Originally posted by Lord SharkOk, I apologise if I peppered my arguments with some point-scoring jabs. I'm often guilty of that so please let me know if I step over the line again. On to the argument.
Sigh, yet another miscommunication. Ok I take my side of the blame on the chin.
I can't quite see how we are going to sort this one.
It isn't the same I'm afraid, and there is no twisting necessary to explain why. What might be necessary is a willingness on both our parts to refrain from attempts at point scoring and offer careful explanations of th ...[text shortened]... once. So I'm unclear as to what you mean by 'two populations'. Perhaps you could clarify?
"In my view natural selection produces shifts in the frequency of genes in populations over time."
I don't know if this is a problem of shorthand or not, but this statement to me is misleading. Let me explain it in mathematical form to see if it makes it clear.
The statement above sees natural selection as a mapping f from the current state of the gene frequency in the population G to the expected value of next generations G' given an environment H (H from habitat - to avoid confusion with the expectations operator).
This view, in mathematical shorthand, can represented by: f(G,H) = E(G'😉.
I'm saying this is an incorrect view because evolution is actually silent about this mapping. Natural selection is defined ex-post because fitness is about survival rates not about expected ones. We see which genotypes are more frequent in the subsequent population (G'😉 and identify those as being naturally selected from G. Natural selection is then a mapping from G' to G.
In shorthand: G = f(G'😉.
Now it's tempting to look at these as functions and since our brain is programmed to order these mappings temporally often people find the intuition of the first view more...err...intuitive. It is, however, misleading because it requires the abstract arbiter that Bosse was talking about.
This, in my view, is the core of our disagreement.
As to likelihood, there are two issues.
First, it's clear that to claim that evolution says anything about likelihood of survival we would required to take the first interpretation. Because if the mapping is from G' to G, then there is no stochasticity involved anymore and so no possible claim on likelihood. It's simply a question of labelling the mapping.
Second, a claim the relative likelihood of trait A over trait B (mutually exclusive) is equivalent to a claim between population 1 and population 2, where both are exactly identical apart from the fact that population 1 has trait A and population 2 has trait B, instead. Making the first claim (about likelihood), is then comparing these two populations.
5 edits
Originally posted by vistesdI have held this view since before the introduction of Plantinga here. I do not think that any S-ist is likely to say that his/her belief in certain S principles means that she/he can apply anything willy-nilly. My argument is that the introduction of the supernatural category generally allows that across different S-ists in such a way that undermines epistemology as a whole, however Plantinga believes that he can defend his particular S beliefs against someone else’s S beliefs....Just look at the range of S-ists on such questions....Plantinga may have a limited view of what constitutes epistemic justification for certain S principles, or epistemic warrant for the use of certain S-principles in the justificatory enterprise—but that does not mean that he is not left with the task of explaining to everyone else why his particular set of (Christian) S principles ought to be considered normative.
[b]I realize you think that introduction of supernatural metaphysics undermines epistemology in total, but I disagree and I think that is false.
I have held this view since before the introduction of Plantinga here. I do not think that any S-ist is likely to say that his/her belief in certain S principles means that she/he can apply anything willy-ni l situation for all of us.
Keep going, my friend. I have to follow now a different dance.[/b]
I'm not sure what it would mean to say that Plantinga has "a limited view of what constitutes epistemic justification for certain S principles". I think he has a view of what constitutes warrant or epistemic justification. (Period.) In his externalist conception of warrant, he makes no qualifications concerning the S category. In his view, a belief will have warrant for a person if it satisfies certain conditions (and his externalist view is some form of reliabilism where those conditions conferring justificatory status have to do to first order with proper function). This is regardless of what relation the belief may have with respect to S category (whether the belief entails an S category; doesn't entail an S category but would still be broadly consistent with an S category; precludes an S category; whatever). Whether the belief has anything to do with S category or not, the same general demands regarding warrant apply in his view.
