The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

Originally posted by vistesd
[/i]Okay, but doesn’t such an “anything is possible” attitude with regard to the terms of S, such that S is presumably [b]a priori indefeasible to any to any defeater, kick the legs out from under epistemology altogether—for the S-ist as well as the N-ist? And would not such an undermining of epistemology generally undermine the cognitive reliabi ...[text shortened]... mic skepticism, and accepting (say) some version of S on blind (cognitively unexamined) “faith”.[/b]

I realize you think that introduction of supernatural metaphysics undermines epistemology in total, but I disagree and I think that is false. It's somewhat ironic to me that you would bring this out in the backdrop on a Plantinga argument in particular, since he is actually the counterexample (as in, one who holds to a supernaturalistic metaphysics and yet still has a very vibrant, considered naturalistic epistemology) that would probably first come to my mind. I think nothing about P's argument warrants this criticism. Nothing in P's argument suggests, for example, that adopting S gives one warrant to just start picking out whatever commitments he wants axiomatically in some willy-nilly, anything goes sort of way. From having some knowledege of P's epistemology, he would never, ever endorse such an idea. Even where P argues (in a different argument) that theistic belief (which in context for him would also entail belief in S) can be warranted, he still adopts an externalist epistemology whereby he agrees that we cannot in principle separate the question of whether such belief is warranted from the de facto question of whether or not such belief is, in fact, true. Does that sound like someone who would ever endorse the idea that belief in S thereby means the S-proponent can be warranted in just anything he wants, willy-nilly? The ironic thing to me here is that this concern of yours was sparked by a Plantinga argument; but to assuage this concern that supernaturalistic metpahysics undermines epistemology and turns it into some arbitrary game, I would say you could look no further than to the epistemology of...Plantinga.

In his argument where P says that the defeater he introduces does not apply to the S-proponent (because they have no reason for doubting that a primary function of their cognitive apparatus is in the delieverance of mostly true or verisimilitudinous beliefs), P is not trying to saying the S-proponent can appeal to whatever he wants or is somehow not bound to the same epistemic constraints as the N-proponent. Rather, P has here in mind what he calls "traditional theism", under which he thinks the traditional theist has reasons to believe that he is made in the likeness of a perfect cognizer and that it was this capable entity's design intention that we have reliable cognitive faculties; and, further, that there is nothing willy-nilly about this, since P also thinks that the traditional theist has good rational arguments to back up the beliefs and committments from which these reasons flow naturally.

Also, I didn't mean to give you the wrong impression in my last post. When I said that the S-proponent can just say ...., I don't mean to say that he is free to just willy-nilly pick out whatever things he wants to defeat your defeater and that somehow in this process he is not bound by epistemic norms. I would expect the S-proponent to be ready to give rational argument for whatever defeater he thinks he has that defeats your defeater. The only point I was trying to make is that it seems to me that your defeater is defeatable in ways that P's defeater is not. Where he claims that his defeater would consititute an ultimate defeater, it seems to me that his argument succeeds in that respect; whereas you claimed the same thing about your defeater and it appears to me your argument would not succeed in that respect. For your argument, if S-proponents feel like bringing argument on your defeater, you would have to consider them as they come on their merits. For P's argument, whatever arguments the N-proponent may bring against his defeater, they seem more readily dismissible in principle on the grounds of question-begging. I admit that I've thought a little more about, though, and I might be a little confused. It's hard for me to understand if your argument actually follows the same form as P's. What I took to be an S-proponent's bringing a defeater on your defeater may actually be more like just denying Premise 2 in the opening post as it regards P's argument. I'm not really sure now.

(1) A person P is endowed with cognitive faculties C.

(2) C is reliable [R], (according to some generally accepted understanding of that term).

(3) In applying C, P decides that N.

(4) The terms of N undermine (2) [the R premise].

(5) Therefore the rational choice is for P to reject N.

(6) However, rejection of N undermines (2) as well, in light of (3).

