[i/]Originally posted by lucifershammer[/i]This argument is based on ONE letter written in 1567 from Royal Judges complaining about what must have been a very rare practice. Their complaint was NOT that the prisoners were taken away but that they were released or more likely allowed to escape after being tried for blasphemy (which was, of course, a MINOR offense unlike heresy). Since there are no written records complaining about such a practice after or before 1567, we may presume that this "loophole" was quickly closed. To me, it only shows the incompetence of the Inquistion and the wonderful creativity of "common" criminals.
[b]All I have to go on for that particular claim is the author's credibility and the coherence of the claim.
[i/]The Audiencia was particularly angry because the tribunal would frequently remove prisoners from the royal prison where they were awaiting trial, try them for some minor offense, and then let them go free without returning them. Si ...[text shortened]... ire book is available online at
http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft958009jk&brand=eschol[/b]
Originally posted by lucifershammer
If the Crucifixion was responsible for the reconciliation of mankind to God, then this reconciliation could not have happened in Time - because there are people who died before Christ who were saved (e.g. Abraham).
If this were the case, then we would see St Paul saying something
like: When Christ was on the Cross, we had been saved from our sins,
or some other weird verbal construction. But we don't see that. We
see a clear causal link: Because Christ was...therefore we are....
The Church teaches that Christ descended into Hell. According to the
teaching of the Church in the Catechism (#633 in my version, which is
the third item under Article 5 in the discussion of the Creed):
Scripture calls the abode of the dead, to which the dead Christ went
down, 'hell' -- 'Sheol' in Hebrew or 'Hades' in Greek -- because those
who are there are deprived of the vision of God. Such is the case
for all the dead, whether evil or righteous, while they await the
Redeemer: which does not mean that their lot is identical, as Jesus
shows through the parable of the poor man Lazarus who was received
into 'Abraham's Bosom': ' It is precisely these holy souls, who awaited
their Savior in Abraham's bosom, whom Christ the Lord delivered when
he descended into hell.' Jesus did not descend into hell to deliver
the damned, nor to destory the hell of damnation, but to free the
just who had gone before him.
(end quote from the Catechism)
So, according to the infallibile teaching of the RCC, there is a definitive
chronological sequence of salvation: Abraham was in hell with the
damned, awaiting the Savior to come which, by necessity, could not
happen until the first Good Friday in 30/33 CE. The following items in
that article elaborate on this point.
So, there is a definitive causal link between the Crucifixion and
Abraham's (et alia) salvation and ascent into heaven. Your example
is, consequently, not relevant.
The problem is that verbs require tense, so we cannot speak of events taking place outside Time without using tense; but, of course, the usage of tense in this case does not imply that the event takes place in Time.
Of course. And a good way to indicate that something is not taking
place in time is to use multiple tenses, such as in Hebrews when it
says that Christ is the same yesterday, today and forever. However,
the verb usage in the contexts I mentioned are very specific and
very unusual. They connote a clear relationship between
the disciple (priest) and the Forgiver (God). Basically, what it says is
if a disciple forgives a sin, it will have already been forgiven in heaven.
To suggest that the latter is somehow out of time is illogical and
textually absurd when other, more clear language is available, e.g.:
when a disciple forgives a sin, it has been forgiven, is forgiven, and
will be forgiven for ever, or something.
edit: That is, the very unusual verb form draws one's attention. Why
would they choose a most bizarre format to indicate something (e.g.,
timelessness) which could easily be expressed a multiplicity of other
ways (and, indeed, is used in other passages in the Christian
Scripture)? The logical answer is: because these passages were trying
to express something different, something clear (as the unusual
verb form indicates).
You're right that, if a baptised Christian has committed a mortal sin, then the sacrament of Reconciliation is not [b]necessary for entry into heaven - a perfect contrition will also do. But how many humans are capable of that?[/b]
Please don't misunderstand me, Lucifershammer. I deeply value the
ritual of Reconcilliation and, texts nonewithstanding, the experience of
the Sacrament can bring a person to a deeper understanding of the
nature of sin, and its impact. And, if a person approaches his/her
confession without a spirit of true contrition, the Absolution doesn't
take place either, as far as I know.
However, the Church asserts a causal link between a priest's
forgiveness (through his office and the ministry of the Church) and
God's. This is utterly unsupported by any reasonable reading of the
original text (both St Matthew's and St John's disparate accounts).