But mostly, I understand your points here to concern something different from the subject of what constitutes epistemic justification: your points have to do with the give and take and the "explaining to" others why a particular view ought to be taken seriously or viewed as correct. That I would say has to do with the "practice of justification" which is basically the social practice of giving and asking for reasons for or against claims. I think this is a practice with implicit normative dimensions, and there are reasonable expectations that govern the providing of reasons. If you are saying that S claims are subject to the same expectations regarding the practices of justification (and the give and take of reasons) as any other claims, then I agree. Of course, I am sure many S-ists subvert these practices; but I am just as sure that many N-ists do the same. You could just as well say "Just look at the range of N-ists" on many questions. At any rate, Plantinga seems quite responsible on both accounts: on the question of what constitutes warrant, he seems to hold S beliefs to the same demands as any other and make no qualifications or exceptions for them to that extent; and on the question of practices of justification, he seems to understand the value of the give and take and seems quite prepared to argue for his supernaturalistic metaphysics.
How is he more justified in bringing in his particular set of S principles than I am in bringing in mine?
Why would the considerations that govern justification of S beliefs be any different from the considerations that govern justification of any other beliefs? Going back to Plantinga as an example, when he says that "a belief has warrant for a person if [such and such conditions are met]" he's talking about S beliefs too. Same would presumably go for whatever view of justification, whether internalist or externalist, reliabilist or coherentist, or whatever. I don't really see any problem here. Unless you just want to be a skeptic with respect to justification in general; otherwise, why the selective skepticism toward S category in particular?
Give me an example of an S principle that is sufficiently grounded that it cannot simply be replaced by any other S principle that I might make up. Once you allow S at all, how can you claim that all S is in any way defeatable by any N?
Again, how is this not just selective skepticism? Why would an S belief that is "sufficiently grounded" look any different from an N belief that is "sufficiently grounded". I don't think Plantinga, for example, would hold that those factors conferring justificatory status are any different in the two cases. I don't see any problem in principle with the introduction of S beliefs (though I am inclined toward, and feel justified in, a regimen of contingent naturalism). Of course I wouldn't want the job of providing you with some "sufficiently grounded" S belief because I don't happen to think any S beliefs are true. But even so, I am pretty sure I could provide examples of pairs of S beliefs where one is better than the other (for instance, some S beliefs we could think up would be simply self-contradictory or maybe just particularly bad given our evidence). And I think I do allow S beliefs in principle, but I guess N candidates would defeat S candidates to the extent that they accord better with our evidence (to first order). I'm not sure if that answers your questions or not.
If (3) is true, and (4) is true in Plantinga’s mind, then I fail to see how (6) [and hence (7)] could still be false—in Plantinga’s mind.
Yes, Plantinga would concede your point in (3) that the belief in naturalism was a deliverance of cognition. And yes, Plantinga agrees with (4). However, there seems to be some general confusion in this thread over what sense Plantinga thinks N "undermines" R. He thinks N undermines R in the sense that either P(R|N&E) is low or the rational attitude is agnosticism with respect to its value; either way, Plantinga thinks the devotee of N&E has a defeater for any belief of his, including the belief in N&E in particular; further, Plantinga argues that this defeater is ultimately an undefeated defeater. So, a better way to state it may be that Plantinga thinks N&E is basically self-defeating. So we have two propositions here: (your 3) that "in applying C, P decides that N&E" (taken on supposition) and (your 4) N&E is self-defeating (Plantinga's contention). In no way do I think these commit one to your (6), which is that "rejection of N&E undermines R". Again, Plantinga's view of cognitive reliability admits that a reliable cognizer can, in application of their cognition, come to belief that is self-defeating. So to reject a deliverance of cognition on the grounds that it is self-defeating (and to that extent irrational) does not commit one to rejecting the general reliability of those cognitive faculties (and does not give one sufficient reason for thinking R is 'undermined'😉. I hope that makes it more clear why I think it is consistent for Plantinga to assent to your (3) and (4) and yet deny your (6).
- Joined
- 30 May 09
- Moves
- 30120
Originally posted by twhitehead
I don't entirely understand what you are saying, and further I don't really know what P's argument is.
On the section of P's argument that we are talking about, the opening post gives a version and I have given a version above. It is simple and limited in scope. I'm sorry I haven't managed to be clearer in what I have said.
My claim is that Naturalism is not a belief but a rational deduction based on information from our reasonably reliable cognition.
I think what you haven't addressed is that the above is potentially undermined by P's argument. I suspect that this might be because you haven't realised that your justification for this claim is circular.
