Spirituality
11 Feb 06
22 Feb 06
Originally posted by bbarrHmm...
According to Kant, the notion of God you employ derives its content purely from the phenomenal realm; it cannot refer to anything noumenal. This is why, generally, we can't think about the noumenal, and hence can't know anything substantial about it. The tension here is in using concepts that derive their conten from the phenomenal to refer, even in some ver ...[text shortened]... pposed to work, which is why I don't subscribe to Kant's view concerning conceptual content.
Thanks for the lessons, though!
22 Feb 06
Originally posted by lucifershammerThis is a very engaging discussion, but I'm not sure what I can contribute because, try as I might, I do not understand Kant's concept of the noumenal world. It was my impression that Kant's noumenal world is not unknowable by definition per se, but that it is the world as it really is, which he then argues is radically unknowable. But if it is true that the phenomenal world is composed of our perceptions, or appearances, of the world as it really is (ie., the noumenal world), then we can already say something about the noumenal world: namely that it gives rise to the appearances that constitute the phenomenal world. So wouldn't we know at least that much about the noumenal world? Also, if one says that the noumenal world does not exist (ie., that there is nothing as it really is), then is one committed to the stance that nothing exists beyond our perceptions (something like Berkeley's stance)? I think I need to do a lot more research on this.
You mean Anselm's Ontological Argument, right? I think there are more modern versions that do not suffer from this (I'm thinking of Godel and Plantinga).
In any case my question should've been more specific - is God of the noumenal realm or the phenomenal?
22 Feb 06
Originally posted by LemonJelloThat was what I used to think as well and, hence, the crux of my argument against (what I thought was) Kant. bbarr indicates my (and your) reading of Kant is wrong. The world as it really is appears to be a union of the knowable (phenomenal) and the unknowable (noumenal) realms.
This is a very engaging discussion, but I'm not sure what I can contribute because, try as I might, I do not understand Kant's concept of the noumenal world. It was my impression that Kant's noumenal world is not unknowable by definition per se, but that it is the world as it really is, which he then argues is radically unknowable. But if it is t ...[text shortened]... ions (something like Berkeley's stance)? I think I need to do a lot more research on this.
Or am I wrong?
23 Feb 06
Originally posted by LemonJelloThen, however, if you maintain that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent (OOO), and essentially argue that this world is the best possible according to your ethical theory, I will just have to conclude that your ethical theory is mysterious too, just like your God.
Where does that leave us? Impasse?
The same God you reject, based on your standards of justice, fairness, etc. Thus, the standard by which you base what is right or wrong is relevant.
You say, if He is all-powerful, then why doesn't He decide like I would decide in this/that situation? Why isn't this God more like me?
You, rejecting God, take on some of the characteristics and aspects of God, namely, those related to judging.
And, in your rejection of God, you demand to resolve the issue your way, not His. Your way? 'Satisfy my intellectual dissatisfaction and/or doubt regarding Your ways and means.' If He were to satisfy your intellectual demands, He wouldn't be perfect, He couldn't be perfect. For, if His plan depended upon the intellectual acumen of anyone, what of the idiot? Where does that leave those between the idiot and your level of intelligence? SOL?
23 Feb 06
Originally posted by FreakyKBHThat's right. God can't think like LemonJello because He's obviously too busy thinking like you.
[b]Then, however, if you maintain that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent (OOO), and essentially argue that this world is the best possible according to your ethical theory, I will just have to conclude that your ethical theory is mysterious too, just like your God.
The same God you reject, based on your standards of justice, fairness, ...[text shortened]... diot? Where does that leave those between the idiot and your level of intelligence? SOL?[/b]
23 Feb 06
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammer[/i]The term ocean is being used in two different senses in this analogy - the whole ocean (including the wave) and the ocean minus the wave.
[b]I don’t confuse being with matter, although I understand the danger in using physical analogies
Let me go back to something you said earlier:
[i]But there is nothing to say that will and intellect are manifest anywhere but in those existents, such as humans, who exhibit them as aspects of their configuration. In that case, will and wave. This is an example of the "Beware of language games" message for you.[/b]
I think the whole problem with our discussion here is that we’re talking past each other now. My fault, I think, for referring to the ocean/wave as an “analogy”—from which you are restricting it to the material* realm, and bringing in the wind, etc. Again, I think my fault.