You can always play the 'Church's infallible teaching' card, where if the
Church says it, it must be true. And I can't argue with an institution
which states theological truths axiomatically. However, what I can do
is argue that their use of the aforementioned Scriptures justifies their
position. They most evidently and conclusively do not. There were
many ways to phrase those two passages to signify casuality or
timelessness. However, the extremely peculiar turns of phrase
common to two Gospel traditions which have very little else in common
speaks with a certain authority (and you said it above): the sins are
forgiven by the Father in heaven, and that forgiveness is affirmed by
the disciple. Because no casual link is established, necessity is not
in question.
Nemesio
P.S.
Also, what you said isn't quite true. Perfect contrition can absolve
a person of their moral sins if they fully intend to go to
Confession as soon as possible. Such a circumstance is considered to
be extraordinary, such as 'grave' situations where a person wants to
receive the Eucharist, is not in a state of Grace, and is mortally ill.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf this is about church loyalty, LH should put it aside. Indulgences are a very active part of the church today, albeit the electronic church. In the Catholic church today, one is invited to partake of the eucharist as part of their ritual for the forgiveness of sins. Contrast this to what I see in many protestant churches where there is the cohersion of "send me your money and I will send you healing power." Is this not an indulgence. Should we not be outraged by this today? I have no loyalty to this nonsense.
No. That's not my style. Just like it's not your style to toss your Church loyalty aside for the purpose of a debate about the shameful parts of its history. I now remember why I stopped debating with you.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesPathetic this, coming from a person whose proclaimed mission is to uphold reason on this Forum. The least one would expect from you is a commitment to dispassionate argument.
No. That's not my style. Just like it's not your style to toss your Church loyalty aside for the purpose of a debate about the shameful parts of its history. I now remember why I stopped debating with you.
Let's see if I can actually deconstruct your argument:
Either those fakers did or did not receive the wondrous benefits of the Inquisition.
I presume this translates to:
Either those fakers did or did not receive the benefits they thought they would from the Inquisition.
If they did, then their fakery obviously went undetected, for the Inquisition would only punish (i.e., bathe in luxury) actual heretics.
I presume this translates to:
If they did, then their fakery obviously went undetected, for the Inquisition would only punish actual heretics.
Where's the logic here? If the Inquisition would only punish (i.e. condemn to death) actual heretics, then it stands to reason that fakers, if detected, would be let off with a slap on the wrist. Which would be exactly what the "fakers" were hoping for - to be rightly identified as fakers by the Inquisition.
If I have correctly analysed your argument, then the incoherence is obvious. If not, then you're free to rephrase it (without the sarcasm - which simply clouds your argument).
Originally posted by lucifershammer[/i]I don't see the logic of this argument - how does the fact that the Inquisition was lenient with heretics and blasphemers who repented in any way affect its ability to detect heresy? [/i]
[b]All I have to go on for that particular claim is the author's credibility and the coherence of the claim.
[i]The Audiencia was particularly angry because the tribunal would frequently remove prisoners from the royal prison where they were awaiting trial, try them for some minor offense, and then let them go free without returning them. Sinc ...[text shortened]... ire book is available online at
http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft958009jk&brand=eschol[/b]
You say those who repented. I just finished reading the second chapter of the book, on judicial procedures. They were designed to get convictions, not elicit the truth. Unless one confessed, the trial was an ordeal that could (and apparently often did) include torture. Even if the actual chance of torture was slight, fear of it could lead one to confess, even if one was not guilty.
[I have taken the quoted passages out of context, but I don't think, on my reading, that the context provides any "relief."]