Let me try to illustrate the kind of circularity I mean with a slightly different example. Suppose I say that engaging in the scientific method requires some working assumptions to be made that cannot be justified from within the method itself.
For example, to bother with taking observations to try to test hypotheses, you must assume that the future will resemble the past in that the physical laws will not change, and so on. Otherwise, what would be the point? If you said that you had justification for this assumption because the rule that the future resembles the past has held so far, you would be using circular reasoning.
Science is a process whereby through reason and repeated observation and experiment (to reduce the chance of flawed cognition) a unique result can be obtained by anybody regardless of their genetics.
We might all agree about that, but my point is that you seem to be taking the basis upon which we can know this for granted.
- Joined
- 30 May 09
- Moves
- 30120
Originally posted by PalynkaOriginally posted by Palynka
Ok, I apologise if I peppered my arguments with some point-scoring jabs. I'm often guilty of that so please let me know if I step over the line again. On to the argument.
"In my view natural selection produces shifts in the frequency of genes in populations over time."
I don't know if this is a problem of shorthand or not, but this statement to me is mis ...[text shortened]... aking the first claim (about likelihood), is then comparing these two populations.
Ok, I apologise if I peppered my arguments with some point-scoring jabs.
No problem, it's not that I disapprove of point-scoring per se, it just seemed to be getting in the way on this occasion. Now that you've explained your position very well in this latest post I think I've got a much better idea of your objection.
I'll have a think about how best to respond because it seems to me to be a thread in itself. I see the issues as the merits of the intentional stance (the shorthand), the distinction between epistemic probability assessed a posteriori on the one hand, and a causal account of what has happened in terms of natural selection on the other.
Perhaps you have seen people fall into obvious errors driven by intuition in thinking about both evolution and probability so many times that you want to talk in a very hygienic way. But I can assure you that I understand that there is no arbiter in the process of evolution, it is not an agent, it cannot look ahead and so on.
Second, a claim the relative likelihood of trait A over trait B (mutually exclusive) is equivalent to a claim between population 1 and population 2
I don't doubt you can draw such an equivalence if these populations are abstract entities. But I think that our disagreement might be philosophical rather than technical, as I said I'll have a think about how to respond.
Originally posted by Lord SharkNo problem, take your time.
Originally posted by Palynka
[b]Ok, I apologise if I peppered my arguments with some point-scoring jabs.
No problem, it's not that I disapprove of point-scoring per se, it just seemed to be getting in the way on this occasion. Now that you've explained your position very well in this latest post I think I've got a much better idea of your obj ...[text shortened]... be philosophical rather than technical, as I said I'll have a think about how to respond.[/b]
Just so you know where I'm coming from, I think you're spot on when you reject premise (2), but I'd use a version of the prosecutors fallacy. So it's true that this went on a bit of a tangent, but it sounded like an interesting one...
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJellovistesd, too late for me to edit. I forgot here to also mention that even in the case of other things being equal, considerations of parsimony also factor and could help to tip scale.
And I think I do allow S beliefs in principle, but I guess N candidates would defeat S candidates to the extent that they accord better with our evidence (to first order).
- Joined
- 30 May 09
- Moves
- 30120
Originally posted by PalynkaYes, the prosecutor's fallacy is one reason why I oppose a nationwide database. While I'm thinking about probability, I'd be very ineterested to know how you would adapt a version of this fallacy to tackle premise 2).
No problem, take your time.
Just so you know where I'm coming from, I think you're spot on when you reject premise (2), but I'd use a version of the prosecutors fallacy. So it's true that this went on a bit of a tangent, but it sounded like an interesting one...
1 edit
Originally posted by Lord SharkBy "P's argument as a whole" I meant as presented in the OP. Unless you tell me differently, I'll assume that you believe that P's argument succeeds if it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low." I believe it fails regardless. I see the argument as a good parlor trick. Like any good parlor trick, it relies on "what appears to be" rather than "what is" as well as misdirection.
Ok, I take the point about our communication difficulties.
My answer to 1) is that the argument in this thread is quite specific. I'm not judging P's argument 'as a whole'.