To focus my point: go back to the whole thing, and use the ocean/wave as a metaphor—like, “my passion is the rush of the ocean.” If, as a metaphor (without the limitations of a strict analogy) it’s still confusing, let me know. I’m not so much interested in picking apart the metaphor—and will gladly accept a better one.
With regard to the above quote: ocean and wave are not separable—and that, it seems to me, is the whole monist point. The ocean is either “waving” or it isn’t. If it is, waves appear. This is a “physicalist” metaphor for emptiness and form, or of unity and differentiation.
* Just for clarity, when you refer to the “material,” how are you using that term? Do you mean strictly matter, as opposed to energy?
23 Feb 06
Originally posted by vistesdWhether metaphor or analogy, it's efficacy lies in the ambiguity surrounding the term 'ocean'. In one sense, it's being used to refer to the entire body of water (waving or otherwise); in another sense it's being used to refer to the body of water minus the wave. Think about it.
[/i][b]The term ocean is being used in two different senses in this analogy - the whole ocean (including the wave) and the ocean minus the wave.
I think the whole problem with our discussion here is that we’re talking past each other now. My fault, I think, for referring to the ocean/wave as an “analogy”—from which you are restricting it to the mater ...[text shortened]... the “material,” how are you using that term? Do you mean strictly matter, as opposed to energy?[/b]
(This is similar to the "You're insulting my children by calling them 'animals'" issue in another thread.)
I'm not taking issue with the monist perspective of unity here. What I am doing is pressing the monist (here, you) to consider the philosophy underpinning such a view of reality.
Re: matter/energy - does it matter?
23 Feb 06
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerOne question that I think is very interesting is the one you posed asking, essentially, whether God is of the noumenal or the phenomenal. I am going to have to do some more research to calibrate my understanding of what is meant by the 'noumenal', but am I right in interpreting your question as equivalent to the following: is it possible to know anything about God as He really is (ie., is God knowable)? My thoughts concerning this question are under construction, but the following would be my first pass at your question:
That was what I used to think as well and, hence, the crux of my argument against (what I thought was) Kant. bbarr indicates my (and your) reading of Kant is wrong. The world as it really is appears to be a union of the knowable (phenomenal) and the unknowable (noumenal) realms.
Or am I wrong?
If there are true propositions concerning God as He really is, then it seems like the question is reducible to whether or not our belief in such claims could possibly be justified, or warranted. Ultimately, I think it would have to come down to whether or not we are talking about an externalist or internalist notion of justification, and I think knowledge of God as He really is would only (just maybe) be possible under an externalist view. For example, Alvin Plantinga has stated that if God exists and has imbued one with a reliable divine sensorium, then the beliefs formulated from such a mechanism are warranted and would constitute knowledge. This might be akin to the claim that resembles something like 'God can only be known if He allows Himself to be known'. Even in such a case, though, I am not sure if the sensations that originate from the divine sensorium would have any connection to God as He really is -- that is, they still may be wholly phenomenal.
On the other hand, if we are considering an internalist conception of epistemic justification, then I fail to see how knowledge of God (a supernatural being) as He really is would be possible at all. One thing I think is outstanding about Kant's contribution was his demand for further delineation between, not just a priori and a posteriori, but also analytic and synthetic. I agree with Kant that synthetic a priori judgements are necessary for meaningful knowledge. But as natural beings, the synthetic a priori judgments necessary for justified belief rest on natural laws that give structure and meaning to our perceptions and experiential data (the phenomenal). Concerning the supernatural, the synthetic a priori judgments necessary for justified belief break down and then so too does human knowledge, based on what is accessible (internal) to the agent.
Not sure if any of this makes sense -- like I said, under construction.
23 Feb 06
1 edit
Originally posted by lucifershammerIn one sense, it's being used to refer to the entire body of water (waving or otherwise); in another sense it's being used to refer to the body of water minus the wave. Think about it.
Whether metaphor or analogy, it's efficacy lies in the ambiguity surrounding the term 'ocean'. In one sense, it's being used to refer to the entire body of water (waving or otherwise); in another sense it's being used to refer to the body of water minus the wave. Think about it.
(This is similar to the "You're insulting my children by calling them hilosophy underpinning such a view of reality.
Re: matter/energy - does it matter?