A standard item in Inquisition procedure as practiced on the Continent was the requirement of two eyewitnesses for conviction. Frequently, however, this rigorous standard was of little help to the accused because one eyewitness was sufficient to permit the inquisitor to use torture to extort the remaining measure of "truth." Insufficient evidence was not considered grounds for presuming innocence, but it had the effect of leaving the accused "semiguilty" and exposed to the next link in the chain of judicial procedures, which was itself a form of punishment. (p.67-68)
If there was sufficient evidence, the consulta could then sentence the accused directly or could vote for torture on the grounds that although strong proof existed, the entire truth was not yet known; therefore, a last effort to obtain a confession from the accused must be attempted, whatever the risk to the prosecution ease. To the contemporary mind, judicial torture is perhaps the most repugnant aspect of inquisitorial procedure, yet it must be seen as a necessary element in a judicial system whose major goal was to obtain the confession of the accused. Confession was vital because of the high and often impossible standard of proof (two independent eyewitnesses) necessary for complete certainty of guilt. The frequent failure to produce two eyewitnesses led to a whole legal "arithmetic" of partial proofs and to a considerable degree of uncertainty in sentencing, while the absence of any empirical method of evaluating circumstantial evidence made it very difficult to supplement denunciations with any other proofs. If the accused could be induced to confess, the court could resolve all of these issues and the prosecution's case would be automatically validated. (pp.78-79)
It is clear, of course, that torture was not limited to the Inquisition, but was used in secular cases as well, and perhaps nore flagrantly:
In practice, the Spanish Inquisition used forms of torture that were common to the entire judicial system and was undoubtedly more careful than the secular courts in applying it. (p.79)
Acquittal was apparently rare, but a kind of suspended sentence could be given to a convicted person who was penitent:
Between 1478 and 1530, the Valencia tribunal only handed down 12 absolutions out of 1,862 sentences. (p.80)
The punishments are covered on pages 80-85.
All in all, it seems to me that the only thing that can be said is that the Inquisition was terrible and abusive, but in some cases less terrible than the behavior of secular courts. That, however, does not absolve the inquistors; a lesser degree of injustice does not equal justice. (I'll continue reading.)
Originally posted by vistesdUnless one confessed, the trial was an ordeal that could (and apparently often did) include torture.
[/i][b]I don't see the logic of this argument - how does the fact that the Inquisition was lenient with heretics and blasphemers who repented in any way affect its ability to detect heresy? [/i]
You say those who repented. I just finished reading the second chapter of the book, on judicial procedures. They were designed to get convictions, not elic ...[text shortened]... the inquistors; a lesser degree of injustice does not equal justice. (I'll continue reading.)[/b]
Read on - you'll see that the procedure clearly established that confessions obtained under torture had to be freely confirmed by the accused later. Even if he recanted the confession, torture was rarely repeated.
Originally posted by lucifershammerWell, that's certainly fair! Besides, if you repeat your torture tooooooooo much they just get a natural immunity like cockroaches to Raid Lawn and Garden. Moderation in all things, right LH😉?
[b]Even if the actual chance of torture was slight, fear of it could lead one to confess, even if one was not guilty.
Read on - you'll see that the procedure clearly established that confessions obtained under torture had to be freely confirmed by the accused later. Even if he recanted the confession, torture was rarely repeated.[/b]
Originally posted by lucifershammerYes I did read that. Since of course the confessions under torture could be thought to be less than “voluntary”—
[b]Even if the actual chance of torture was slight, fear of it could lead one to confess, even if one was not guilty.
Read on - you'll see that the procedure clearly established that confessions obtained under torture had to be freely confirmed by the accused later. Even if he recanted the confession, torture was rarely repeated.[/b]
Confessions obtained under torture, unlike those given freely during interrogation, implied the failure of the entire effort to make the accused "play the role of voluntary partner in the procedure" and thereby to validate the politicoreligious role of the Inquisition.[89] Since the ritual of acceptance and repentance could not be valid without a strong element of voluntarism, the accused who confessed under torture had to be brought back within 24 hours to confirm the confession that he had made.
And yes, repeat tortures were applied in apparently less than 1.0% of cases recorded. Now, a couple questions I did not see answered there (but maybe in later chapters):
1. And if the accused recanted his confession-under-torture, what was his/her fate then?
2. How “voluntary” do you think that “confirmation of confession” really was? Do you think the accused knew the probabilities of being tortured again (“Okay, I have a better than 99% chance of not being tortured again if I recant, so I say, ‘Go for it!’.” )?
3. How many such failures to confirm the confession were there? Lots?
How can any of this make the Inquisition anything better than a somewhat less hideous affair than the secular injustice system? I mean: “Torture them once, shame on them; torture them twice, shame on us”? I’m not trying to be sarcastic—just to put it in a kind of bold relief. I really think you are arguing awfully hard to prove very, very little…
Originally posted by vistesdYou should try to be sarcastic more enough: “Torture them once, shame on them; torture them twice, shame on us” is pretty good.
Yes I did read that. Since of course the confessions under torture could be thought to be less than “voluntary”—
[i/]Confessions obtained under torture, unlike those given freely during interrogation, implied the failure of the entire effort to make the accused "play the role of voluntary partner in the procedure" and thereby to validate the politicore ...[text shortened]... a kind of bold relief. I really think you are arguing awfully hard to prove very, very little…
Originally posted by vistesdI haven't read through the book myself, so I don't know what the answers to your three questions are.