If we come to the view that given evolution and naturalism, the probability that we are reliable cognizers is low, this part of P's argument succeeds. I see it as a reductio ad absurdum.
I'm going to ask you to step outside the argument and look at how it’s constructed. Keep in mind that for the argument to succeed, it must provide compelling evidence for the naturalist to abandon naturalism.
Ostensibly P's argument is an argument against naturalism. However the tie to naturalism is tenuous at best and practically speaking, non-existent. If you look closely it is apparent that it is actually an argument against naturalists. It says nothing against naturalism providing a plausible explanation of life on this planet. Rather it is an argument against the reasonableness of naturalists believing in naturalism because of doubts about the reliability of their cognitive abilities. Even if all naturalists were to abandon belief in naturalism, naturalism would be no more or less true. There is no direct tie to naturalism. Misdirection.
The argument also says nothing about the actual reliability of cognitive abilities. Rather "grave doubts" are to be had because of probability of random mutation and natural selection producing reliable cognitive abilities. So the basis by which naturalists are to abandon their belief in naturalism is also indirect. Misdirection again.
Let’s also look at what happens should a naturalist abandon naturalism because of the argument:
A premise of the argument is that "naturalism is true". It argues that it is reasonable for the naturalist to abandon that which is true, naturalism.
It argues that it is reasonable for the naturalist to abandon naturalism, but does not mention what he should abandon it for. What is the alternative? Super-naturalism? If so, whatever doubts of super-naturalism the naturalist may have must not outweigh whatever doubts a naturalist may have in the reliability of his cognitive ability.
Considering the above, do you really believe it reasonable that naturalists abandon naturalism?
- Joined
- 30 May 09
- Moves
- 30120
Originally posted by ThinkOfOneOk, so we are talking about the argument as expressed by the OP.
By "P's argument as a whole" I meant as presented in the OP. Unless you tell me differently, I'll assume that you believe that P's argument succeeds if it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low." I believe it fails regardless. I see the argument as a good parlor trick. Like any good parlor trick, ...[text shortened]... above, do you really believe it reasonable that naturalists abandon naturalism?
In my view, if either of us were foolish enough to concede that the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given N&E is low, then the argument would succeed. However, as I pointed out upthread, this success would be limited in scope. It wouldn't warrant a conclusion that the christian god exists, for example.
I agree with you that a parlor trick is a good description for this argument. Our disagreement is just about how it was done.
Misdirection is often a feature of such tricks, that's true. But then again, so are props that aren't quite what they appear to be. Premise 2) is false and that's that for me.
You asked me to step outside the argument and look at how it is constructed. I think I've done that. I've said that I regard it as a reductio ad absurdum structure. How do we have confidence in any of our premises? Only if we have reliable cognitive faculties, since otherwise, premises that seem reasonable might not be, and we would have no way of telling.
Plantinga does argue that given naturalism and evolution, the probability that we are reliable thinkers is low or not knowable. So is this an argument against naturalism or naturalists? I think neither. It is simply an argument that to think that naturalism and evolution are true is self defeating.
You make the point that the argument says nothing about the actual reliability of our cognitive abilities and you characterise this as an indirect approach. But this raises the question of how we are to say anything meaningful about the actual reliability, doesn't it? Can you propose an answer that does not implicitly rely on your ability to formulate said answer, and my ability to interpret it?
When you ask us to look what happens if we were to abandon naturalism, you make two points. One is that naturalism is a premise, so we are being asked to abandon what we hold to be true. That isn't a problem for this structure of argument though, reductio ad absurdum. Compare this with the proof that the square root of two is irrational.
The other point you make is, what's the alternative? I cry foul. The OP argument is silent on the alternative, and you explicitly said that we weren't considering P's argument as a whole.
Finally, you asked this:
Considering the above, do you really believe it reasonable that naturalists abandon naturalism?
My reply is that I have no need to consider the above, because I have already decided on what I consider to be better grounds, that it would not be reasonable.
2 edits
Originally posted by Lord SharkMy reply is that I have no need to consider the above, because I have already decided on what I consider to be better grounds, that it would not be reasonable.
Ok, so we are talking about the argument as expressed by the OP.
