Originally posted by Palynka What if they have no souls and exist only as God's instruments (some sort of manequins)?
This is how I reject the GAFE's conclusion. One cannot measure suffering upon others, because the others may not exist as one does(or thinks he does).
I could of course be a brain in a vat, in which case those Down's babies may not even exist. There is always room for such radical doubt. But as with any logically valid argument, my assessment of whether or not the evidential Problem of Evil is sound relies on how likely I think it is that the premises are true. I cannot deny that such circumstances that are posited from a stance of radical doubt may be true, such as the case you describe; however, to the extent that I find them extremely unlikely, it does not sway me from the determination that the premises in the GAFE are still very likely true, and thus that the argument is sound.
Also, even if it were the case that the Down's babies are not really suffering, their apparent suffering may still make me disheartened and pained. I would still have to ask whether or not the pain that I myself feel is logically necessary.
Originally posted by Palynka Although in Critique of Pure Reason he denies the point of discussing metaphysics, he associates the phenomena with noumena.
To my knowledge he claims that only the noumena which have associated phenomena can be partially known but not in themselves as we're limited by the knowledge of its manifestations.
There is no complete separation between the nou matter what. But the question would then be
"Is it possible to know anything about God?"
Kant does mention god, but only (a) to discredit traditional arguments for god, and (b) to reintroduce him (through morality) in a rather unconvincing way.
Kant is not looking for clues to the noumenal realm through the properties of the phenomenal realm; he is interested in gaining knowledge through examining the concepts we apply to the phenomenal realm.
Originally posted by LemonJello I could of course be a brain in a vat, in which case those Down's babies may not even exist. There is always room for such radical doubt. But as with any logically valid argument, my assessment of whether or not the evidential Problem of Evil is sound relies on how likely I think it is that the premises are true. I cannot deny that such circumstances t ...[text shortened]... I would still have to ask whether or not the pain that I myself feel is logically necessary.
I agree with the idea that such a god does not exist, but I don't agree with it being a logical impossibility or entailing a logical contradiction that excludes all such types of god (which was the point of GAFE if I remember it correctly).
Originally posted by bbarr I never employ the term 'failure' in my argument, so I'm not sure what you're asking.
Assuming the integrity of God in eternity past, once He determined to create, there was the possibility for something other than His perfection, thus failure. You employ 'suffering,' but without giving it any moral or emotional value, could the term 'failure' substitute?
27 Feb '06 10:14
Religious tolerance
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