(7) Therefore, [b]whether P accepts or rejects N, the reliability of C is undermined.[/b]

(Firstly, (4) is false; as I said, I already disagree with Plantinga that there is no reasonable or sensible account for reliable cognitive faculties within a naturalistic metaphysical framework. But, of course for discussion here, we'll assume (4) is true.) But (6) is also false, and therefore so is (7). Under "generally accepted understanding" of what it is for cognitive faculties to be reliable, it is not the case that such an instance of overturning acceptance on some theoretical matter (whether or not N is true) "undermines" R or gives P sufficient reason to reject the premise that his cognitive faculties are reliable (even given that P initially came to decision on it through those very cognitive faculites in question). That would only hold under some unreasonable, extremely stringent conception of what it is for cognitive faculties to be reliable. Under generally accepted understanding of what it is for cognitive faculties to be reliable, you can come to all sorts of new decisions or acceptances on theoretical matters (say, anytime you uncover what you take to be new evidence on some defeasible matter) without threatening the idea that you are cognitively reliable. If rejection of N is more conative than cognitive (e.g., I mentioned that Plantinga makes distinction between beliefs and acceptances, whereby the latter have greater volitional aspect), it still fails to be the case that choosing to overturn your acceptance gives you sufficient reason to reject the idea that your cognitive faculties are reliable: generally accepted understanding of what it is for cognitive faculties to be reliable still admits that you can be wrong or mistaken in many of your deliverances of cognition, so no reason to be so shaken by an instance of this.

But your argument does raise an interesting point. You can make the following basic objection toward Plantinga. You can say, look, you're basically asking the naturalist to go against a specific deliverance of his cognition in order to stick to the idea that his cognition is generally reliable!!! Isn't this kind of strange, and isn't this a problem for Plantinga's argument? But no, actually I don't think this is any real problem for Plantinga. Plantinga thinks naturalists are to that extent irrational; and yet he is at the same time committed to the idea that naturalists are reliable cognizers (just like he is committed to the idea that theists -- and basically humans in general -- are reliable cognizers). Why isn't this a problem for his argument? Because his view of what it is for cognitive faculties to be reliable isn't so stringent that it doesn't admit that one can be irrational at times; or that one can hold false beliefs on many theoretical matters; or that within the community there can be many disparate beliefs on many theoretical matters. And whether or not N is true is a theoretical matter. In his argument, he already explicitly admits that there are "many areas of cognitive endeavor marked by enormous disagreement, wildly varying opinion...here the sheer volume of disagreement and the great variety of and contrariety of options proposed suggest that either not all of us are such that our cognitive faculties do function according to the design plan, in these areas, or that it is not the case that the relevant modules of the design plan are aimed at truth, or that the design plan for those areas is defective." But, despite this, Plantinga thinks we are reliable cognizers (that includes naturalists too) because he thinks, nevertheless, that there is a very vast area of cognitive terrain where our cognitive faculties provide us with mostly true or verisimilitudinous beliefs. He can very well hold that naturalists are reliable cognizers even though they happen to misfire in just another one of those many areas where disparate ideas abound.

I realize that it's basically a corollary of his argument that you and I as naturalists are to that extent being irrational. But, don't worry, he still thinks we are reliable cognizers. 🙂

I really don't think these are the best types of attacks to bring against P's argument (in fact, I think they fail to bring any real pressure against his argument). In contrast, I think a good place to bring his argument down is where Lord Shark already singled out.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Seems like it could be quite the ordeal. I imagine quite a long string of arguments, counter arguments and so on for determining such things as the reliability factor of evolution producing "cognitive agents", the reliability of the reliability factor, how to deal with the level of inscrutability, the highest reliability factor for which abandonment o ...[text shortened]... he incorrect action, then I have to question your definition of "reason".[/b]

Hmm, from your response I gather...that we're still failing to communicate.

