Originally posted by LemonJello
Yes, precisely. 'Necessarily concordant' was probably not the best wording since that might be construed as being in reference to causal sufficiency, which is not good enough.
In short, Freaky, I am asking you to show that the suffering of the babies was logically necessary for the greater good to obtain.
Imagine two discrete and non-interacting universes, A and B.
A is perfect, a form of heaven on earth
B is less-than-perfect, a form of, well, earth on earth.
Nonetheless, both universes bear a substantial resemblance to one another. For example, there is a chessplayer called Pawnokeyhole in both (although the quality of his play in A is markedly better than in B). Let's call these chessplayers Pawnokeyhole A and Pawnokeyhole B.
Also, although B is less-than-perfect, it's reasonably good--as close to utopia, say, as is hypothetically possible to achieve on earth.
Suppose God created A, and say that is was very good, indeed, perfect. He was happy with his immaculate handiwork. But then the following thought occurred to him. "Well, it's good that universe A, with Pawnokeyhole A in it, exists. However, I can envisage another universe, B, with Pawnokeyhole B in it. True, this universe would not be perfect. However, if I don't create it, then Pawnokeyhole B will never exist. And that would be a shame because, although universe B is flawed, there could never in principle be Pawnokeyhole B unless I also created this flawed universe. And the existence of Pawnokeyhole B per se is sufficiently good, on balance, to outweigh the evil present in Universe B; or, at least, the existence of the totality of human beings, such as Pawnokeyhole, in Universe B is sufficiently good, on balance, to outweigh the evil present in Universe B. Hence, I will create universe B."
Question: Would this be a cogent line of reasoning on God's part?
If it is cogent, might God actually find it desirable to create all possible universe where the good outweighs the bad, in order to maximize goodness overall, and where much of that goodness takes the form of what might be termed "ontological goodness", the goodness of existing as a particular being, even if in an imperfect world?
An interesting feature of bbarr's argument from evil against the existence of God is that it holds God to a higher standard than many conventional theodicies. It takes seriously the traditional premise that God is both morally perfect as well as infinitely knowing and capable, and goes on to deduce that such a God would not countenance the existence of even a single instance of evil that was not absolutely necessary for some greater good to obtain. However, it seems very easy to point to instances of evil that ostensibly do not meet this stringent criterion. Hence, the existence of God, as traditionally conceived, is highly dubious.
In contrast, many other theodicies try to conclude that, on balance, the good in this world merely outweighs the evil--a still difficult, but perhaps more potentially feasible, proposition. The line of argument advanced above is an attempt to life easier for the would-be theodicist. Does it work? If it doesn't, what is wrong with it?