Yes I did read that. Since of course the confessions under torture could be thought to be less than “voluntary”—
Confessions obtained under torture, unlike those given freely during interrogation, implied the failure of the entire effort to make the accused "play the role of voluntary partner in the procedure" and thereby to validate the politicorel ...[text shortened]... nd of bold relief. I really think you are arguing awfully hard to prove very, very little…
How can any of this make the Inquisition anything better than a somewhat less hideous affair than the secular injustice system?
The point I (and ivanhoe) are making is this - the Inquisition evokes a much stronger emotional response from us today because we are used to the modern judicial system, with all the rights and privileges it provides the accused. This judicial system had not even been invented at the time of the Inquisition (and would evolve in the same general direction as the Inquisition compared to secular procedures). So, when Prof. Madden claims that the Inquisition brought justice and mercy to medieval society he is, relatively speaking, correct (also keep in mind that, but for the Inquisition, convicted heretics would've automatically been executed by the secular authorities - especially following the experience of the wars with the Albigensians). And, as far as the people at the time were concerned, the Inquisitorial tribunals would've represented a vast improvement over existing systems.
In an article that BdN cited not too long back, the incidence of torture under the Inquisition was deemed comparable to the incidence of torture under the American police in the 1930s.
Now, I'm not condoning the methods of the Inquisition (or, indeed, the American police) - but I think it would be difficult for me to evaluate the impact of the Inquisition if I continue to evaluate it with my 20th century sensibilities.
That's all.
Originally posted by lucifershammerBunk; public trials with the ability to confront your accusers long predated the Inquistion. The Inquistion was a cruel throwback to suppress the sacred rights of conscience every man has by birth run by a bunch of brutal savages.
I haven't read through the book myself, so I don't know what the answers to your three questions are.
[b]How can any of this make the Inquisition anything better than a somewhat less hideous affair than the secular injustice system?
The point I (and ivanhoe) are making is this - the Inquisition evokes a much stronger emotional response fro ...[text shortened]... he Inquisition if I continue to evaluate it with my 20th century sensibilities.
That's all.[/b]
Originally posted by no1marauderpublic trials with the ability to confront your accusers long predated the Inquistion.
Bunk; public trials with the ability to confront your accusers long predated the Inquistion. The Inquistion was a cruel throwback to suppress the sacred rights of conscience every man has by birth run by a bunch of brutal savages.
If you'd read my Inquisition(s) thread you'd know that this right was removed a few centuries earlier because the accused or their families began to assassinate witnesses.
EDIT: And what makes the right to confront your accusers so sacrosanct? In your opinion, is justice served by forcing rape victims to come before the rapists? Molested children before molesters? How about witnesses to syndicated crime?
Originally posted by lucifershammerYour Inquistion thread is filled with bad history and half-truths. Compare the Magna Carta provisions of 1215 with your secret proceeding:
[b]public trials with the ability to confront your accusers long predated the Inquistion.
If you'd read my Inquisition(s) thread you'd know that this right was removed a few centuries earlier because the accused or their families began to assassinate witnesses.[/b]
39. No freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
40. To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.
Was your Inquistion "progressive" compared to the Magna Carta?
Originally posted by lucifershammerThe right to X does not entail that X-ing is mandatory. I may have a right to confront my accusers, but this does not mean that I am forced to confront my accusers. Rather, this means that if I am prevented from confronting my accusers, my rights have thereby been violated.
[b]public trials with the ability to confront your accusers long predated the Inquistion.
If you'd read my Inquisition(s) thread you'd know that this right was removed a few centuries earlier because the accused or their families began to assassinate witnesses.
EDIT: And what makes the right to confront your accusers so sacrosanct? In your ...[text shortened]... before the rapists? Molested children before molesters? How about witnesses to syndicated crime?[/b]
Originally posted by lucifershammerAt least we've dispensed with the allowable "one torture" rule of your wonderful RCC.
[b]public trials with the ability to confront your accusers long predated the Inquistion.
If you'd read my Inquisition(s) thread you'd know that this right was removed a few centuries earlier because the accused or their families began to assassinate witnesses.
EDIT: And what makes the right to confront your accusers so sacrosanct? In your ...[text shortened]... before the rapists? Molested children before molesters? How about witnesses to syndicated crime?[/b]