I'll have a think about whether I can think of a way to move things on.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
Seems like it could be quite the ordeal. I imagine quite a long string of arguments, counter arguments and so on for determining such things as the reliability factor of evolution producing "cognitive agents", the reliability of the reliability factor, how to deal with the level of inscrutability, the highest reliability factor for which abandonment o ...[text shortened]... he incorrect action, then I have to question your definition of "reason".[/b]

Hi ThinkOfOne,

I had a think about your argument and wondered whether it is similar in structure to the following:

Supposing there is a creationist, let's call them Smith.

Smith argues that if you believe naturalism is true then the chances of life arising by chance on a planet are vanishingly small. For abiogenesis to occur, not only does the planet have to be the in the right distance range from its star, all sorts of other conditions must be met, culminating in an unlikely sequence of chemical reactions to produce a self-replicator.

Smith argues that the odds against this on a given planet are overwhelming, say of the order of 1:100000000000.

Smith concludes that the odds that we got here by natural processes are so small that it is not rational to believe we did. (God enters stage left.)

I'll assume for now that you agree this argument looks enough like P's to serve as an analogy for the sake of argument, but of course if you think it isn't, just say.

I think Smith's argument commits the Lottery Fallacy, that is to say, we have evidence to suppose that there are of the order of 100000000000 stars in our galaxy alone, a significant proportion of which have multiple planets in orbit. So we might reasonably expect, given Smith's estimated odds, that life would have arisen by sheer chance once in our galaxy. If so, by definition, we are a result of that.

So Smith's argument fails.

I think that you think P's argument fails in a similar way, but I don't think it does.

Does that move us on or plunge us into even greater disagreement?

Originally posted by LemonJello
I realize you think that introduction of supernatural metaphysics undermines epistemology in total, but I disagree and I think that is false. It's somewhat ironic to me that you would bring this out in the backdrop on a Plantinga argument in particular, since he is actually the counterexample (as in, one who holds to a supernaturalistic metaphysics and y ...[text shortened]... g his argument down is where Lord Shark already singled out.

I realize you think that introduction of supernatural metaphysics undermines epistemology in total, but I disagree and I think that is false.

I have held this view since before the introduction of Plantinga here. I do not think that any S-ist is likely to say that his/her belief in certain S principles means that she/he can apply anything willy-nilly. My argument is that the introduction of the supernatural category generally allows that across different S-ists in such a way that undermines epistemology as a whole, however Plantinga believes that he can defend his particular S beliefs against someone else’s S beliefs. [This is perhaps akin to Wittgenstein’s argument in On Certainty—as I understand him, anyway—that allowing some things to be doubted (e.g., that I can say knowledgeably that I did or did not have lunch in Peking yesterday) undermines epistemology as a whole.]

Just look at the range of S-ists on such questions: Christians (of various stripes, who disagree on fundamental S principles and their epistemic grounding—or not), other monotheists, polytheists. Non-theistic S-ists. Plantinga may have a limited view of what constitutes epistemic justification for certain S principles, or epistemic warrant for the use of certain S-principles in the justificatory enterprise—but that does not mean that he is not left with the task of explaining to everyone else why his particular set of (Christian) S principles ought to be considered normative.

And by what criteria will he do so? How is he more justified in bringing in his particular set of S principles than I am in bringing in mine? What are the limits, before one concludes that bringing in the S-category itself has opened an epistemic Pandora’s box that makes arguments between foundationalists and coherentists (say) pale by comparison? Some S-ists even place S outside logic (I think that just makes S incoherent, but that is not going to deter the credo quia absurdum est crowd).

Give me an example of an S principle that is sufficiently grounded that it cannot simply be replaced by any other S principle that I might make up. Once you allow S at all, how can you claim that all S is in any way defeatable by any N?

(Firstly, (4) is false; as I said, I already disagree with Plantinga that there is no reasonable or sensible account for reliable cognitive faculties within a naturalistic metaphysical framework. But, of course for discussion here, we'll assume (4) is true.) But (6) is also false, and therefore so is (7).

