act cannot come without the conviction that one or the other path must be correct - even if one does not have all the evidence to make a perfect judgment.
Originally posted by vistesdPardon me if I'm intruding here. But your analogy of "light stimulus" seemed to be similar to the Mark example I gave earlier.
What I one time would have said is a problem with the synthetic a priori is that there is a given aspect of the cosmos about which I can have no empirical (a posteriori) knowledge; in fact—and I am thinking about time-space dimensionality as an example here—such a synthetic a priori dictates the terms in which I see/experience the world.
Now, I do ...[text shortened]... essions of the “perennial philosophy” led to my conclusion that (c) was the most reasonable one.
Even if our minds "translate" mystical experiences, provided one assumes that our minds are looking at the same being, it should be possible to identify the source of error by triangulating with the experiences of others. Indeed, that would be part of our normal judgment process if we were, say, colour-blind and wanted to know the colour of a particular car, say. We don't end up thinking "That car is both blue and red"!
Originally posted by FreakyKBHI guess you're not called "Freaky" for nothin'.
[b]He either directly caused it or He didn't.
Direct, or immediate, is different than indirect, or mediate. For instance, God immediately created Adam, but mediately creates man. As such, a view of a detail cannot yield a view of the whole. Part, yes, but not whole. The distinction must be made for anything to make sense, and I will do what I can ...[text shortened]... blasphemy that even one fallen creature represents in the presence of God's perfection.[/b]
Your words are nothing more than a florid affront to the well-known "secret decoder ring theory" which seems to permeate your entire faith. I would not presume to tell you that you are wrong -- only that you are completely and utterly ineffectual and lacking all form of persuasion. I happen to think that there is at least some connection between your ability to support your theistic claims and the question of whether or not your theistic belief is warranted. By telling me that I cannot comprehend the ways of God until I first (compelled apparently by no reasons at all -- rather, in spite of reasons to the contrary) place my stamp of approval on them, you are advocating arbitrary actions and unwarranted beliefs.
The ironic thing is that I am not the one making ridiculous claims about your God. You are the one making quick work of that task. I am just letting you know how absurd the claims really are. It's not nice of you to define His existence right out of likelihood from the get-go, which is what you accomplish when you claim that He is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. How well does that claim align with our observations concerning many natural disasters -- for instance, Hurricane Katrina?* If such a God existed, the world would be just as ridiculous as His essence -- essentially, exaggeration run amok.
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*Please take a moment to slip on your secret ring before answering.
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Originally posted by lucifershammer[/b]But that seems to be the direction your arguments are going in.
[b]Yes, but there is the possibility that that perspective misrepresents or distorts the truth (remember the blind men and elephant parable). Unless you want to push it to the point of “every perspective represents the truth for that person, because that is how they see it”—which is exactly what I think you don’t want to do. Neither do I, B even if one does not have all the evidence to make a perfect judgment.
It may be. But I am trying to resist it. 🙂
Even with the blind men and the elephant, the mistake they made is not in asserting what they felt (e.g. tail, leg or tusk), but in extrapolating that to the whole elephant. If they'd simply said "I feel a trunk" or "The elephant has a trunk" - they would be correct.
But the point is they didn’t extrapolate to the whole elephant. They knew nothing by what they felt, and translated that (erroneously) into what they could comprehend without knowing “elephant.” They did not (could not?) offer an accurate, but partial, description of “elephant.” They did not have sufficient information.
Now, by analogy, “elephant” becomes, expansively, the “all of all of it”—or Brahman, or God (given a sufficiently “big” God). And so it is possible that your “translations” may not only be partial, but also erroneous.
And, if you know something about God, then the opposite cannot be true.
Agreed. And this, I think is our point of impasse. (I think I am moving closer to metamorphosis’ position.)
I don't want to get into a listing of my belief system here. But I will say this - if no one can know objective truth about God, then what's the point in looking? Why do you seek?
Well, I think your belief system is sufficiently complex, that it would take a lot of space. 🙂 But you see the necessity of being able to answer those questions?
“Why do you seek?” Excellent question. I more and more think that seeking logically expressible truth about the ineffable is a waste of time.
To say that the objective truth about God is unknowable is itself to assert an objective truth about God - a self-refuting argument.
This seems to me to be no more than a language problem. If you’re correct, then there is nothing that we can say is objectively unknowable, because we have already stated something objective about it, i.e. its unknowability. I could probably rephrase the statement with the addition of an exception clause.
I might also say something like: “The only thing I can say about the ineffable is that it’s ineffable.” This is why, as I noted (and as others have noted before me), perhaps it makes no sense to attempt to speak of it in logical discourse—as opposed, say, to Zen koans.