In my view, if either of us were foolish enough to concede that the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given N&E is low, then the argument would succeed. However, as I pointed out upthread, this success would be limited in scope. It wouldn't warrant a conclusion that the c ady decided on what I consider to be better grounds, that it would not be reasonable.
Well, this could have gone better. I probably could have been clearer, but the intent of the post was to show that the argument fails even if it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low." As such, the question was asked within this context. Please read thru the post again with this in mind.
You asked me to step outside the argument and look at how it is constructed. I think I've done that. I've said that I regard it as a reductio ad absurdum structure...When you ask us to look what happens if we were to abandon naturalism, you make two points. One is that naturalism is a premise, so we are being asked to abandon what we hold to be true. That isn't a problem for this structure of argument though, reductio ad absurdum. Compare this with the proof that the square root of two is irrational.
While it seems that the argument takes a reductio ad absurdum form, the point was that the construction, as opposed to form, is really poor. Seems that reducio ad asurdum should require that the argument be air tight as it is in the "square root of two" argument, otherwise one is left wondering if there is truly a contradiction or merely a poorly conceived argument. The point of the post was to show how poorly conceived the argument is.
How do we have confidence in any of our premises? Only if we have reliable cognitive faculties, since otherwise, premises that seem reasonable might not be, and we would have no way of telling...You make the point that the argument says nothing about the actual reliability of our cognitive abilities and you characterise this as an indirect approach. But this raises the question of how we are to say anything meaningful about the actual reliability, doesn't it? Can you propose an answer that does not implicitly rely on your ability to formulate said answer, and my ability to interpret it?
Realistically there is no way to prove that we have reliable cognitive faculties period. One can only proceed as if we do. From a practical standpoint, there really is no other choice. If the reality is that we don't, then it doesn't matter anyway.
Plantinga does argue that given naturalism and evolution, the probability that we are reliable thinkers is low or not knowable. So is this an argument against naturalism or naturalists? I think neither. It is simply an argument that to think that naturalism and evolution are true is self defeating.
Seems that your last statement boils down to an argument against naturalists, i.e., those that believe in naturalism. Think about it. Like I said, "It says nothing against naturalism providing a plausible explanation of life on this planet. Rather it is an argument against the reasonableness of naturalists believing in naturalism because of doubts about the reliability of their cognitive abilities."
The other point you make is, what's the alternative? I cry foul. The OP argument is silent on the alternative, and you explicitly said that we weren't considering P's argument as a whole.
I realize that the OP argument is silent on the alternative, but as a practical matter, what else is there? If it is "reasonable" for the naturalist to abandon naturalism, the only alternative is non-naturalism. The only way I could conceive of non-naturalism was as super-naturalism. Are there other alternatives?
- Joined
- 30 May 09
- Moves
- 30120
1 edit
Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Well, this could have gone better. I probably could have been clearer, but the intent of the post was to show that the argument fails even if it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low." As such, the question was asked within this context. Please read thru the post again with this in mind.
In my view, you haven't shown it. I still think that after I having read it again.
Seems that reducio ad asurdum should require that the argument be air tight as it is in the "square root of two" argument, otherwise one is left wondering if there is truly a contradiction or merely a poorly conceived argument. The point of the post was to show how poorly conceived the argument is.
You actually think you have a rational basis for concluding that naturalism and evolution are true, even if they predict that you wouldn't have a rational basis for concluding they were true? This might not be a formal argument as in the root 2 case, but where is the air escaping from?
Realistically there is no way to prove that we have reliable cognitive faculties period. One can only proceed as if we do. From a practical standpoint, there really is no other choice. If the reality is that we don't, then it doesn't matter anyway.
I agree that there is no non-circular way to answer global scepticism, I have already said as much upthread. But proceeding as if we have reliable cognitive faculties because to do otherwise is self-stultifying is one thing, but to continue to do so whilst holding premises that predict that we aren't, is quite another. If 2) were proven, that's what we'd be doing, we would be continuing to assume we are reliable, whilst holding premises that predict that it is very unlikely that we are. The rational option in that case would not be just to assume we were the lucky lottery winners, instead, if we wanted to avoid self-stultifying scepticism, we would be better to throw out or modify our premises (N or E).