I agree that (4) is false. But it seems that Plantinga’s formulation takes it as true, since it is the very (unquantifiable or inscrutable) terms of naturalism that, it is claimed, “gravely call into question” the N-ists cognitive reliability. If (3) is true, and (4) is true in Plantinga’s mind, then I fail to see how (6) [and hence (7)] could still be false—in Plantinga’s mind.

Also, the OP does not claim to show that the N-ist is simply (and irrationally) in error—“misfires”—about N, but that N does undermine their very cognitive reliability [according to (4) of the OP].

Now, you have brought in considerations of Plantinga that are not apparent from the OP. I am simply arguing against the OP, assuming it as a proper statement of Plantinga’s position—I am not attempting to argue against the whole body of Plantinga’s apologetics, not am I suggesting that he is not an intellect to be reckoned with.

_____________________________________________________

Now, frankly, if one’s intellect has to be equal to Plantinga’s in order for one to have sufficient cognitive faculties (innate intelligence, education, etc.) to decide with some confidence (and, yes, I realize that someone can be totally ignorant, and yet exude confidence; but I recognize the potential of my own ignorance) such metaphysical questions as N versus S (or theism versus non-theism), then I am out of the loop. Frankly, my dear old friend, I don’t understand half of what you write anymore—good for you! I am no anti-intellectualist! I am saying that I am now at cognitive impasse.

Even if you and LS are able to demonstrate how you are able to deconstruct Plantinga, I am sure Plantinga (or someone like him) has a response, to which you will have a response…. Ad infinitum. And I am pretty sure that Plantinga and you and LS would all have to be very painstaking (and “dumb it down” ) for me to understand.

Considerations of “that moon” are virtually endless. As long as they are fun and entertaining, then perhaps Hafiz is wrong, and they are just a continuation of the dance. Talmudic Judaism (even without the addition of kabbalah) is aimed at allowing endless hermeneutical permutations—the “oral torah”—as long as there are people of intelligence to make them within a broad set of hermeneutical rules. Surely the debate between S-ist and N-ist metaphysics is also subject to endless permutations. You will never figure out “what to do about that moon” except subjectively, for yourself. And other folks (like Plantinga) will always be able to credibly disagree.

It’s good to know when one has reached one’s limits. I have reached mine. Now, I need to have the courage to make my own decisions—to keep moving, as blackbeetle says—in the face of those limits. That is part of the existential situation for all of us.

Keep going, my friend. I have to follow now a different dance.

Originally posted by black beetle
But all we have is our self and our specific cognitive agents, and even these are empty -so we have to keep up moving!

Nagasena would rather say that Plantinga commits an error when he suggests that evolutionary naturalism is self-defeating whilst the traditional theism is not, because neither position has an answer to hyperbolic doubt: the evolution ...[text shortened]... r an argument that refutes scepticism for his theistic thesis too, methinks his argument fails😵

I am not convinced that Sextus to totally undermined, though I think he is subject to revision.

For example, I think strict equipollence is too rigorous a standard for holding a final conclusion in abeyance. (Although, pragmatically, I may have to choose in how I live: e.g., a declared agnostic will still conduct herself either as if there is, or as if there isn’t, a god; Sextus does not seem to deny that, as, e.g., he admits such things as adherence to social custom, as well as the force of appearances).

I also think that Sextus claim that the skeptic need not argue about whatever “appearances” force upon his senses (e.g., whether I am hot or cold, or whether that train will run me down if I don’t get out of the way) can be broadened to include empirical observations, and inductive inference therefrom, generally—that is, much if not most, of physical science.

But that leaves plenty of room for what I am calling “cognitive impasse” that can be teased out from, say, the five modes. For example, if the supernatural category can be logically admitted at all, then I do not see how consistent application of the five modes would not keep the S versus N debate alive ad infinitum.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Hi ThinkOfOne,

I had a think about your argument and wondered whether it is similar in structure to the following:

Supposing there is a creationist, let's call them Smith.