I’m having trouble here pasting your quote into Word (where I’m writing this), but I never said that courage entailed lack of conviction. One perhaps could also speak of a “necessary practical presumption” of certainty. But when one faces oneself, in one owns mind, one must also honestly confront that presumption.
Originally posted by lucifershammerThe “architecture of our consciousness” and neuro-physiology is common across human beings (perhaps like a fairly narrow bell curve).
Pardon me if I'm intruding here. But your analogy of "light stimulus" seemed to be similar to the Mark example I gave earlier.
Even if our minds "translate" mystical experiences, provided one assumes that our minds are looking at the same being, it should be possible to identify the source of error by triangulating with the experiences of others. I ...[text shortened]... lour of a particular car, say. We don't end up thinking "That car is both blue and red"!
Most of perceive colors in pretty much the same way. Most of us can only perceive light within a specific spectral range.
The point is, that we only perceive within such limits.
A large portion of my position rests on the Kantian question you and bbarr are addressing, so I want to defer comments a bit to follow that.
Originally posted by DragonFriendSo, your top shelf bottle of support for Premise 1' is Pascal's Wager? First of all, I fail to see how Pascal's reasoning was sound. Are you familiar with some of the many criticisms of such reasoning?
Let's start with the practical implications. If the Christians are right, then our lives continue after our bodies die. And that life is eternal and we will exist in either a very good or a very bad place. There's only two choices. The good news is that you can choose, during your physical life, which type of eternal life you get to have. So what you do ...[text shortened]... one way that can happen and that's if the stories in the Bible are actually true.
DF
If the Christians are wrong and God doesn't exist, then all that has happened is that we Christians have wasted our time trying to learn how to live in a way that gets along with others better.
If the Christians are wrong about God's existence, and yet are working toward trying to improve coexistent living conditions by reasonable ethical standards, then I fail to see how that is a waste of time in entirety. The doting on a supernatural being part, probably. However, concerning Pascal's Wager, there are objections that demonstrate that your line of thinking here is cramped.
In short, I am familiar with the writings of Blaise Pascal, and I do not find them compelling. Do you have other support for Premise 1'?
Support for the existance of God.
If you're truly asking
Why wouldn't I be asking? The theist has screamed a claim from the rooftops. It is natural to ask him what support he has for it, rather than my embarking on a winding, seemingly arbitrary journey to try to reproduce his results. Thanks for your suggestions.
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Originally posted by vistesdI think we differ in our definitions of 'ineffable'. You seem to be using it in the sense of 'that about which nothing can be said' (except perhaps that it's ineffable); I'm using it in the sense of 'that about which everything cannot be said'.
But that seems to be the direction your arguments are going in.
It may be. But I am trying to resist it. 🙂
Even with the blind men and the elephant, the mistake they made is not in asserting what they felt (e.g. tail, leg or tusk), but in extrapolating that to the whole elephant. If they'd simply said "I feel a trunk" or "The elephant en one faces oneself, in one owns mind, one must also honestly confront that presumption.
But, even if I concede that God/Tao/Brahman/IGOB is ineffable in the sense you're using above (and it's more than just a language problem - as the history of philosophical skepticism would attest to), I would still say that you are saying something more about it. For instance, in asserting that it's the "ground of being", you are saying that it isn't, for instance, just the rose growing in the park opposite my house (this is the via negativa method that the Scholastics used in describing God). You are saying that it is an existent being, rather than just a product of the imagination. You are saying that it is the source of being for all beings we encounter in our daily experience. You are saying that it is the source of all perfections we encounter in Nature. And so on. You will soon find that more can be said about the "ineffable" than merely that it's ineffable. What's more, while everything that can be said may not be perfect or complete, it is nevertheless true.
Originally posted by lucifershammer(1) is nonsensical, and Kant doesn't accept (2). First, there is no "noumena of the human being" anymore than there is a "noumena of a chair". The noumenal world is the world as it is independent of the mind. Second, the process of human knowing is, at least in part, the process of applying concepts to the phenomenal world, and this is both something we can know about and certainly not an aspect of the noumenal world.
Basically:
(1) We cannot know anything of the noumenon of any being. (Kant)
(2) The process of human knowing is part of the noumenon of the human being.
(3) (From 1 and 2) We cannot know anything about the process of human knowing.
(4) (1) is a true statement about the process of human knowing.
(5) (From 4) We can know something about the proce ...[text shortened]... om 3 and 5) Contradiction.
I suppose one can refine the argument, but that's the crux of it.
Originally posted by vistesdAnother good post. You're helping me get my mind back on track.
[b]Your posts are good reading.