I can think of no sensible way to talk about the entire body of water minus the waves, if the body of water is “waving”—except to ask if it’s possible that the ocean may not wave, that is, to speak of potential states of the ocean other then the one it is in (waving). That is, I may speak conceptually about the ocean in a non-waving state. The question then is, based on reason or empiricism, what are the possibilities of the ocean in a non-waving state (that is, has the ocean ever been observed in a non-waving state? Is there any logical prohibition, given what we know about the nature of the ocean, on its being in a non-waving state?)
Moving from the metaphor, I can see no sensible way to speak of the GoB minus the forms of being it is forming—except for the exception noted above, which seems to me to be a much more interesting question in light of the complexity of the GoB as compared to the simplicity of the metaphor.
Note: Protestant theologian Paul Tillich, in his Systematic Theology referred to a “pre-Trinitarian” formula (I prefer to think of it as a pre-personalized formula): Ground of Being, Power of Being , and Being-Itself. Again, there is the question of whether such ways of talking imply a separability that is not actual, only conceptual.*
Re: matter/energy - does it matter?
It might. I asked on the basis of your comment about my use of the word “configuration,” which I intended synonymously with “pattern.”
* LATE EDIT: I maintain that it is only a way of talking; and that, in fact, Ground, Power and Form all refer to the One Being. That may be a cause of confusion here.
23 Feb 06
1 edit
Originally posted by FreakyKBHYou say, if He is all-powerful, then why doesn't He decide like I would decide in this/that situation? Why isn't this God more like me?
[b]Then, however, if you maintain that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent (OOO), and essentially argue that this world is the best possible according to your ethical theory, I will just have to conclude that your ethical theory is mysterious too, just like your God.
The same God you reject, based on your standards of justice, fairness, diot? Where does that leave those between the idiot and your level of intelligence? SOL?[/b]
I disagree that this is what I am saying or trying to say. What I am trying to say is better expressed through some careful formulation of the evidential Problem of Evil. There are other threads devoted to this (bbarr put together a nice formulation some time ago), and there are books upon books and essays upon essays written on this problem. I am having trouble making heads or tails of your posts, which may mean that you and your God deserve each other (two mysterious peas in a pod?). I am not sure if you will find this response adequate.
24 Feb 06
Originally posted by FreakyKBHI will reference you to a former RHP thread that deals with this very topic. I recommend it as an instructive and engaging (at least at times -- it's a long thread) introduction to the Problem of Evil:
Perhaps I am coming to conclusions you don't intend. Clear it up for me, if you don't mind.
In a sentence or two, your primary reason for rejecting the OOO God, please?
http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=21886
Essentially, the Problem of Evil is designed to show that the existence of OOO God does not align well at all with our observations of the world (specifically with respect to observations concerning the existence of logically unnecessary suffering and evil) and that, accordingly, there is a wealth of compelling evidence against the existence of OOO God. By way of informal example, consider the following words of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong:
"Many babies each year are born with Down's syndrome. Most of these babies, with normal pediatric care, will grow up healthy. A significant number, however, have intestinal obstructions that will kill them if they do not receive an operation. Without the operation, dehydration and infection will cause these babies to wither and die over a period of hours and days. Today this operation is relatively simple, but not long ago these babies could not be saved. So just think about a baby born with Down's syndrome and an intestinal blockage in 1900. This baby suffers for days and then dies."
Freaky, if your contention is that OOO God exists, then He must have had adequate and sufficient reasons to allow this type of suffering to occur -- ie., the occurrence of this pain and suffering must have been logically necessary to bring about the greater good, given whatever you take the greater good to be. So please explain, in compelling terms, God's reasons for allowing this type of pain and suffering to happen. And please keep in mind, Freaky, that to say that such evil is merely causally sufficient in bringing about certain goods is not even remotely the same as saying that such evil is logically necessary for the greater good to obtain (ie., that without said evil, it would be impossible for the greater good to obtain). Take care, Freaky.
24 Feb 06
Originally posted by LemonJello...and when you do, Freaky, it won't be enough to simply say "We cannot begin to understand god's motivations", for you and yours seem to do an awful lot of pontificating on what god's motivations are, when it suits your argument.
So please explain, in compelling terms, God's reasons for allowing this type of pain and suffering to happen.