Smith argues that if you believe naturalism is true then the chances of life arising by chance on a planet are vanishingly small. For abiogenesis to occur, not only does the pl ...[text shortened]... n't think it does.

Does that move us on or plunge us into even greater disagreement?

I think that you think P's argument fails in a similar way, but I don't think it does.

You know, this morning a thought occurred to me this morning as to what might be gumming up the works here. This statement kind of leads in that direction, so let me ask you this: If it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low", do you believe that P's argument succeeds? If you do, what do you believe allows P's argument to succeed where Smith's argument fails? I pretty sure I know the answer, but at this point, I'd like to hear something definitive from you.

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
[b]I think that you think P's argument fails in a similar way, but I don't think it does.

You know, this morning a thought occurred to me this morning as to what might be gumming up the works here. This statement kind of leads in that direction, so let me ask you this: If it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents giv ...[text shortened]... re I know the answer, but at this point, I'd like to hear something definitive from you.[/b]

Ok, so why does Smith's argument really fail? If you do a calculation using Bayes' Theorem, it certainly looks as if it succeeds. But only if you assume that the probability that life could arise via natural laws is tiny /per se/ and feed that into the formula, you can assume a high prior probability for the naturalist explanation, but maybe plug in that the probability of abiogenesis given a peculiar version of non-naturalism (creator god) is very high...and there it is, result! The probability that the naturalist explanation is true given that life has arisen comes out as tiny.

This is the lottery fallacy in action though, because the probability that life could arise anywhere given a naturalist explanation is high, because of the estimated number of candidate planets. That's a rather different figure than the 'per se' figure we fed into the formula.

Why isn't P's argument susceptible to the same analysis? The reason is that in the Smith case, we have independent empirical evidence that:
a) Life has arisen
b) there are so many candidate planets that we can argue that the probability that life could happen somewhere is high.

Whereas in the case of P's argument:

i) we can have no non-circular evidence that reliable cognizers have arisen
ii) even if we surmise, using the same logic as in b), that reliable cognizers are quite likely to arise somewhere in the universe, in the light of i), we cannot assume that we are they.

therefore the likelihood that we are reliable cognizers given a naturalistic explanation and evolution remains low, since we are still unlikely to be the reliable ones amongst the population of cognizers in the universe. (Or so the argument goes).

So, you were pretty sure you knew the answer, were you right?

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Ok, so why does Smith's argument really fail? If you do a calculation using Bayes' Theorem, it certainly looks as if it succeeds. But only if you assume that the probability that life could arise via natural laws is tiny /per se/ and feed that into the formula, you can assume a high prior probability for the naturalist explanation, but maybe plug in that ...[text shortened]... so the argument goes).

So, you were pretty sure you knew the answer, were you right?

lol. Actually I was primarily interested in two things:

1) "If it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low", do you believe that P's argument succeeds?"

Which you didn't explicitly answer. To be clear, I'm talking about P's argument on the whole.

2) "If you do, what do you believe allows P's argument to succeed"

Which seems to boil down to we have no independent evidence that we are "reliable cognitive agents" and it is unlikely that we are.

Sound about right?

So, how about answering 1)?

Nice suit and tie by the way 🙂

Originally posted by ThinkOfOne
lol. Actually I was primarily interested in two things:

1) "If it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low", do you believe that P's argument succeeds?"

Which you didn't explicitly answer. To be clear, I'm talking about P's argument on the whole.

2) "If you do, what do you believe allows P' ...[text shortened]... ound about right?

So, how about answering 1)?

Nice suit and tie by the way 🙂

Come now, no need to be coy, you must have worked out my answer to 1), no?

So let's have some response, doesn't matter how it is dressed.

Originally posted by Lord Shark
Come now, no need to be coy, you must have worked out my answer to 1), no?