Thanks. Mutual. You help me un-muddle my own thinking.
I associate the absurd with the seeming lack of any grander scheme -- essentially, the feeling that there is no ultimate purpose.
Yet, there does seem to be a grand wholeness to it all—it is cosmos rather than chaos; and, of course, one might q ...[text shortened]... but neither are you permitted to withdraw from it.” (Rabbi Tarfon, in Pirkei Avot, 2:21)[/b]
Yet, there does seem to be a grand wholeness to it all—it is cosmos rather than chaos; and, of course, one might quite rationally say, “So what? If it were otherwise, we wouldn’t be here to think about it.” But recognition of the wholeness is what impels us to art: no awe, no art.
Yes, it would be difficult to deny that -- the recognition of a manifest and seeming "wholeness" is at times compelling. Should I have just left off the word "seeming"? That is a question that keeps reappearing. I often feel drawn to art and music as a form of expression. Is it because I am compelled by the recognition of wholeness, or is it because I am seeking a wholeness that I can call my own, or is it just because, as Schopenhauer argues, my main daily task is fending off boredom? Schopenhauer is looking for entertainment solutions, whereas, I would like to say that my working so hard on the classical guitar is a search for something deeper -- aesthetics, maybe.
And theology can be like art—or it can become, as you say, “cookie-cutter.”
Of course you are right. I should not use "cookie cutter" so sloppily. My disdain is really better aimed at the methods that profess answers and make guarantees. Theology can be a rewarding search for "aesthetics" as well. However, I do not think it should pretend like my observations are irrelevant: I do not think it should not deny the absurd.
That is why I say that the absurd is not escapable via mysticism
I happen to agree with this. Darn, I need to run to class. I'll try to return later to write some more thoughts.
Originally posted by vistesdI'm confused about what you meant in the first part of your post. The synthetic a priori is constituted by a set of propositions (perhaps empty) that are 1) knowable independently of sensory experience, and 2) not analytic (that is, not true just by virtue of their syntax or by the meanings of their constituent terms). Kant takes geometric knowledge to be paradigmatic here.
What I one time would have said is a problem with the synthetic a priori is that there is a given aspect of the cosmos about which I can have no empirical (a posteriori) knowledge; in fact—and I am thinking about time-space dimensionality as an example here—such a synthetic a priori dictates the terms in which I see/experience the world.
Now, I do ...[text shortened]... essions of the “perennial philosophy” led to my conclusion that (c) was the most reasonable one.
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Originally posted by bbarr1. Doesn't 'noumenon' simply mean "thing-in-itself" (as distinguished from 'phenomenon', "thing as it appears to us"😉?
(1) is nonsensical, and Kant doesn't accept (2). First, there is no "noumena of the human being" anymore than there is a "noumena of a chair". The noumenal world is the world as it is independent of the mind. Second, the process of human knowing is, at least in part, the process of applying concepts to the phenomenal world, and this is both something we can know about and certainly not an aspect of the noumenal world.
2. Why is (1) nonsensical?
3. Does the process of thinking belong to the noumenal world or the phenomenal world?
4. If the noumenal world is the world as it is 'independent of the mind', how is Kant able to posit its existence at all?
5. What's the point in positing a noumenal world?
6. In the context of this discussion, where does the GTBGW (God/Tao/Brahman/Ground of Being/whatever) lie?
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Originally posted by lucifershammerA couple things:
I think we differ in our definitions of 'ineffable'. You seem to be using it in the sense of 'that about which nothing can be said' (except perhaps that it's ineffable); I'm using it in the sense of 'that about which everything cannot be said'.
But, even if I concede that God/Tao/Brahman/IGOB is ineffable in the sense you're using above (and it's m at can be said may not be perfect or complete, it is nevertheless true.
(1) Yes, a phrase such as “ground of being” is problematic. From now on I will call it Boom!, period.
(2) Part of the effability problem that I mentioned earlier, and I’ll try to make clearer here,* was that no experience of boom is (a) free of “adulteration” by our own consciousness, and (b) that there is no way to unentangle which part of any description might be our own “translation,” as opposed to “the thing in itself.” Therefore, whatever I “eff” about boom is questionable. In the end, all I am really communicating is my attempt to communicate an experience.
What the Zen masters wisely realize is that all language about boom is problematic.
I am reminded once again about the Zen story: A baby fish looks at its mother and says, “Mom, when are you going to show me that ocean you’re always talking about?” [An interesting side note: One of the Talmudic names for God is makom, place.]
* Now all of this goes to the Kantian discussion, and I want to follow that a bit, and may refine my understanding and articulation.
EDIT: Do you think tathata will get me in more trouble than boom?