Seems that your last statement boils down to an argument against naturalists, i.e., those that believe in naturalism. Think about it. Like I said, "It says nothing against naturalism providing a plausible explanation of life on this planet. Rather it is an argument against the reasonableness of naturalists believing in naturalism because of doubts about the reliability of their cognitive abilities."
I'm afraid it does say something fundamental against naturalism providing a plausible explanation of life on this planet. Think about it. What it says is this: if you think that naturalism provides a plausible explanation of life on this planet, then the chances are that your idea of plausibility is wrong.
I realize that the OP argument is silent on the alternative, but as a practical matter, what else is there?
Not my problem really 🙂
Originally posted by Lord SharkI am somewhat skeptical about that conclusion. Why is it rational to throw out the premises simply because we don't like the conclusion it leads us too? You seem to be saying that we somehow know independently that our cognitive ability is not flawed and thus must throw out any premises that predict otherwise. But the whole argument depends on the claim that we do not have any such independent knowledge.
The rational option in that case would not be just to assume we were the lucky lottery winners, instead, if we wanted to avoid self-stultifying scepticism, we would be better to throw out or modify our premises (N or E).
- Joined
- 30 May 09
- Moves
- 30120
Originally posted by twhiteheadBut that is the choice isn't it? If 2) were true, and we want to be coherent, we would either have to conclude that we weren't reliable, which undermines the process by which we choose and assess premises anyway, or we reject some premises.
I am somewhat skeptical about that conclusion. Why is it rational to throw out the premises simply because we don't like the conclusion it leads us too? You seem to be saying that we somehow know independently that our cognitive ability is not flawed and thus must throw out any premises that predict otherwise. But the whole argument depends on the claim that we do not have any such independent knowledge.
- Joined
- 30 May 09
- Moves
- 30120
Originally posted by PalynkaPalynka,
Ok, I apologise if I peppered my arguments with some point-scoring jabs. I'm often guilty of that so please let me know if I step over the line again. On to the argument.
"In my view natural selection produces shifts in the frequency of genes in populations over time."
I don't know if this is a problem of shorthand or not, but this statement to me is mis ...[text shortened]... aking the first claim (about likelihood), is then comparing these two populations.
I've had a think, so I thought I 'd respond to some of your points.
I made this statement:
"In my view natural selection produces shifts in the frequency of genes in populations over time."
The statement above sees natural selection as a mapping f from the current state of the gene frequency in the population G to the expected value of next generations G' given an environment H (H from habitat - to avoid confusion with the expectations operator).
This view, in mathematical shorthand, can represented by: f(G,H) = E(G'😉
You go on to say,
I'm saying this is an incorrect view because evolution is actually silent about this mapping. Natural selection is defined ex-post because fitness is about survival rates not about expected ones.
But it was you who introduced the notion of 'expected values'. I didn't. If you wanted to represent my view, you wouldn't need the E term at all. Evolution by natural selection is the process that results in shifts in gene frequency. So if we as humans want to express the shift as a mapping from G to G' I don't see a problem with that. We understand that evolution isn't just silent on expectation, it is silent on everything, it is we humans that want to talk about mappings and probabilities, and sometimes we use kinds of shorthand, like the intentional stance. I think these strategies can be useful.
So I disagree with this:
Natural selection is then a mapping from G' to G.
Whether we as humans want to consider G to G' or the inverse mapping G' to G is about our purposes. Evolution itself is not either mapping. The map is not the territory.
Now it's tempting to look at these as functions and since our brain is programmed to order these mappings temporally often people find the intuition of the first view more...err...intuitive. It is, however, misleading because it requires the abstract arbiter that Bosse was talking about.
I don't agree that anything I have said requires an arbiter of any kind, unless shorthand statements that take the intentional stance are taken literally. They are not intended that way.
Suppose at time t, the frequency distribution of genes in a population is G and then at time t + 10^8 it is G' . Then we have some different ways of looking at this. We can regard evolution as our theoretical model to explore the causal factors that took things in the temporal direction G to G'.
Epistemologically, we might be looking at G' and comparing that with G and seeking to explain a posteriori how it is that G became G'. So although we might directly be tooking at G' to G, unless you want to argue some kind of perdurantist case, the temporal ordering in the world (as we experience it) is from G to G'.
I'll turn to the second part, about probability in the next post.