So let's have some response, doesn't matter how it is dressed.

Not trying to be "coy". Your response did not seem to address whether or not you believe that P's argument succeeds if it is proven that "the probability of our being reliable cognitive agents given these origins is low" and with our history of "failure to communicate", I don't want to assume anything.

I don't have time right now to give you my response, but I'll get to it later.

Originally posted by vistesd
I am not convinced that Sextus to totally undermined, though I think he is subject to revision.

For example, I think strict equipollence is too rigorous a standard for holding a final conclusion in abeyance. (Although, pragmatically, I may have to choose in how I live: e.g., a declared agnostic will still conduct herself either as if there is, or as i ...[text shortened]... onsistent application of the five modes would not keep the S versus N debate alive ad infinitum.

Oh we agree on the basis that he is not totally undermined due to the reason you mentioned -but I see it this way: once the wavefunction is collapsed, then a specific fact/ event (a peak on the surface of the lake of the countless probabilities) is determined and has become real within the dualist world regardless of the quality of the cognitive agents and of the cognitive/ awareness field of the observer who caused it and of every other involved and/ or not involved observers' cognitive agents and cognitive/ awareness field. Therefore, once a move is picked out of the pool of my countless possibilities and is played by me on the chessboard, Sextus (who doubts the reality of every fact/ event that he cannot observe in person) is left behind whilst I keep up walking (because pragmatically I do have to choose in how I live herenow -I am the Truth!).

And the flip side: do you remeber that other thread regarding wine and your sharp conversation with LJ about Hafiz? Well, at that level I have just to recover -I have to regain whatever I lost and whatever is stolen from me. I have to recover my own perception of a value that I already possess, and the Wine forces me to understand that my Ego alone is the agent that is disabling me from understanding that I simply cannot see what I already possess. So I just empty myself to the hilt of words, ideas, opinions and of my ego. Then, since I do not hold causes/ effects, dualism goes down the drain through the total emptiness; then, when I have nothing, even that idea of having nothing must be taken away, and it is taken away by perceiving clearly the events in our physical world herenow, second after second. Kensho, satori and at once I am the Truth! Therefore, when somebody says “I put that girl down a long time ago, so why are you still carrying her around?!”, he offers an immediate and non-conceptual approach at the same time, and such an approach is merely Life, and Life “is the best vintage wine and we all have already drunk countless bottles therefore we cannot yet act as if we have not even wet our lips”.
Since just perceiving clearly the sounds of this world second by second is enough when one is aware of her/ his nature and of the nature of the floating world, Sextus' path becomes merely an appearance; nothing holy😵

Originally posted by epiphinehas
Plantinga's argument fails, I think, simply because the mere possibility that we've inherited a flawed cognitive apparatus will never be enough of a reason to abandon a naturalistic worldview outright, since to rule out naturalism altogether would be to rule out a possible explanation of how the world might, in fact, work, whether our cogni ...[text shortened]... on or not. That seems to me to be the crux of the problem with the EAAN; the rest is details.

The whole issue of 'only random mutation and natural selection' is one of the many flaws in the argument. Most people who bring up that topic haven't got the first clue about how evolution works and thus make the most horrendous probability calculations. He would have done far better to simply say 'we don't know what the probability is' rather than try to make a claim based on something he does not understand.
However having looked it up on Wikipedia, I see that his argument regarding evolution as stated there is actually quite different from what was presented in this thread (but it has its own set of flaws).
The question I have (and still have not got worked out in my head) is:
Supposing that we have no way of knowing whether we are reliable cognitive agents (or we suspect the probability is low), do we then abandon all hope? Is there an alternative method for learning about the universe other than via our cognitive agency?
It just seems to me that we must take it as an assumption that we are reliable cognitive agents (to a point) or we might as well cease all inquiry. Alternatively one could say that reality is that which we perceive and thus the reliability is by definition.